The Campaign against the XXVI Moekims of 1 July 1879 – 4 July 1879 was the Dutch military campaign in the Sagi der XXVI Moekims of Atjeh, led by the governor Major-general K. van der Heyden, which carried the four principal fortified mosques — the missigit Melajoe, the missigit Boëng Tjala, the missigit Lambaroe, and the missigit Toengkoep — at the first storm or found them already evacuated. By 4 July 1879 the Dutch were wholly master of the XXVI Moekims, at the cost of 19 dead, 82 wounded, and 6 horses.
Background
After the campaign against the XXII Moekims and the fall of Gleiêng on 9 July [1879], there still remained the punishment of the XXVI Moekims, to bring these also to submission and to drive out the enemy bands entirely. Here the leaders of the revolt still kept themselves: the Imam Longbatta at Lamgoet, and most of the others at the missigit Toengkoep. “As was learned, the campaign in the XXII Moekims and especially the march to Gleiêng had made a deep impression, but one was not yet willing to give up the struggle, and the population would be provided not only with many breech-loading rifles but also amply with powder and lead. There was therefore still a serious struggle to be expected; most kampong borders would be fortified, and everywhere the enemy had stopped and dammed the creeks and watercourses, to hold up the water and thus make the terrain more impassable for us.”
The Campaign
On 1 July [1879] the columns marched from various points into the theatre of war. “They met relatively little opposition, and the principal fortified points — as the missigit Melajoe, the missigit Boëng Tjala, the missigit Lambaroe, and the missigit Toengkoep — were taken at the first storm or had already been evacuated. On 4 July [1879] we were wholly master of the XXVI Moekims.”
The Outcome
“In unexpectedly short time, after a struggle of only a couple of days, we were master in that sagi. The enemy, seeing himself attacked from all sides, was evidently seized by great fright, considered no further resistance possible, abandoned his strong positions, and fled with wife and children. The continual dry weather allowed our troops to push through everywhere into the kampongs secured by swamps, thorn-bushes and dense woods, which would have been defensible against strong troop-divisions especially in the rainy season. Everywhere were found proofs that the whole population had prepared itself for the bitterest resistance; the chiefs and leaders, who since 1877 had repeatedly given the appearance of wishing to submit, had made good use of the time and gathered here many means for the defence. The outcome of the operations exceeded the boldest expectations; at the cost of 19 dead, 82 wounded and 6 horses, we had come so far that in the XXVI Moekims no more fights need be fought. By a regulated patrol service on a large scale, the conquered regions now had to be kept clear of enemies, their defences destroyed, their supplies carried off or made unusable. The well-disposed had to be given the opportunity to return quietly to their kampongs; roads and bridges had to be made. The lodgings of the troops had to be improved. The XXVI Moekims had to be carefully surveyed and mapped.” At the same time, by a strict closure of the harbours, care was taken that the enemy should receive no more weapons of war or provisions from the sea-side.
See Also
- K. van der Heyden
- Imam of Longbatta
- Panglima Polim
- XXVI Moekims
- missigit Melajoe
- missigit Boëng Tjala
- missigit Lambaroe
- missigit Toengkoep
- Lamgoet
- Campaign against the XXII Moekims (1879)
- Selimoen Expedition (August 1879)
- Aceh War
Source
De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 105-108.