Zeeroverij (piracy) — and in particular Atjehse zeeroverij (Atjehese piracy) — was the practice of maritime piracy carried on from the Atjeh coast throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which together with the Atjehese slave trade was the principal international grievance against the Atjehers and the proximate cause of the Atjeh-oorlog. Atjehese piracy claimed numerous foreign merchant ships among its victims, drew the American bombardment of 1831 and the British bombardment of 1844, and was the explicit object of the obligation laid on the Netherlands by the Sumatra-contract of 1871 to make a definitive end to the slave trade and piracy on the Atjeh coast.
The Atjehese Piracy in the Nineteenth Century
Frijling records that in the absence of effective Dutch authority in the Buitengewesten — see niet-inmengingspolitiek — both zeeroverij (piracy) and landroverij (land-piracy — rampok- and ketjoepartijen, plundering and extortion) assumed “ongehoorde afmetingen.” Foreign merchant ships were among the victims. The Atjehese coast, in particular, was the principal base of the piracy; “de Atjehers dreven niet alleen een drukke slavenhandel, maar zij waren ook beruchte zeerovers. Talrijke schepen waren hun ten offer gevallen.”
The Foreign Reprisals of 1831 and 1844
In 1831 the American government had the Atjehse coastal population chastised by one of its warships — see American bombardment of 1831 — “bij wijze van wraakneming — ontkennende der Nederlandse souvereiniteit.” In 1844 the British government followed the American precedent — see British bombardment of 1844. Both actions illustrate the international pressure on the Dutch to suppress Atjehese piracy and the foreign willingness to act unilaterally in the absence of effective Dutch authority.
The Sumatra-contract of 1871 and the Dutch Military Measures of 1872
The Sumatra-contract of 1871 gave the Netherlands a free hand over the whole of Sumatra in exchange for an undertaking to make a definitive end to the Atjehese slave trade and piracy. After repeated urging by the British government in London, the Dutch government decided in 1872 to take military measures against the Atjehese piracy and slave trade — see Dutch military measures of 1872. The decision led directly to the first Aceh expedition of April 1873.
The Failure of “Limited” Measures and the Continuation of Piracy
The Dutch assumption that “limited” military measures would bring the Atjehers to reason was rapidly falsified. After the capture of the Kraton on 24 January 1874 the Dutch government, believing the Atjehers sufficiently impressed, recalled the troops to Batavia; the result was that a year later troops had to be sent again. “Slavenhandel en zeeroverij werden op de oude voet voortgezet,” Frijling records; “De offers aan mensenlevens waren vergeefs gebracht.” The protracted “schier eindeloos gesukkel” of the Atjeh-oorlog followed, and was only brought to an end by the pacification of Van Heutsz around the turn of the century.
A late instance: the Raijah of 1893
That piracy on the Acehnese coast did not end with the declaration of war is shown by the seizure of the steamer Raijah of the Indische Paketvaart on the night of 20 July 1893, twenty years after the opening of hostilities. Seven men of Pedir, smuggled aboard in the hold at Telok Semawé by an Acehnese member of the crew, killed the helmsman, the second mate and the captain, ran the vessel ashore near Kerti on the north coast, and went ashore with their plunder and five women, having first stove in the ship’s remaining boats. Twenty-four of those aboard were killed, twelve wounded and eighteen drowned. The episode is narrated in full at Raijah piracy (20 July 1893).
The affair is significant for the history of zeeroverij in two respects. It demonstrates that a scheduled mail-and-passenger steamer running between recognised open ports under the scheepvaartregeling could still be taken at sea in 1893; and it shows the mechanism by which such seizures were organised from within the shipping system itself, through the complicity of a crew member, rather than by attack from without in the manner of the raiding-prauws of earlier centuries. P. H. R. Beuming, who recorded it, used the episode as the closing exhibit in his argument that piracy had been the true cause of the Atjeh-oorlog; see Beuming’s account of the origin of the Atjeh-oorlog.
Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)
The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.
The Zeeroof — Atjehnese piracy — was, in the source’s narrative, the principal Dutch grievance against Atjeh throughout the nineteenth century. The “zucht der Atjehers, schepen af te lopen en te plunderen en rooftochten te ondernemen op het gebied van aangrenzende volken” (inclination of the Atjehnese to run ships down and plunder them and to undertake raiding expeditions into the territory of neighbouring peoples) had, the source records, “ons de gehele vorige eeuw door moeilijkheden bezorgd” (caused us difficulties throughout the entire previous century).
The 1824 undertaking
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 contained the impossible double commitment: the Netherlands would respect Atjehnese independence while simultaneously “de zeeroof zouden beteugelen en zorgen voor de veiligheid van de handel” (suppress piracy and ensure the safety of commerce). The two commitments proved “twee eisen, die moeilijk met elkaar in overeenstemming te brengen waren” (two demands difficult to reconcile with each other).
The 1857 contract
The 1824 undertaking was given operational form in 1857 when, after the dispatch of a warship, a contract was concluded with the Sultan of Atjeh stipulating “wederzijdse toelating van handel en tegengang van zee-, strand- en mensenroof” (mutual admission of trade and suppression of sea-, strand- and people-robbing). The contract was “niet nageleefd” (not honoured). Dutch, English, American and other ships continued to be plundered.
The 1871 framing
The Sumatra-tractaat of 1871 was, the source insists, narrowly anti-piracy in its framing: “Aan verovering van Atjeh werd nog niet gedacht, alleen aan onderdrukking van zeeroof” (Conquest of Atjeh was not yet contemplated, only the suppression of piracy). The slide from suppression to conquest was, however, already implicit in the 1871 treaty.
The Dutch, English, American plundering
The source records that “Nederlandse, Engelse, Amerikaanse en andere schepen werden geplunderd” (Dutch, English, American and other ships were plundered). The international character of the piracy’s victims is, in the source’s narrative, the immediate diplomatic pressure that produced the 1871 Sumatra-tractaat and the 1873 declaration of war.
Significance
The zeeroof is, in the source’s narrative, the principal Dutch grievance against Atjeh throughout the nineteenth century. The 1824 undertaking to suppress it, the 1857 contract, the 1871 Sumatra-tractaat, and the 1873 declaration of war are all, in the source, sequential responses to the persistence of Atjehnese piracy.
See Also
- Raijah piracy (20 July 1893)
- Raijah (steamer)
- Pacificatie van Atjeh
- Capture of the Kraton (24 January 1874)
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London
- Slavernij in Nederlandsch-Indië
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1871
- Achehnese
- 1831
- Aceh War
- Dutch military measures against Atjehse piracy (1872)
- First Aceh Expedition (1873)
- American bombardment of the Atjehse coast (1831)
- J. Frijling
- 1844
- J. B. van Heutsz
- 1872
- Niet-inmengingspolitiek
- 1871
- Bombardment of the Atjehse coast by the British (1844)
- 1873
- Acheh
- Declaration of war against the Sultan of Atjeh (1873)
- Sultan of Acheh
- Sumatra-tractaat (1871)
- Atjehoorlog
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824
- 1857
- 1824
Sources
J. Frijling, Een stukje geschiedenis der Indische Buitengewesten, voor wie dat niet overbodig mocht zijn (1946), pp. 1, 7–8. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0465 0898.
Nederlanders over de Zeeën: 350 Jaar geschiedenis van Nederland buitengaats, onder redactie van Dr. H. J. de Graaf, met medewerking van Prof. G. Gonggrijp, W. R. Menkman en Prof. Jhr Dr P. J. van Winter, 2e geheel herziene druk (Utrecht: W. de Haan N.V., MCMLV), pp. 197, 216.
Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, met speciaal vervaardigde kaart en toepasselijke photo’s, bewerkt door P. H. R. Beuming, oud-onderofficier van het Ned.-Indische Leger (Amsterdam, December 1911). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br N 82-144, pp. 6–11.
Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above. Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.