The Singapore incident of early 1873 was the series of contacts between Atjehsche envoys and the consuls of America and Italy at Singapore, in which the envoys — while travelling on Dutch warships en route to Atjeh — simultaneously sought foreign support against the Netherlands. The incident, reported by Dutch consul-general Read, became the principal pretext for the declaration of war on Atjeh, though its seriousness was contested during the Tweede Kamer debate of April 1874.
The contacts
Atjehsche envoys approached the American consul and the Italian consul at Singapore seeking protectorate arrangements against the Netherlands. The American consul — acting without instruction from his home government — engaged in discussions with the envoys about a possible treaty. A false letter was planted in Read’s hands to increase his anxiety about the situation.
The American government’s response
Nierstrasz cited the telegrams showing that the American home government had no plans regarding Atjeh and that the consul had acted on his own authority. The American Secretary of State Fish had responded to Dutch inquiries by stating that American ships would go wherever American interests required, but had immediately telegraphed to confirm that no American plan existed to meddle in Atjeh affairs. The American admiral’s statements confirmed this in his reports to Washington.
Godefroi acknowledged that the Indische administration had been “somewhat nervous” in its assessment of the events, but argued that one could not disregard the behaviour of consular agents even when their home governments disavowed them, citing the precedent of American diplomatic and consular agents in Europe holding unauthorized meetings.
The Italian dimension
Van Zuylen noted that the Italian complications had little relation to Sumatra and would more likely have resulted in an Italian establishment on Borneo, and that these difficulties had been overcome through peaceful diplomatic means.
The British consul’s assessment
Kuyper pointed out that Read’s assessment of the American consul Jenkins and the Italian figure Racchia was diametrically opposite to the assessment by the British officials Birch and Ott. The outcome proved the British assessment correct: nothing improper had been done by either Jenkins or Racchia.
The fabricated letter
A false letter was deliberately planted in Read’s hands to increase his alarm. Read himself acknowledged the letter was not authentic. Kuyper argued that this proved that parties were speculating on Read’s credulity.
The treaty with Brunei
An American treaty with Brunei already existed. Kuyper suggested that Ariffin, the informant used by the Dutch, might have known of this treaty and fabricated information based on it to mislead the Dutch authorities.
See Also
- Read (consul-generaal at Singapore)
- Ariffin
- Studer
- Kuyper
- Nierstrasz
- Godefroi
- Van Zuylen van Nyevelt
- Declaration of war on Atjeh (1873)
- Tweede Kamer debate on Atjeh war origins (April 1874)
- Loudon
- I.D. Fransen van de Putte
- Sumatra-tractaat (1871)
Source
Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergaderingen der Tweede Kamer in comité-général van 16, 17, 18 en 20 April 1874: Oorlog met Atjeh, pp. 13–14, 16–18, 23–24, 69–77.