Nieuw Guinea — the western half of the island of New Guinea — was, from 1828 onwards, a Dutch territorial claim that, in practice, consisted of no more than “hier en daar langs de kusten vlaggen of wapenborden” — flags or arms-boards here and there along the coast. The 1897 Tweede Kamer debate on credits for a more real administrative establishment on Nieuw Guinea is, in the Vermeulen retrospective, the type-specimen of the colonial-parliamentary warning against the “first step” that, in the case of Atjeh, had led from the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] of 1871 to the declaration of war of 1873.
The 1828 possession
The Dutch claim to Nieuw Guinea was formalised in 1828 by taking possession of the territory as far as the 141st meridian. The legal basis was the mid-17th-century submission of the sultan of Tidore, whose territory the Dutch had — “gemakshalve” — for convenience taken to include “het land der Papoea’s en de omliggende eilanden” — the land of the Papuans and the surrounding islands. The 1828 act consisted, in practice, of placing flags and arms-boards along the coast as tokens of Dutch supremacy. According to Van Kol (s.d.) these tokens were “tamelijk goed gespaard door de inboorlingen” — fairly well spared by the natives — who entertained a superstitious fear of the unknown animals (the Dutch lions) depicted on them.
The 1897 budget debate
In 1897 the Dutch government asked the Tweede Kamer for credits for a more substantial administrative establishment on Nieuw Guinea, arguing that the establishment was purely pacific in intent and was undertaken at the request of the zending (missions). The Tweede Kamer was “huiverig” — hesitant — to “steken in een wespennest” — stick its hand in a wasps’ nest. After a contested division the credits were granted by 49 against 23.
The Van Welderen Rengers maxim
The liberal MP Van Welderen Rengers used the 1897 debate to formulate the maxim that became a frequently-quoted touchstone of colonial parliamentary debate:
“In koloniale zaken [geldt] het allerminst het spreekwoord: c’est le premier pas qui coûte. De eerste stap wordt gemakkelijk gedaan, het zijn juist de volgende stappen waartoe men ter wille van het prestige gedwongen wordt, welke ons geld en helaas ook mensenlevens kosten.”
Van Welderen Rengers pointed, as the type-specimen, to the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|sluiting van het Sumatra-tractaat]] of 1871 — when some chambermembers had feared “moeilijkheden met Atjeh” but had been reassured by minister Van Bosse — and to the 1873 declaration of war on Atjeh that had followed.
The “Jee maintiendrai” image
The Dutch claim on Nieuw Guinea is, in Vermeulen’s paraphrase, a case in which “ons ‘Jee maintiendrai’ te bengelen [hing] in een door niemand bezocht bosje risophoren, die met hun slanke luchtwortels een treffend symbool vormden van de ‘echte’ grondslagen van ons gezag op Nieuw Guinea” — our ‘Jee maintiendrai’ dangled in a mangrove thicket visited by no one, which with its slender aerial roots formed a striking symbol of the “genuine” foundations of our authority on New Guinea.
Significance
Nieuw Guinea is, in the Vermeulen retrospective, the geographical mirror of Atjeh. Both were territories of “fictief” Dutch sovereignty; the 1897 Tweede Kamer debate on Nieuw Guinea is the canonical colonial-parliamentary warning against the diplomatic first step that, in the case of Atjeh, had led to a 35-year war.
See Also
- Tidore
- Sumatra-tractaat (1871)
- Declaration of war against the Sultan of Atjeh (1873)
- Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904)
- W. J. van Welderen Rengers
- P. P. van Bosse
- H. B. van Kol
- 1828
- 1871
- 1873
- 1897
Source
Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 267-268.