Ladoeng Landing and Glé Broeë Attack (22–23 June 1896)

Properties2
tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, marine, aceh-war
aliasesLadoeng Landing and Glé Broeë Attack, Sea-landing at Ladoeng, Amfibische aanval op Glé Broeë, 22–23 June 1896

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The Ladoeng Landing and Glé Broeë Attack (22–23 June 1896) was the two-pronged combined-arms attack on the Achehnese stelling of Glé Broeë east of Kroeng-Kali, commanded overall by Kol. Stemfoort, in which a 1e Colonne (sea-landing) under Lt.-Col. G. A. Hansen — comprising the 3e Bataljon (14 officers, 417 men), Genie, ambulance, and train — embarked at Oleh-leh at 4 p.m. on 22 June 1896 on the H. M. Merapi, the Gouvernementsstoomer *Condor*, and the Gouvernementsstoomer *Albatros*, anchored off Ladoeng at 2:30 a.m. on 23 June 1896, landed under the command of Lt. ter zee 1e kl. van den Broek in four échelons, and marched through the mountains via Glé Broeë to reach the plain of the XXVI Moekims by 11:30 a.m. — while a 2e Colonne (land) under Kol. Stemfoort himself, comprising the 6e, 12e, and 14e Bataljons, two cavalry pelotons, the 2e and 4e Bergbatterijen, Genie detachments, and three ambulances, marched from Lam-Njong at 6:45 a.m. on 23 June 1896. Compagnie Linck stormed the Kroeng-Kali *benteng*; 2nd Lt. Heyligers was first inside (with hoornblazer van Spanje and fusilier Veeges No. 31895); the benteng was destroyed. T. Tjoet Toengkoeb and Panglima Nja Makam retreated to Lam-Tobah.

Background

By the fourth week of June 1896 the three-day offensive had broken Teungkoe Oemar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang, the tuchtiging of Lam-Krak had reduced the western redoubt, and the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik had broken the south-western bentengs and had driven T. Tjoet Toengkoeb and Panglima Nja Makam into retreat. The remaining Achehnese strongpoint of consequence was the Glé Broeë stelling east of Kroeng-Kali — a system of fortified works on the slopes of the eponymous hill, which had been the target of the recapture of 4 August 1895 and which the Achehnese had since re-fortified. The Kroeng-Kali *benteng* — a square redoubt 15 m on a side, with walls 1.5 m high and a small swivel gun — formed the eastern anchor of the stelling and had been the target of the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik of 17 June 1896, when compagnie Linck had stormed it under fire from the lilla.

The Regeeringscommissaris resolved to mount a final, two-pronged operation against the Glé Broeë stelling before his departure from Atjeh on 28 June 1896. The plan called for a sea-landing colonne under Lt.-Col. Hansen to land at Ladoeng on the eastern coast, to march through the mountains via Glé Broeë, and to descend on the XXVI Moekims plain from the east; while a land colonne under Stemfoort himself advanced from the west along the established road. The two colonnes would converge on the Glé Broeë stelling and the Kroeng-Kali *benteng* from opposite directions.

The 1e Colonne (Sea-Landing) under Hansen

The 1e Colonne (sea-landing) under Lt.-Col. G. A. Hansen comprised the 3e Bataljon (14 officers, 417 men), Genie (1 officer, 21 men), ambulance under Dr. Rasoux-Kühr (12 men), and train (4 mandoers, 112 dwangarbeiders). The Chef van den Staf was Kapt. van Daalen — the same officer who had served as Van Heutsz’s Chef van den Staf at the Slag bij Tjot Tjako; the Adjudant was 1e Luit. Onland.

The 1e Colonne embarked at Oleh-leh at 4 p.m. on 22 June 1896 on three vessels: the H. M. Merapi (carrying the staff, one European compagnie, and the train); the Gouvernementsstoomer *Condor* (carrying one Ambonese compagnie and the train); and the Gouvernementsstoomer *Albatros* (carrying one European and one Ambonese compagnie, the train, the Genie, and the ambulance). The three vessels anchored off Ladoeng at 2:30 a.m. on 23 June 1896.

The landing was led by Lt. ter zee 1e kl. van den Broek in four échelons. The disembarkation was contested: one European sergeant and one fusilier were wounded by an Achehnese (who was killed). The 1e Colonne then marched through the mountains via Glé Broeë, reaching the XXVI Moekims plain by 11:30 a.m. — emerging east of Lambaroe rather than opposite the Glé Broeë versterkingen, because the latter were already occupied by the Dutch 2e Colonne. The 1e Colonne crossed the Kroeng-Angin bridge at 1:45 p.m., rested at Kroeng-Kali, reached Boekit Karang by 3:40 p.m., and the Kraton an hour later. The march through the mountains was, by Kruisheer’s reckoning, comparable to the earlier columns of Dompseler (1877, 6–7 hours) and Halewijn (1879, 9.5 hours in reverse) — a measure of the difficulty of the terrain.

The 2e Colonne (Land) under Stemfoort

The 2e Colonne (land) under Kol. Stemfoort comprised the 6e, 12e, and 14e Bataljons, two cavalry pelotons (under Happé and Gentil), the 2e and 4e Bergbatterijen, Genie detachments, and three ambulances. The 2e Colonne marched from Lam-Njong at 6:45 a.m. on 23 June 1896. The cavalry — pelotons Happé and Gentil — scouted Landoero, Lam-Poe-Oe, Lam-Genoi, Masdjid Siem, and Lam-Oedjoeng: no resistance was encountered. The hoofd of Lam-Poe-Oe hoisted a white flag. About 50 men under Teungkoe Panteh Glima were reported in the eastern stelling.

The artillery opened fire at 10 a.m. on the old Kroeng-Kali *benteng*; the Achehnese fled toward Glé Pajong. The bridge was repaired; the cavalry passed at 10:47 a.m. By 12:50 p.m. the versterkingen on Glé Broeë were found weakly occupied; a compagnie of the 14e Bataljon and the Genie burned the buildings there.

The Storming of the Kroeng-Kali Benteng

The storming of the Kroeng-Kali *benteng* fell to compagnie Linck — the same compagnie that had stormed the benteng at the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik on 17 June 1896. The benteng was a square redoubt, 15 m on a side, with walls 1.5 m high, defended by a a small swivel gun of the type used by the Achehnese. Compagnie Linck closed under fire from the lilla. 2nd Lt. Heyligers was the first inside the benteng — accompanied by hoornblazer van Spanje and fusilier Veeges (No. 31895). The same three officers and men who had been first into the Kroeng-Kali benteng on 17 June 1896 were first in again on 23 June 1896 — a remarkable distinction. 1st Lt. P. van der Molen and 2 European fusiliers were wounded. The benteng was destroyed. About 10 muzzle-loading rifles were captured.

The 12e Bataljon’s Advance and the Return

The 12e Bataljon marched via Lam-Poe-Oe and Lepong eastward to the swamp, lalsoing for Lam-Blang (which the guide could not locate), then south. The 12e Bataljon was heavily fired upon from the mountains: 2 European fusiliers were wounded, 1 fatally. The 12e Bataljon returned via Kroeng-Kali under continuous flank and rear fire; 4 more were wounded near the bridge. The 14e Bataljon covered the retreat. The last troops reached Lam-Njong at 7 p.m. The losses of the 2e Colonne on 23 June 1896: 1 European fusilier dead, 2 European and 3 native fusiliers wounded. Ammunition expended: 23 granaten, 24 granaatkartetsen, 8,784 Beaumont cartridges.

T. Tjoet Toengkoeb and Panglima Nja Makam retreated to Lam-Tobah.

Significance

The Ladoeng Landing and Glé Broeë Attack of 22 June–23 June 1896 was the largest amphibious operation of the Atjeh-oorlog in the first semester of 1896 and the operational climax of the June campaign. The two-pronged attack — a sea-landing colonne and a land colonne converging on the same objective from opposite directions — demonstrated the full integration of the Dutch Navy and the Dutch Army in a single coordinated operation, and the operational debut of the marinelandingsdivisie as a strategic instrument. The storming of the Kroeng-Kali *benteng* by compagnie Linck — with the same three men (Heyligers, van Spanje, Veeges) first in for the second time in a week — was one of the most-celebrated small-unit actions of the campaign. The operation also marked the operational close of the Vetter interregnum: within five days the farewell parade would be held, and within six days Vetter would depart for Batavia. The Ladoeng Landing was, in this sense, the final military achievement of the first semester of 1896 — the closing of the strategic recovery that had begun, in confusion and disaster, with the defection of 29 March 1896.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 322–330.

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