Read was the Dutch consul-general at Singapore whose reports on the activities of Atjehsche envoys seeking foreign protectorate against the Netherlands — particularly the contacts with the American consul at Singapore — formed one of the principal pretexts for the declaration of war on Atjeh in March 1873. His intelligence was contested during the Tweede Kamer debate as unreliable and alarmist, and his role in inflating the threat of American intervention became a central argument for those who considered the war unjustified.
The Singapore incident
Atjehsche envoys, while enjoying Dutch hospitality on Dutch warships en route to Atjeh, simultaneously sought support against the Netherlands from the consuls of America and Italy at Singapore. Read reported these contacts to the Dutch authorities, creating alarm in Batavia and the Hague about imminent foreign intervention in Atjeh.
Kuyper noted that Read himself was “a man of great measures”: “Il faut agir d’un grand coup” — Read wrote to Schiff. Read imagined himself pursued by mauvais intrigants and his idée fixe was that one must act against them. Kuyper argued that Read’s diagnosis was unreliable: Read had an extremely favourable opinion of Jenkins and Racchia (the American and Italian consular figures), while the British officials Birch and Ott held opposite views. Read also believed that the Atjehsche envoys’ purchase of a ship was merely a fabrication, yet resident Schiff confirmed it was genuine, identifying Angelbeek as the broker and even naming the purchase price. A false letter was planted in Read’s hands to increase his anxiety, and Read himself acknowledged the letter was not authentic.
The Tweede Kamer critique
Kuyper argued that given the known characteristics of Read, the Government should have dispatched a diplomatic agent to Singapore to verify the situation on the ground, rather than relying solely on Read’s reports. He further argued that a Hollander should have been sent rather than an Englishman to defend Dutch interests in such unusual complications. Fransen van de Putte defended Read’s reliability, noting that Read was “a good reliable man who had rendered us excellent services” — as far as his role as trade agent and information gatherer, Kuyper did not dispute this, but questioned Read’s diplomatic judgment.
Major Studer and Ariffin
Major Studer, who was also present at Singapore during the incident, was characterised by Kuyper as a “fool” — though the Minister interpreted this as meaning Studer had been deceived rather than that he was foolish. Mohammed Ariffin of Moko-Moko was used as an informant; Kuyper noted that the Minister had not denied that Ariffin was used as a spy but that control over him was necessary, since Ariffin might have known of the existing American treaty with Brunei and could have fabricated information to mislead the Dutch.
See Also
- Tweede Kamer debate on Atjeh war origins (April 1874)
- Declaration of war on Atjeh (1873)
- Loudon
- I.D. Fransen van de Putte
- Schiff
- Ariffin
- Studer
- Kuyper
- Singapore incident (1873)
Source
Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergaderingen der Tweede Kamer in comité-général van 16, 17, 18 en 20 April 1874: Oorlog met Atjeh, pp. 69–76, 88–89.