The Departure of the Main Force on 20 April 1874 marked the end of Lieutenant-General Van Swieten’s active command in the Atjeh campaign and the transition from the expeditionary phase of the Second Expedition to the prolonged garrison phase that would characterize the Dutch occupation for decades to come. The departing commander issued a farewell address to the officers and men of the expeditionary force — a document remarkable both for its warmth and for the political programme it outlined — and transferred command to Colonel Pel, who assumed the title of military and civil commander at Atjeh.
The Context of Departure
By mid-April 1874, the approaching rainy season made large-scale offensive operations impossible and the housing of the expeditionary force in adequate shelter impracticable. The cholera that had struck the transports at Soerabaja before departure in November 1873 had continued to claim victims throughout the campaign; combined with the exhausting labour of fortification-building, the tropical heat, and constant combat, the force was depleted and exhausted.
Van Swieten had already determined that the military objective of the expedition — the capture of the Kraton and the establishment of a permanent Dutch position — had been achieved. The Kraton had fallen on 24 January; the proclamation of annexation had been issued on 31 January; several subordinate states had submitted; and the Dutch position at Kotta Radja had been fortified into a defensible stronghold with secure communication to the sea. What remained was to consolidate, not to expand.
The Farewell Address
On 20 April 1874, from the headquarters at Penajoeng, Van Swieten issued his farewell address to the officers and men of the sea and land forces comprising the Second Expedition. The address is remarkable for its detail, its warmth, and the political programme it articulated.
Van Swieten began by acknowledging that the field campaign was at an end: the approaching rainy season forbade large-scale offensive operations and the housing of so large a force. The main force would take up winter quarters, and the preservation of the gained position would be entrusted to a fixed garrison of sufficient strength, even to support the defence by offensive movements when necessary.
He then expressed his satisfaction and gratitude:
“When we reflect upon what has been accomplished since the day of embarkation, we may look down upon it with self-satisfaction. Already on that day the struggle began with a terrible disease, which for five months has persisted, has claimed numerous victims, and yet has broken no man’s courage.”
He paid particular tribute to the navy: “I shall not presume to enter into particulars thereof, which belongs more to the competence of her worthy Commander. But this I can and must say, that the performances of the navy have in every respect been for our operations an indispensable, a not-to-be-dispensed-with aid, without which our striving and our efforts would have been fruitless.”
Of the infantry, he wrote that it had displayed “an excellent spirit and military discipline,” without which the brilliant results of the campaign would not have been achieved. The artillery had been “no less than the infantry a model of military discipline and corps spirit.” The engineers and the company of miners and sappers had acquitted themselves “equally excellently” and had been “untiring despite the exhausting climate in the performance of heavy labour, not seldom within range of enemy fire.”
The medical service, Van Swieten wrote, had displayed devotion that could not be forgotten — the medical officers tending cholera patients and dressing the wounded even under enemy fire, and the hospital personnel caring for sick and wounded “with danger to their own lives.”
The Political Programme
The farewell address also contained a clear statement of political purpose. Van Swieten noted that several subordinate states had already submitted: on the west coast, all the statelets from Troemon northward to Wylah; on the north coast, Gighen with Endjoeng; on the east coast, Edi, Soengei Raja, Pasei, and Kurtei; while Tamiang would soon follow.
He then articulated the policy that would guide the remaining Dutch forces:
“You have defeated the enemy’s main force, and although the people still refuses to submit, our moderation after victory and our firm will to govern with mildness and justice will open its eyes and cause it at last to lay down its arms.”
This was the programme of conciliation that Van Swieten had championed throughout the campaign — the refusal to burn kampongs, the respect for non-combatants, the willingness to negotiate — and he presented it not merely as a moral imperative but as a strategic one: the means by which the Acehnese would eventually be reconciled to Dutch rule.
Transfer of Command
With the departure of the main force, the command passed to Colonel L. J. H. J. Pel, who assumed the title of “military and civil Commander at Atjeh.” The garrison that remained behind was tasked with holding the Kraton and its surrounding posts, maintaining communication with the fleet, and continuing the policy of gradual extension of Dutch authority through a combination of military firmness and political conciliation.
Van Swieten’s departure was, in a very real sense, the end of an era in the Aceh War. The expeditionary phase — characterized by large-scale operations, clear military objectives, and a unified political-military command — gave way to the garrison phase, in which successive commanders would struggle to maintain the position against persistent Acehnese attacks and the demands of a war that showed no sign of ending.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873-1874)
- Jan van Swieten
- J. L. J. H. Pel
- Kotta Radja
- Van Swieten’s Proclamation of 31 January 1874
- The Disastrous Battle of 16 April 1874
- Aceh War
- Groot-Atjeh
Source
De waarheid over onze vestiging in Atjeh, door den Luitenant-Generaal J. van Swieten, Zalt-Bommel, Joh. Noman en Zoon, [1879], Bijlage P, pp. 491–493 (Farewell Address, 20 April 1874).