Tengkoe di Tirou

Tengkoe di Tirou — also written Teungku di Tiro — was the principal religious leader (teungku) of the Atjehese resistance during the period of the concentration system from 1884 to his sudden death in January 1891, and the soul of the Atjehese resistance in the judgment of Kruijt. His influence, which grew steadily throughout the governorship of Demmeni and Van Teijn, made him the principal obstacle to the Dutch policy of negotiated submission; and his death, together with that of Panglima Polim in the same month, removed the principal addressee of the Dutch conciliation and led to the failure of the Van Teijn governorship.

The Soul of the Resistance (1884–1890)

Under the concentration system of Demmeni (1884–1886), the Dutch retired into the concentrated stelling around Kota Radja to await patiently the enemy’s submission. The enemy — abundantly supplied from the coasts, familiar with Dutch capriciousness, knowing that the Dutch were never sure of what they really wanted (“Kompanie tidah tentoe; orang blanda bodoh” — the Kompanie is never sure of its case; the Hollanders are stupid, as the Atjehers said) — prosecuted the war in his own way. Toeankoe Hasschim, guardian and father-in-law of the youthful pretender, sent the principal leaders to the coastal statelets to stir up the population, to call all to the holy war, and to collect money and men; and he did so “in overleg met het geestelijke hoofd Tengkoe di Tirou, wiens invloed steeds toenam” (in concert with the religious leader Tengkoe di Tirou, whose influence ever increased).

Those who openly took part in the struggle were henceforth called Muslemin. The Sultan’s influence greatly increased. In all Atjeh and for all Atjehers he was — and remained, at the time of Kruijt’s writing — the lawful head of the country. His decision was invoked in many disputes. From his name the orders for the war were everywhere given. The principal leaders bound themselves afresh under oath against the Dutch, among them the later Dutch “friends” Toekoe Oemar and Nja Makam.

The Encirclement of the Dutch Line (1887–1890)

Under Van Teijn’s governorship (1886–1891), Tengkoe di Tirou’s power and influence continued to grow. The Dutch stelling was regularly surrounded by a ring of fortifications thrown up by Tengkoe di Tirou; from these the line itself was bombarded with artillery, the means of communication destroyed, raids made within the line, and harm done where possible. The enemy even entrenched himself within the line repeatedly, and had to be driven out with force of arms in April and October 1887 and in July 1888; and a part of the railway had to be moved further inward.

Kruijt characterises Tengkoe di Tirou’s strategy in the following terms: convinced that the Atjehers in the open field must lose to the Dutch, he judged it best to make clever use of Dutch credulity, by means of apparently well-meant proposals of submission, reports of discord among the Atjehers, and so on, through supposed friends or well-disposed persons, to throw sand in the Dutch’s eyes and bring them into a sweet delusion of conciliation — and then at the same time to creep up on them and spring on them like a tiger on its prey, where possible to commit acts of piracy à la Hok Canton to bring the Dutch into difficulties with England, and constantly to urge perseverance: “wat wij niet kunnen doen zullen onze kinderen en kleinkinderen volbrengen” (what we cannot do, our children and grandchildren will accomplish).

The 1889 Offer to Bring the Sultan

Given the existing tension between Panglima Polim and Tengkoe di Tirou, Tengkoe di Tirou — fearful of eventually being caught behind the net, or seeking to be ahead of the others — in 1889 offered to bring the Sultan to the Dutch. Convinced of being on the right path (for the Dutch had long been sending friendly chiefs and emissaries, supposedly at the Sultan’s invitation — for so the adat ran — with gifts to Kemala, to take soundings), the Dutch did not accept Tengkoe di Tirou’s offer, in which he had of course stipulated certain advantages for himself. More missions to Kemala, very solemn and imposing, followed; presumably the members of the missions received, or rather bought with Dutch money, Sultan’s appointments — but for the Dutch all led to nothing.

The Strong Position Opposite the Dutch Line

The strong position taken by Tengkoe di Tirou opposite the Dutch line, the difficulty the Dutch had in keeping him at bay, together with the Dutch sweet, conciliatory attitude toward Kemala and other chiefs, heightened among the Atjehers the hope that it would ultimately succeed to drive the Dutch into the sea. When, moreover, the health of Van Teijn — whose early replacement was foreseen, promising a change of administration and direction — gave the Atjehers reason to adopt, like the Dutch, a policy of waiting and to postpone conciliation for the time being, that was an additional reason.

Death and Succession (January 1891)

In January 1891 Tengkoe di Tirou and Panglima Polim died suddenly, and this too was an occasion for the Kemala-party in any case to await first the consequences of the impending change of administration. In April 1891 Van Teijn, thus disappointed in his expectations, after years of heavy laborious work, departed owing to increasing indisposition. His successor was Colonel Pompe van Meerdervoort.

In Groot-Atjeh, Tengkoe di Tirou was succeeded as head of the resistance by his son Tengkoe Mohamed Amin, who was recognised as such by the Sultan in January 1892.

Significance

Tengkoe di Tirou is the principal religious leader of the middle phase of the Atjeh-oorlog and the architect of the strategy of deceptive conciliation that frustrated the Dutch policy of negotiated submission under Van Teijn. His encirclement of the Dutch stelling with a ring of fortifications, his bombardment of the Dutch line with artillery, his tiger-like strategy of ambush, and his diplomatic manoeuvring to extract Dutch money and arms while preserving the Atjehese resistance, made him the soul of the Atjehese war effort in the judgment of Kruijt. His death in January 1891 — together with that of Panglima Polim — was the immediate cause of the failure of the Van Teijn governorship and the descent into the brief and contentious interregnum of Pompe van Meerdervoort and the subsequent disaster of Deijkerhoff and the defection of Teuku Umar.

Tengkoe di Tirou was a member of the famous di Tiro family of religious leaders, whose predecessors had led the original Atjehese resistance to the Dutch in 1873–1874 and whose successors would continue to lead Atjehese resistance into the twentieth century. The family’s role as religious leaders of the Atjehese resistance is one of the constants of the Atjeh-oorlog.

Account from De onderwerping van Atjeh (Van Heutsz, 1893)

In the 1893 tract De onderwerping van Atjeh, Van Heutsz singles out Tengkoe di Tirou — Tëngku di Tiro, in the older Dutch spelling Tengkoe di Tirou; historically Tengku Chik di Tiro, Teungku di Tiro — alongside the political chief Toeankoe Haschim and the sultan-candidate Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed at Kemala, as one of the principal authorities of the Atjehnese war party in the cajoleering-decade of 1884–1886. He is the figure Van Heutsz names as the Koranic preacher who, met den koran in de hand (with the Koran in hand), spoorde de geloovigen met succes aan tot volharding in den strijd tegen den ongeloovigen indringer — exhorted the faithful, with success, to perseverance in the struggle against the unbelieving invader — and whose religious authority gave the resistance the sanction the political and dynastic authorities at Kemala could not themselves supply.

Koranic preacher of the resistance

Tengkoe di Tirou enters Van Heutsz’s narrative as the religious counterpart to the political settlement at Kemala. Where Toeankoe Haschim supplied the dynastic form — installing his pupil Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed as sultan at the Indrapoeri mosque — and where the sultan-candidate supplied the constitutional authority, Tengkoe di Tirou supplied the religious sanction: the Koranic exegesis that legitimised the resistance against a non-Muslim invader. Van Heutsz’s text fixes the role with precision:

“vooral Tengkoe di Tirou met den koran in de hand de geloovigen met succes aanspoorde tot volharding in den strijd tegen den ongeloovigen indringer, vooral nu deze allerwegen blijk had gegeven van zwakte en onmacht”. — above all Tengkoe di Tirou, with the Koran in hand, exhorted the faithful with success to perseverance in the struggle against the unbelieving invader, especially now that he had everywhere given evidence of weakness and impotence.

The formula met den koran in de hand — with the Koran in hand — is Van Heutsz’s: the ulama preached the volharding (perseverance) the war party required, and the Koran was, in his preaching, both the warrant and the proof. The resistance was, by this exegesis, not a political rising against a colonial power but a religious duty of the faithful against an ongeloovige indringer (unbelieving invader) — a sabil struggle of the kind the Atjehnese tradition would remember as the sabil war.

Exploitation of Dutch weakness and onmacht

The second clause of Van Heutsz’s sentence fixes the conjuncture that gave Tengkoe di Tirou’s preaching its force: the ongeloovigen indringer had allerwegen blijk gegeven van zwakte en onmacht — had everywhere given evidence of weakness and impotence. The reference is to the cajoleering-decade of 1884–1886 — the years of the Concentratie of 19 August 1884, the Demmeni hybrid half sluiting / half scheepvaartregeling of 13 October 1884, the Staatsblad No. 85 of 1885 repeal of the blokkade, and the December 1885 abolition of the residual scheepvaartregeling. The Dutch position had, in those years, been reduced to the geconcentreerde linie at Kota-Radja and a few coastal points, with the Onderhoorigheden abandoned to the politiek van non-interventie. The Atjehnese chiefs and population had allerwegen — everywhere — seen the evidence: the Dutch withdrawals, the Dutch compromises, the Dutch zwakte en onmacht.

The Koranic exegesis was thus also a political diagnosis. The ongeloovige indringer had shown himself weak; the Koran itself, Van Heutsz notes elsewhere, voorschrijft, dat een geloovige zich nooit anders aan een ongeloovige mag onderwerpen, dan genoodzaakt door dwang — prescribes that a believer may never submit to an unbeliever except when compelled by force. The Dutch zwakte en onmacht had removed the dwang (compulsion) that could have made submission religiously permissible; Tengkoe di Tirou’s preaching filled the space the Dutch had vacated, and the volharding of the faithful was its result.

Religious authority of the resistance

The religious authority Tengkoe di Tirou exercised in the resistance was, in Van Heutsz’s narrative, the third leg of the Atjehnese constitutional settlement at Kemala: the dynastic authority of the sultan-candidate Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed, the political authority of the regent Toeankoe Haschim, and the religious authority of the ulama Tengkoe di Tirou. The three were complementary. The sultan-candidate supplied the form — the name in which the orders dispatched from Kemala “als komende van het eenig wettige gezag, van den sultan” (as coming from the only lawful authority, from the sultan) were issued. The regent supplied the substance — the zeer krachtige persoonlijkheid (very forceful personality) at the head of the tegenpartij, the manipulator of his pupil, the architect of the emmedji Indrapoeri installation. The ulama supplied the sanction — the Koranic warrant that legitimised the resistance and exhorted the faithful to its volharding. The arrangement was the Atjehnese analogue of the constitutional division of authority — sultan, ulèëbalang, ulama — that would later be analysed in detail by Snouck Hurgronje; Van Heutsz’s 1893 text gives it its first systematic Dutch description.

The Van Teijn repulse (first year of the Van Teijn governorship, 1887)

The military counterpart to Tengkoe di Tirou’s religious authority was his command of armed benden (bands) that, in the first year of the Van Teijn governorship (1886–1891), entrenched themselves near Kota Moesapi close to the Dutch linie. Van Heutsz records the two repulses — the first Dutch military success of the Van Teijn governorship:

“hoe hij de steeds driester geworden Tengkoe di Tirou en zijne benden reeds in het eerste jaar van zijn bestuur tot tweemaal toe met bebloede koppen uit onze linie sloeg, toen zij zich daar nabij Kota Moesapi genesteld hadden”. — how, in the first year of his administration, he twice drove the ever-bolder Tengkoe di Tirou and his bands, with bloody heads, out of our line, when they had entrenched themselves near Kota Moesapi.

The steeds driester geworden (ever-bolder) Tengkoe di Tirou was twice driven, met bebloede koppen (with bloody heads), out of the Dutch linie. The repulse was the operational proof that the religious authority of the resistance could be met by force; it was also the political capital Van Teijn would spend, in the years 1888–1890, on the closure of the Noord- en Westkust and the actieve verdediging of the linie. The ulama himself survived the repulses, and his bende reappears in Van Heutsz’s text in the Koeala Pantjoer prauw-rooftocht of the same governorship — a subordinate chief from the VI Moekims was required, as a test of his sincerity of submission, to recover a stolen prauw belonging to Tekoe Neq van Merassa from “eene bende van Tengkoe die Tirou” at Koeala Pantjoer.

Significance (per Van Heutsz)

Tengkoe di Tirou’s significance in Van Heutsz’s narrative is that of the ulama whom Van Heutsz names as the religious leader of the Atjehnese resistance in the cajoleering-decade of 1884–1886 — the Koranic preacher who, met den koran in de hand, spoorde de geloovigen met succes aan tot volharding in den strijd tegen den ongeloovigen indringer; the religious authority whose exegesis exploited the zwakte en onmacht the Dutch had allerwegen blijk gegeven — the political diagnosis that gave the Koranic warrant its force, since the Koran itself voorschrijft, dat een geloovige zich nooit anders aan een ongeloovige mag onderwerpen, dan genoodzaakt door dwang, and the Dutch weakness had removed the dwang that could have made submission religiously permissible; and the third leg of the Atjehnese constitutional settlement at Kemala — the religious sanction that complemented the dynastic authority of Toeankoe Mohamad Daoed and the political authority of Toeankoe Haschim, and that gave the resistance the religious form the political and dynastic authorities could not themselves supply. His two repulses by Van Teijn in the first year of the 1886–1891 governorship — met bebloede koppen uit onze linie — were the first Dutch military success against the religious authority of the resistance; the ulama himself survived, and his bende would reappear in the Koeala Pantjoer prauw-rooftocht of the same governorship.

Sources

The Achehnese, Vol. II, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 25, 58.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter III, XI.

The right-hand man of Teungku Muhamat Amin and eventually his successor as leader of the Tiro religious tradition, son of a simple leube. He became a leading figure in the holy war in Great Acheh until his death, after which his son Teungku Mat Amin succeeded him. His rival Teungku Kuta Karang contemptuously called him “Leube Saman” rather than “Teungku Tiro.” The founder of the rateb Saman, a mystical devotional school based on rhythmic recitation and bodily movement that became extremely popular across the Eastern Archipelago. A Medina-based teacher of the first half of the 18th century, he composed both the Arabic words and the postures of the rateb. His successors in Indonesia developed it into an ever more gymnastic, and less doctrinally meaningful, performance, but it remains one of Acheh’s most popular devotional recreations. De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 80, 96, 107-108. Toekoe di Tiroe (also written Toekoe di Tiro) was a self-reliant chief in Pedir on the north coast of Atjeh, particularly hostile to the Dutch throughout the late 1870s, who repeatedly attacked the Dutch post at Segli and whose stronghold at Garouw was the object of an expedition under Van der Heyden in May 1878. His band was still active at Lampisang in August 1879, where it awaited and gave serious opposition to the Dutch column on its way to Selimoen. Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 10, 16 (Een Terugblik — Wat Reeds Verkregen Werd; De Geestelijkheid in Atjeh — Teungkoe di Tiro). The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1906).

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege stamps Toekoe di Tiroe “hunnen voornaamsten aanvoerder” — the Atjehnese people’s foremost leader — in early 1885, and reports from the Koloniaal Verslag that he had then established his headquarters at Anak Galoeng, “geruimen tijd het onze” (“for a long time ours”): the place to which the Gouverneur-Commissaris Pruijs van der Hoeven had wanted in September 1880 to move the chief seat of the government as lying more centrally in the then position — a proposal the government would not consent to. From that sign-palace of the former Dutch mastery the leader issued, on 2 February 1885 (16 Rabioel Achir 1302), the victory proclamation on the retreat of the Dutch, spread among the Atjehsche and even the Javanese population (see Proclamation of Toekoe di Tiroe (2 February 1885)). To Verstege the fact that the foremost enemy held his court within the very bounds of the old headquarters was the commentary of events on the ministerial assurance that the concentration had placed the Atjehers in a worse condition.

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter IX (the soul of the resistance), Chapter X (the encirclement and the 1889 offer), Chapter XI (death and succession). OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 49–50, 53–57, 61.

De onderwerping van Atjeh, door J. B. van Heutsz, Majoor der Infanterie, gewezen Chef van den Staf in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden. ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders van Cleef; Batavia: G. Kolff en Co., 1893, esp. p. 40. OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-107-De_onderwerping_van_Atjeh_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 67, 70. OCR: DLP-158.

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