Machtsvertoon in III Moekims Daroe (29 May 1896)

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tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliasesMachtsvertoon in III Moekims Daroe, Show-of-force in III Moekims Daroe, 29 May 1896 III Moekims Daroe

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The Machtsvertoon in III Moekims Daroe (29 May 1896) — the show-of-force in the moekim cluster of the III Moekims Daroe — was a Dutch demonstration of force conducted on 29 May 1896 by a colonne under Lt.-Col. C. J. Laceulle — Chef van den Staf Kapt. G. C. H. v. Daalen; adjudant Luit.-Adj. Bekker — in parallel with the machtsvertoon in the IX Moekims under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz and in the immediate aftermath of the three-day offensive. The colonne comprised the 6e Bataljon under Maj. Okhuizen, the 7e Bataljon under Maj. Jacobs, a cavalry platoon under 1e Luit. J. P. Gentil, two sections of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers, and engineers under Luit.-Adj. E. J. de Rochemont. The assignment was to search the kampongs of Kandang, Olehi-Loeng, Poenir Le-Oe, Goee-Gadjah, and Tjabang. The head of the III Moekims Daroe — the hoeloebalang Panglima Bintang — had already secretly shown sympathy to the Dutch side.

Background

By the last week of May 1896 the three-day offensive had broken Teungkoe Oemar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang and the strategic initiative was firmly in Dutch hands. The Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, resolved to consolidate the political position in the moekim clusters adjacent to the area of operations. Two machtsvertoon colonnes were dispatched simultaneously on 29 May 1896: one, under Van Heutsz, to the IX Moekims; the other, under Laceulle, to the III Moekims Daroe. The objective in each case was to demonstrate the Government’s reach, to search the kampongs for arms and resistance fighters, and to encourage the hoeloebalang of the districts to declare for the Government.

The III Moekims Daroe — a cluster of three moekim lying to the south of the Lampoeng / Lampisang region — was of particular political interest. Its hoeloebalang, Panglima Bintang, had already secretly shown sympathy to the Dutch side — a sympathy that would, three weeks later, culminate in his formal submission on 20 June 1896. The machtsvertoon of 29 May 1896 was, in part, a test of Panglima Bintang’s political disposition: would he cooperate openly with the Dutch, or would he maintain the posture of armed neutrality that had characterised his position since the defection of 29 March 1896?

The Composition of the Colonne

The colonne for the machtsvertoon in the III Moekims Daroe was placed under Lt.-Col. C. J. Laceulle — the same officer who had commanded the Colonne Laceulle at the capture of Lam-Pisang on 24 May 1896. His Chef van den Staf was Kapt. G. C. H. v. Daalen of the General Staff — a different member of the van Daalen family from the G. C. E. van Daalen who had served as Van Heutsz’s Chef van den Staf at the Slag bij Tjot Tjako; his adjudant was Luit.-Adj. Bekker. The composition was: the 6e Bataljon under Maj. D. A. Okhuizen — the same battalion and commander that had carried the stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau on 25 May 1896; the 7e Bataljon under Maj. J. R. Jacobs — the same battalion and commander that had stormed the south-eastern rand of Lam-Asan on 23 May 1896; a cavalry platoon under 1e Luit. J. P. Gentil; two sections of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers; and engineers under Luit.-Adj. E. J. de Rochemont.

The Assignment and the Course of the Operation

The colonne’s assignment was to search the kampongs of Kandang, Olehi-Loeng, Poenir Le-Oe, Goee-Gadjah, and Tjabang — the principal settlements of the III Moekims Daroe. The search was both military and political: military, in that the colonne was lalsoing for arms, resistance fighters, and evidence of cooperation with Oemar; political, in that the colonne was testing the disposition of Panglima Bintang and the other hoeloebalang of the district. The cavalry under Gentil reconnoitred ahead; the infantry searched the kampongs in turn; the artillery was held in reserve.

The operation was, in tactical terms, uneventful. The kampongs were searched; some arms were recovered; no major engagement developed. The political outcome, however, was significant: the secret sympathy of Panglima Bintang was confirmed, and the groundwork was laid for his formal submission on 20 June 1896. The operation was conducted in parallel with the machtsvertoon in the IX Moekims under Van Heutsz — a coordinated demonstration of Dutch reach across two adjacent moekim clusters.

Significance

The Machtsvertoon in III Moekims Daroe on 29 May 1896 was, in operational terms, a small affair — a search of five kampongs with no major engagement and no significant casualties. In political terms, however, it was an essential step in the consolidation of the Dutch position after the three-day offensive. The confirmation of the secret sympathy of Panglima Bintang — the hoeloebalang of the III Moekims Daroe — was the principal outcome of the operation, and it set the stage for the political realignment of June 1896. The machtsvertoon also demonstrated the Government’s capacity to operate simultaneously in two moekim clusters — the IX Moekims under Van Heutsz and the III Moekims Daroe under Laceulle — a capacity that would be expanded, in June, to the coordinated multi-colonne operations of the tuchtiging of Lam-Krak and the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik. The machtsvertoon of 29 May 1896 was, in this sense, the political and operational bridge between the offensive of May and the consolidation of June.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 223–226.

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