Panglima Bintang

Properties2
tagsperson, achehnese, aceh-war, diplomacy, military
aliasesPanglima Bintang, T. Panglima Bintang

4 min read

Panglima Bintang — also written T. Panglima Bintang — was the hereditary territorial chief of the III Moekims Daroe whose hedging diplomacy in the spring and early summer of 1896 epitomises the dilemma of the Achehnese chief caught between the Dutch colonial government and the defection of Teuku Umar of 29 March 1896, as recorded in A. Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96. Bintang “sent word [in early May 1896] he would join the strongest side”, a stance of explicit opportunism which Kruisheer records as that of “welk hooft op onze hand was” (which head was on our side) — that is, despite his public posture of neutrality, Bintang had privately committed to the Dutch. He made his “first appearance before the Dutch administration” on 20 June 1896, “fearing Umar’s revenge”, and was told by the Regeeringscommissaris Vetter “to remain at Poenir to protect his subordinates”. He “returned 12 of 16 trompladers” (muzzle-loaders) lent to him after the Regeeringscommissaris’s mid-June disarmament order, a partial compliance which preserved four weapons while formally obeying the order.

The III Moekims Daroe and the Position of Panglima Bintang

The III Moekims Daroe lay in the southern sector of Groot-Atjeh and contained the grot of Daroe — the site of Teungkoe Koeta Karang’s kaloet meditations and, later, of Teungkoe Panté Gelimah’s imitation of the same practice. The III Moekims Daroe bordered the V Moekims Montassik to the east and the Dutch post line at Ketapan Doea to the west, and its hoeloebalang therefore commanded the approaches to both the western and the southern theatres of operations. The Imam van Daroe came in to the Dutch line in response to a summons from the assistent-resident in the spring of 1896 and “reported that Pa Bintang, the heads, and the population of the 3 Moekims Daroe were against Oemar” — a report which suggests that Bintang’s covert pro-Dutch stance reflected, or was at least consistent with, a broader anti-Umar sentiment in his landschap. The territory also formed part of the Dutch lines of communication with the south, and the 29 May 1896 show of force under Lt.-Col. Laceulle was explicitly directed through the III Moekims Daroe to demonstrate Dutch authority and to confirm Bintang’s reliability.

The 20 June 1896 Submission and the Disarmament Order

The crisis of Bintang’s position came on 20 June 1896, when — almost three months after Umar’s defection and following the heavy Dutch tuchtigingen of the IV/VI Moekims and Lam-Krak — he “made his first appearance [since Umar’s defection] before the Dutch administration, fearing Umar’s revenge”. Bintang’s fear was realistic: he was a hoeloebalang who had privately committed to the Dutch while his neighbouring chiefs (T. Rajoet of the V Moekims Montassik, Toekoe Brahim and others) had joined Umar, and Umar’s reprisals against perceived Dutch collaborators were well known. Bintang “requested permission to settle with his father-in-law, the imam of Lamara”, within the concentrated line — a request for asylum which the Regeeringscommissaris Vetter denied, ruling instead “that Bintang should remain in his mukim at Poenir to protect his subordinates against molest”. The decision reflected the Dutch strategic preference for cooperative hoeloebalang in situ rather than as refugees within the line. The Regeeringscommissaris’s mid-June disarmament order — that guns lent in loan to heads outside the line be returned — produced Bintang’s partial compliance: he “returned 12 of 16 trompladers” lent to him, retaining four. The partial return was characteristic of Bintang’s diplomacy throughout the spring of 1896.

Significance

Panglima Bintang’s significance in ATJEH ‘96 lies in his embodiment of the hoeloebalang who chose the Dutch side privately while maintaining a posture of neutrality publicly, and whose survival depended on the Dutch military umbrella which the spring and summer 1896 operations were intended to provide. His 20 June 1896 submission — and Vetter’s refusal to grant him asylum — illustrates the Dutch strategic preference for cooperative Achehnese chiefs in their home territories rather than as refugees within the line, a preference which would shape the colonial bindingspolitiek for the remainder of the war.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 141, 148, 156, 186, 319, 330, 337.

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