Imam of Longbatta — also written Imam Longbatta, Iman Longbatta, or, after the alternate spelling of the place, Imam Longbattah — was the hereditary imeum (religious chief) of the mukim of Lueng Bata (also written Longbatta) near the Kraton of Acheh, and one of the principal Acehnese military and religious leaders of the first phase of the Atjeh-oorlog. Named together with Panglima Polem and Toekoe Rajoet Lamkapang by General Pel in 1875 as one of the influential chiefs who led the war-party — and identified by Kolonel PEL as “een van de voornaamste verzetslieden,” one of the principal resistance leaders — he is remembered in the Hikajat Prang Kompeuni as the leader who, after the conquest of the XXVI Moekims in 1879, “sheathed his sword and withdrew from public life.”

Political Status and Character

The Imeum of Lueng Bata (also known as Imam of Longbatta) was the hereditary chief of the mukim of Lueng Bata — one of the three mukims (with Pagaraye and Lam Sayun) which, though properly belonging to the XXV Mukims, had in former times the status of wakeueh-districts, free from the control of the Panglima Sagi. By the late 19th century the only surviving trace of that status was the independence of the chiefs of these mukims. The influential and powerful Imeum was, on many occasions, the adviser and ally of the Sultan, but this very relation made it necessary for the latter to hold him in great respect and treat him with marked distinction.

According to Snouck Hurgronje, the Imeum was “a rare phenomenon among” the Acehnese chiefs in his combination of a dissolute life with an unyielding hatred of the infidel. Like most of his fellows he sought to be foremost at fights of animals, gambling parties and sanguinary internal forays; but at the same time he possessed those qualities whereby an Acehnese might rise to be an uleebalang though not entitled to such a position by birth. Continually surrounded by boys, he complied with their demands for the repair of their kites and toys as generously as with those of his followers when they begged him to put the requisite fine edge or polish on their weapons. In battle and arduous toil he always encouraged the others by his own example, and at the sharing of profit or spoil he forgot no one. Dissolute though his life was when viewed from a religious standpoint, he was unsurpassed in his hatred of the infidel, while not behind the majority of his countrymen in his reverence for saints and ulamas.

The War-Party

In his note of 30 April 30 April 1875 General Pel named the Imam together with Panglima Polem and Toekoe Rajoet Lamkapang as among the influential chiefs of the war-party. The biographer Van den Berg records the identification in the same terms: when Kolonel PEL resolved on 31 December 31 December 1874 to drive the Atjehers from the immediate vicinity of the Dutch main positions and to make the Atjeh River the eastern defensive line, the action was directed specifically against Longbatta, “welks hoofd, IMAN LONGBATTA, een van de voornaamste verzetslieden was.” The wording echoes the contemporary identification by Pel of the imam as one of the principal leaders of the prang (war) party in his note of 30 April 30 April 1875.

He was the religious head of Longbatta (also written Longbattah), one of the kampongs near the Kraton of Acheh that had been one of the Dutch army’s bitterest enemies since the second Aceh expedition of 1873-1874. His religious authority gave him a position distinct from the hereditary hoeloebalangs; he was an imam — the head of the mosque and the religious community — and could therefore command the kind of loyalty that came from the religious conception of the war as a jihad against the infidel Dutch.

When the Acehnese war against the Gompeuni (Dutch) began, many sought the coveted death of martyrs to their creed, selling their lives as dearly as they could. Sometimes they fought in separate bands and sometimes they joined the standards of those adat-chiefs who took the most zealous part in the defence of the capital — such as the Imeum of Lueng Bata, who was foremost in defence of the capital. Together with Teuku Uma and the members of his own family, the Imeum was among the energetic adventurers who, in the prevailing confusion, saw a chance of essaying their fortunes afresh.

Earlier Mention: The Embassy of Mas Soemo Widikdjo

The kampong Longbatta first appears in the source work as the place where the Dutch envoy Mas Soemo Widikdjo was murdered in December 1873. Van Swieten had sent two letters to the sultan offering terms; with their delivery he charged Mas Soemo Widikdjo, the son of a British-Indian officer, “who had repeatedly rendered us services as a guide or interpreter on previous occasions, hoping for his children to recover the place in society which he had lost for himself by the early death of his father.” He departed on 26 December [1873] and never returned: “Later it became known that, after being held prisoner for a couple of days, he was murderously killed at Longbatta.”

The Missigit Longbatta Operations of 31 December 1874 – 13 January 1875

The 31 December 31 December 1874 action against Longbatta resulted in the capture of the Missigit (mosque) Longbatta. The mosque was then fortified by Tweede-Luitenant C. J. Snijders of the Bataillon Mineurs en Sappeurs between 1 and 13 January 13 January 1875 as a redoubt enclosing the building, in the face of daily rifle and gun fire from the Atjehers, who refused to accept the loss of their sanctuary — “wilden niet lijdelijk in het verlies van hun heiligdom berusten.” On 9 January 9 January 1875 the post was so heavily bombarded that one officer and three men were severely wounded; in the night of 10/11 January 11 January the enemy pressed to within 50 metres of the parapet before being driven off by case-shot and infantry volleys. The continued Atjehese counter-attacks on the work, including the night assault of 10/11 January 11 January 1875, illustrate the symbolic as well as strategic importance of the site.

Resistance in 1879

After the submission of Habib Abdurrahman on 13 October 1878 and the capture of Indrapuri on 24 March 1879, the Imam was among those who flared up the struggle with new strength: “On the contrary, it was as if the struggle, under the leadership of our embittered enemies — Panglima Polem, Imam Longbatta and others — flared up with new strength.”

During the campaign against the XXVI Moekims of early July 1879, the Imam was reported to be at Lamgoet, while “most of the others” were at the missigit Toengkoep. After the submission of the XXVI Moekims and the Selimoen expedition of August 1879, he was among those who, with Panglima Polem and his son Radja Koelala, refused to give up the fight and fled to the upper lands of Pedir — specifically, to Kemala, in the interior south of Pedir.

The Hikajat prang Kompeuni

The Hikajat Prang Kompeuni, the Acehnese epic of the war whose contents were communicated by Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, gives the Imam a place in its account of the close of the first conquest:

“But when the XXVI Moekims were conquered, and shortly afterwards the one-eyed general [K. van der Heyden] made victorious campaigns even through the XXII Moekims, to the astonishment of the hitherto boasting Highlanders, then the Imam of Longbattah sheathed his sword and withdrew from public life. Now broke a three-year period of rest, in which the one-eyed general consolidated his conquests.”

The Imam’s withdrawal marks the end of the first phase of the prang Gompeuni. He was succeeded in influence over the resistance by the ulama party, who organised the jihad against the Dutch after the period of the concentration scheme.

Death and Legacy

The Imeum of Lueng Bata died in 1901, during the military operations in Samalanga. His death removed one of the last representatives of the old hereditary military adat-chiefs who combined personal valour with political weight. In Teungku Tiro (Muhamat Amin)‘s pamphlet to the Dutch Government he is named among the four — Teuku Kali, Teuku Ne’ of Meura’sa, the Panglima Meuseugit Raya and the Imeum of Lueng Bata — on whose counsel the Sultan was obliged to depend, and whose decision in turn depended, as the ulama’s argument continued, on the three panglimas of the sagis and ultimately on the ulamas themselves, “who derive their knowledge from Allah and his Apostle.”

The Imeum of Lueng Bata also appears among those uleebalangs in the Sultan’s territory and the so-called wakeueh-districts — including Teuku Kali, the Panglima Meuseugit Raya, and the Imeums of Chadé — who, though not members of the formal board of twelve, had much more weight in the scale than many of its members.

See Also

Pre-war role: adviser to Sultan Machmoed

The Atjeh-Album of 1896 records that, before the Dutch attack of 1873, the Imam of Longbatta — named in the album as Toekoe Imam Longbattah — served as one of the three principal advisers consulted by Sultan Toeankoe Machmoed on the question of whether to open negotiations with the Dutch. When the Sultan, without the Habib’s knowledge, commissioned Panglima Tibang to open negotiations with the Dutch steamship Maar en Waul then lying at the roadstead of Groot-Atjeh, the Habib insisted that zulke gewichtige saangelegenheid (such a weighty matter) could not be decided by the Sultan alone. The matter was referred to a council of three chiefs — Toekoe Imam Longbattah, Toekoe Kadli en Toekoe Noq van Marassa — who declared themselves in agreement with the Habib and accompanied him to Batavia on the steamship Patti (Captain Roura) to treat with the Governor-General.

This pre-war advisory role places the Imam of Longbatta — together with Toekoe Kadli and Toekoe Noq van Marassa — among the three senior chiefs whose consent was required for the Sultan’s diplomatic initiatives. The council of three is, in the album’s reading, the principal advisory body of the late sultanate, and the Imam’s place on it reflects the seniority of his religious office.

Account from Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — the Imam as an office in 1896

Imam — also spelled iman in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — was the Achehnese office of Islamic prayer leader and community religious head of a single moekim or kampong. The imam stood at the base of the religious hierarchy, below the oelama and the teungkoe: he was the parish priest of the mosque community, leading the daily prayers, teaching the Quran to children, and acting as the religious notary of births, marriages and deaths. In the conditions of the Atjeh-oorlog the imam also functioned as a local mediator between his community and the Dutch colonial government. Kruisheer names several imams in addition to the Imam of Longbatta: the Imam van Daroe (friendly to the Dutch); the Imam van Lam-Koenjit who had the fort Paja Krah; Imam Lam-Rebo; the Tockoe Imam Siem; and the Imam of Lamara (father-in-law of Panglima Bintang).

Etymology and Meaning of the Imam office

The word إمام is Arabic for “leader”, “model”, or “prayer leader”. In Sunni usage — and in the Acehnese context — the imam is the man who leads the congregational prayer and acts as the religious head of his community. The office is not hereditary; an imam is chosen by the community for his learning, piety and respect. In Acehnese institutional geography each moekim had its imam, attached to the masdjid (mosque) that gave the moekim its name. The imam is distinguished from the oelama by the local, parish-level scope of his authority and from the teungkoe by the absence of a learned-honorific dimension. Many imams combined religious office with secular authority: the Imam of Lamara was father-in-law of the powerful Panglima Bintang of the III Moekims Daroe.

Historical Context of Imams in 1896

In the first semester of 1896 imams were the local level at which the Dutch attempted to broker pacification. Kruisheer records an imam of Djempit who, before 18 May 1896, sent a request to the Dutch to cease firing on his moekim. The Toekoe Neg. Imam of IX Moekims wrote to the bestuur (administration) on 6 May 1896 with professions of goodwill — professions the Dutch answered by demanding the inlevering (return) of geweren (rifles) and ammunitie (ammunition) and the cessation of hostile fire. The Imam of Daroe was friendly to the Dutch; the Imam of Lam-Koenjit maintained a fort (Paja Krah) in his moekim. The imam of the IX Moekims was a recognised interlocutor of the Government, capable of corresponding on behalf of his moekim. The office was thus a double one: religious head of the community and secular negotiator with the colonial power.

Examples in the Source

Kruisheer’s named imams include: the Imam van Daroe — friendly to the Dutch, mentioned in connection with the III Moekims Daroe. The Imam van Lam-Koenjit — who had a fort Paja Krah, mentioned in the context of the siege of Lamkoenjit and the 4 April 1896 night attack. Imam Lam-Rebo — named among the religious heads of the sagi XXVI. The Tockoe Imam Siem — named for Siem. The Imam of Lamara — father-in-law of Panglima Bintang. The Toekoe Neg. Imam of IX Moekims — author of the letter of 6 May 1896 to the bestuur. The Imam van Djempit — author of the versoek (request) before 18 May 1896 to cease firing.

Significance of the Imam as an institution

The imam was the indispensable lowest level of religious-administrative mediation in the Aceh War. Because each moekim had its imam, and because each imam could speak (or refuse to speak) for his moekim, the war could be bargained at a much finer grain than the level of the hoeloebalang or sagi. The Dutch strategy of corresponding with individual imams — accepting their professions of goodwill, demanding inlevering of weapons — was an attempt to chip away at the resistance moekim by moekim. The unreliability of the resulting agreements (T. Tjoet Lamtengah’s betuiging (declaration) of goodwill proved onwaar (false) on 21 May 1896) reflects the limits of the strategy: an imam’s profession did not bind his hoeloebalang, his panglima or his teungkoe.

See Also (additional)

Sources

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 27, 71, 103, 108.

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

The Achehnese, Vol. II, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

D. van den Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852–1939): Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk (Voorburg: September 1944), p. 28. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0301 4872. The biography identifies the imam as “een van de voornaamste verzetslieden” on the authority of Kolonel Pel’s note of 30 April 30 April 1875, and records the Missigit Longbatta operations of 31 December 31 December 1874January 1875 against his kampong.

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 72, 104, 149, 166, 171, 220, 231, 267, 319, 330, 337.

Imam of Longbatta — also written Imam Longbatta, Iman Longbatta, or, after the alternate spelling of the place, Imam Longbattah — was the hereditary imeum (religious chief) of the mukim of Lueng Bata (also written Longbatta) near the Kraton of Acheh, and one of the principal Acehnese military and religious leaders of the first phase of the Atjeh-oorlog. Named together with Panglima Polem and Toekoe Rajoet Lamkapang by General Pel in 1875 as one of the influential chiefs who led the war-party — and identified by Kolonel PEL as “een van de voornaamste verzetslieden,” one of the principal resistance leaders — he is remembered in the Hikajat Prang Kompeuni as the leader who, after the conquest of the XXVI Moekims in 1879, “sheathed his sword and withdrew from public life.” Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 14–15 (De Geestelijkheid in Atjeh — Habib Abdoe’r Rachman).

Political Status and Character

The Imeum of Lueng Bata (also known as Imam of Longbatta) was the hereditary chief of the mukim of Lueng Bata — one of the three mukims (with Pagaraye and Lam Sayun) which, though properly belonging to the XXV Mukims, had in former times the status of wakeueh-districts, free from the control of the Panglima Sagi. By the late 19th century the only surviving trace of that status was the independence of the chiefs of these mukims. The influential and powerful Imeum was, on many occasions, the adviser and ally of the Sultan, but this very relation made it necessary for the latter to hold him in great respect and treat him with marked distinction.

According to Snouck Hurgronje, the Imeum was “a rare phenomenon among” the Acehnese chiefs in his combination of a dissolute life with an unyielding hatred of the infidel. Like most of his fellows he sought to be foremost at fights of animals, gambling parties and sanguinary internal forays; but at the same time he possessed those qualities whereby an Acehnese might rise to be an uleebalang though not entitled to such a position by birth. Continually surrounded by boys, he complied with their demands for the repair of their kites and toys as generously as with those of his followers when they begged him to put the requisite fine edge or polish on their weapons. In battle and arduous toil he always encouraged the others by his own example, and at the sharing of profit or spoil he forgot no one. Dissolute though his life was when viewed from a religious standpoint, he was unsurpassed in his hatred of the infidel, while not behind the majority of his countrymen in his reverence for saints and ulamas.

The War-Party

In his note of 30 April 30 April 1875 General Pel named the Imam together with Panglima Polem and Toekoe Rajoet Lamkapang as among the influential chiefs of the war-party. The biographer Van den Berg records the identification in the same terms: when Kolonel PEL resolved on 31 December 31 December 1874 to drive the Atjehers from the immediate vicinity of the Dutch main positions and to make the Atjeh River the eastern defensive line, the action was directed specifically against Longbatta, “welks hoofd, IMAN LONGBATTA, een van de voornaamste verzetslieden was.” The wording echoes the contemporary identification by Pel of the imam as one of the principal leaders of the prang (war) party in his note of 30 April 30 April 1875.

He was the religious head of Longbatta (also written Longbattah), one of the kampongs near the Kraton of Acheh that had been one of the Dutch army’s bitterest enemies since the second Aceh expedition of 1873-1874. His religious authority gave him a position distinct from the hereditary hoeloebalangs; he was an imam — the head of the mosque and the religious community — and could therefore command the kind of loyalty that came from the religious conception of the war as a jihad against the infidel Dutch.

When the Acehnese war against the Gompeuni (Dutch) began, many sought the coveted death of martyrs to their creed, selling their lives as dearly as they could. Sometimes they fought in separate bands and sometimes they joined the standards of those adat-chiefs who took the most zealous part in the defence of the capital — such as the Imeum of Lueng Bata, who was foremost in defence of the capital. Together with Teuku Uma and the members of his own family, the Imeum was among the energetic adventurers who, in the prevailing confusion, saw a chance of essaying their fortunes afresh.

Earlier Mention: The Embassy of Mas Soemo Widikdjo

The kampong Longbatta first appears in the source work as the place where the Dutch envoy Mas Soemo Widikdjo was murdered in December 1873. Van Swieten had sent two letters to the sultan offering terms; with their delivery he charged Mas Soemo Widikdjo, the son of a British-Indian officer, “who had repeatedly rendered us services as a guide or interpreter on previous occasions, hoping for his children to recover the place in society which he had lost for himself by the early death of his father.” He departed on 26 December [1873] and never returned: “Later it became known that, after being held prisoner for a couple of days, he was murderously killed at Longbatta.”

The Missigit Longbatta Operations of 31 December 1874 – 13 January 1875

The 31 December 31 December 1874 action against Longbatta resulted in the capture of the Missigit (mosque) Longbatta. The mosque was then fortified by Tweede-Luitenant C. J. Snijders of the Bataillon Mineurs en Sappeurs between 1 and 13 January 13 January 1875 as a redoubt enclosing the building, in the face of daily rifle and gun fire from the Atjehers, who refused to accept the loss of their sanctuary — “wilden niet lijdelijk in het verlies van hun heiligdom berusten.” On 9 January 9 January 1875 the post was so heavily bombarded that one officer and three men were severely wounded; in the night of 10/11 January 11 January the enemy pressed to within 50 metres of the parapet before being driven off by case-shot and infantry volleys. The continued Atjehese counter-attacks on the work, including the night assault of 10/11 January 11 January 1875, illustrate the symbolic as well as strategic importance of the site.

Resistance in 1879

After the submission of Habib Abdurrahman on 13 October 1878 and the capture of Indrapuri on 24 March 1879, the Imam was among those who flared up the struggle with new strength: “On the contrary, it was as if the struggle, under the leadership of our embittered enemies — Panglima Polem, Imam Longbatta and others — flared up with new strength.”

During the campaign against the XXVI Moekims of early July 1879, the Imam was reported to be at Lamgoet, while “most of the others” were at the missigit Toengkoep. After the submission of the XXVI Moekims and the Selimoen expedition of August 1879, he was among those who, with Panglima Polem and his son Radja Koelala, refused to give up the fight and fled to the upper lands of Pedir — specifically, to Kemala, in the interior south of Pedir.

The Hikajat prang Kompeuni

The Hikajat Prang Kompeuni, the Acehnese epic of the war whose contents were communicated by Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, gives the Imam a place in its account of the close of the first conquest:

“But when the XXVI Moekims were conquered, and shortly afterwards the one-eyed general [K. van der Heyden] made victorious campaigns even through the XXII Moekims, to the astonishment of the hitherto boasting Highlanders, then the Imam of Longbattah sheathed his sword and withdrew from public life. Now broke a three-year period of rest, in which the one-eyed general consolidated his conquests.”

The Imam’s withdrawal marks the end of the first phase of the prang Gompeuni. He was succeeded in influence over the resistance by the ulama party, who organised the jihad against the Dutch after the period of the concentration scheme.

Death and Legacy

The Imeum of Lueng Bata died in 1901, during the military operations in Samalanga. His death removed one of the last representatives of the old hereditary military adat-chiefs who combined personal valour with political weight. In Teungku Tiro (Muhamat Amin)‘s pamphlet to the Dutch Government he is named among the four — Teuku Kali, Teuku Ne’ of Meura’sa, the Panglima Meuseugit Raya and the Imeum of Lueng Bata — on whose counsel the Sultan was obliged to depend, and whose decision in turn depended, as the ulama’s argument continued, on the three panglimas of the sagis and ultimately on the ulamas themselves, “who derive their knowledge from Allah and his Apostle.”

The Imeum of Lueng Bata also appears among those uleebalangs in the Sultan’s territory and the so-called wakeueh-districts — including Teuku Kali, the Panglima Meuseugit Raya, and the Imeums of Chadé — who, though not members of the formal board of twelve, had much more weight in the scale than many of its members.

See Also

Sources

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 27, 71, 103, 108.

The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

The Achehnese, Vol. II, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.

D. van den Berg, Cornelis Jacobus Snijders (1852–1939): Een leven in dienst van zijn Land en zijn Volk (Voorburg: September 1944), p. 28. Koninklijke Bibliotheek shelfmark 0301 4872. The biography identifies the imam as “een van de voornaamste verzetslieden” on the authority of Kolonel Pel’s note of 30 April 30 April 1875, and records the Missigit Longbatta operations of 31 December 31 December 1874January 1875 against his kampong.

Account from Onze vestiging in Atjeh (Borel, 1878)

The Imam of Longbatta was the religious leader (imam) of Longbatta and, alongside Panglima Polim, one of the principal hostile Atjehneesche chiefs of the Atjeh-oorlog. His residence at Longbatta made the kampong the religious as well as the military centre of the resistance around Kota Radja, and his name is, in Borel’s narrative, paired with Polim’s as the symbol of the most stubborn centre of Atjehneesche defiance.

Longbatta as Religious and Military Centre

Longbatta was a zeer belangrijke kampong, long the residence of Panglima Polim, the Imam of Longbatta, and other hostile chiefs. The presence of the imam gave the resistance at Longbatta a religious as well as a military character: the Mesigit (stone mosque) of Longbatta was both a fortification and a place of worship, and the imam’s authority reinforced the hoofd’s. The combination of military and religious leadership at Longbatta helps explain the tenacity of the resistance there: the kampong was the meeting point of the XXII Moekims and XXVI Moekims — the two most hostile sagi of Groot-Atjeh — and its Mesigit became, after its capture on the morning of 31 December 1874, the tophoek (apex) of the stelling-Pel, six thousand metres into enemy territory.

The Longbatta Operations and the Imam’s Resistance

The battle of Longbatta of 31 December 1874 — Pel’s converging movement against the kampong — was undertaken precisely because Longbatta had become, under Polim and the Imam, “the key to the enemy’s line of investment around K. Radja.” The fortified Mesigit was taken without a shot on the morning of the 31st, when the enemy streamed east to face Romswinckel’s feint; but the same afternoon van der Meer’s disaster on the sawah turned the victory into a reverse. The Mesigit remained in Dutch hands, and a post was opgericht. The night attack on the Mesigit of 22 November 1875 — when a band of some fifty Atjehneezen climbed over the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among the sleeping manschappen — was, in Borel’s reading, the measure of the religious-military resistance the Imam embodied. The Dutch losses were thirteen zwaar gewonden including two officieren; Borel stresses that the attack could have been disastrous if done with more force and from multiple sides — at night, in man-to-man struggle, the Atjehneesche klewang is “een vreeslijk wapen.”

Significance

The Imam of Longbatta is, in Borel’s narrative, the embodiment of the religious fanatisme that the Dutch had underestimated in 18731874. The combination of imam and hoofd at Longbatta gave the resistance a cohesion that no purely military chief could have supplied, and the capture of the Mesigit on 31 December 1874 was, in Borel’s reading, the precondition of every subsequent Dutch advance to the south and east. The Imam’s name is paired with Polim’s as the symbol of the resistance that the afwachtende houding of van Swieten had allowed to harden.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. p. 228.