Disarmament of Buitenlinie Chiefs (mid-June 1896)

Properties2
tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, diplomacy, military, aceh-war
aliasesDisarmament of Buitenlinie Chiefs, Return of guns by Acehnese chiefs, Inleveren van wapens, Mid-June 1896

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The Disarmament of Buitenlinie Chiefs (mid-June 1896) was the order issued by the Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, that the rifles lent in loan to the chiefs outside the concentrated line be returned to the Government, and the subsequent return — partial or complete — of those weapons by the principal hoeloebalang of the buitenlinie. T. Panglima Bintang of the III Moekims Daroe returned 12 of 16 muzzle-loaders. T. Nja Mohamad returned 20 trompladers and 1 Beaumont. T. Nja Geh van Oleh-Soesoeh returned 4 Beaumonts. T. Nja Imeum — son of the actual hoeloebalang of the IX Moekims — brought all his imams (except Lam-Koenjit’s, who was “sick”) to the administration on 15 June 1896. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the disarmament was the political complement to the military operations of May–June 1896 — the physical unwinding of the native-allied policy of 1893–1896 that had culminated in the defection.

Background

The native-allied policy of Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff — inaugurated by the subjection of Teuku Umar of 30 September 1893 — had involved the distribution of Dutch government weapons to cooperative hoeloebalang on the buitenlinie. The weapons were lent in loan: the Government retained ownership, and the hoeloebalang were expected to use them in the Government’s service against the recalcitrant interior. The defection of 29 March 1896 — when Teuku Umar turned his Dutch-supplied arms against his patrons — had revealed the catastrophic risk of this policy. The Besluit of 9 May 1896 had formally prohibited the further supply of weapons to Achehnese. The Regeeringscommissaris now resolved to recover the weapons that had already been distributed.

The political context was favourable. The three-day offensive had broken Oemar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang; the tuchtiging of Lam-Krak had reduced the western redoubt; the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik was about to break the south-western bentengs. The hoeloebalang of the buitenlinie — whatever their private disposition — could no longer doubt the Government’s capacity to enforce its will. The recovery of the lent weapons was, in this sense, a test of the political realignment of the spring of 1896: those who returned their weapons were acknowledging the Government’s supremacy; those who refused or prevaricated were marking themselves out as disaffected.

The Returns

The returns of weapons by the principal hoeloebalang of the buitenlinie were as follows:

  • T. Panglima Bintang of the III Moekims Daroe returned 12 of 16 muzzle-loading rifles. The partial return — 12 of 16 — was a political gesture: Panglima Bintang was, at this point, on the point of his formal submission of 20 June 1896, and the return of 12 weapons was a tangible demonstration of his goodwill. The withholding of 4 weapons was, however, a hedge: Panglima Bintang was not yet prepared to place himself entirely at the Government’s mercy, and the retention of 4 weapons preserved a residual capacity for self-defence should the political wind shift again.

  • T. Nja Mohamad returned 20 trompladers and 1 Beaumont — the latter a modern Dutch breech-loading rifle of the type carried by the Dutch infantry. The return of a Beaumont was particularly significant: the Beaumont was a government weapon, and its return was a clear acknowledgment that the bruikleen was at an end. The return of 20 trompladers — a substantial arsenal — was, in political terms, a major submission.

  • T. Nja Geh van Oleh-Soesoeh returned 4 Beaumonts — four modern Dutch breech-loading rifles. The return was, given the small number of weapons, presumably the complete return of the bruikleen to this chief.

  • T. Nja Imeum — son of the actual hoeloebalang of the IX Moekims — brought all his imams (except Lam-Koenjit’s, who was “sick”) to the administration on 15 June 1896. The imams were told again that troop movements only aimed to prevent the establishment of foreign and evil elements. The population of the III and IX Moekims soon returned fully to their kampongs, including Lam-Pagar and Lam-Tengah (VI Moekims).

The Political Effect

The political effect of the disarmament was substantial. The return of the weapons — particularly the Beaumonts — was a public acknowledgment by the hoeloebalang of the buitenlinie that the Government’s supremacy had been restored and that the native-allied policy of 1893–1896 was at an end. The hoeloebalang who returned their weapons placed themselves, politically, on the Government’s side; those who withheld them — like Panglima Bintang’s retention of 4 trompladers — hedged their bets but acknowledged, in the act of partial return, the direction of the political wind. The concurrent submission of T. Nja Imeum and his imams, and the subsequent full return of the population of the III and IX Moekims to their kampongs, were further indications of the political realignment.

Significance

The Disarmament of Buitenlinie Chiefs in mid-June 1896 was the political complement to the military operations of May–June 1896 and the physical unwinding of the native-allied policy of 1893–1896. The recovery of the lent weapons was, in itself, a small matter — a few dozen rifles, mostly obsolete trompladers. The political significance of the disarmament was, however, out of all proportion to the material recovery: each weapon returned was a public act of submission, a tangible acknowledgment that the Government’s supremacy had been restored. The partial return by Panglima Bintang — 12 of 16 — was, in its way, the most politically revealing: it showed that the hoeloebalang of the buitenlinie were willing to acknowledge the Government but were not yet willing to place themselves entirely at its mercy. The full submission of Panglima Bintang would follow on 20 June 1896; the broader political realignment of the buitenlinie would continue through the summer and autumn of 1896. The disarmament was, in this sense, both the close of the native-allied policy and the opening of the next phase of the Atjeh-oorlog — a phase in which the Dutch would rely, once again, on their own troops rather than on native auxiliaries.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, p. 267.

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