Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven (“Our Establishment in Aceh, critically described”) is a critical Dutch-language military history of the opening phase of the Atjeh-oorlog, written by Kapitein der Artillerie G. F. W. Borel and published at ‘s-Gravenhage by D. A. Thieme in 1878, after the conflict had already lasted more than five years. Composed in seventeen chapters and furnished with two folded maps — a Kaart van Groot-Atjeh and a Schets van het Bivouak Penajoeng en van den Kraton met omgeving at 1:10 000 — the book is both a narrative of the first expedition under Generaal Köhler and of the second expedition and occupation under generaal van Swieten and generaal Pel, and a sustained polemic against the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture) that, in Borel’s judgement, squandered the fruits of the fall of the Kraton and prolonged the war. It closes with Borel’s own prescription — an Indische Brigade raised in the Netherlands — and bears the author’s signature at ‘s-Gravenhage on 27 August 1878.
Author and Purpose
Borel was a Kapitein der Artillerie, Ridder van de Militaire Willemsorde, and bearer of the Eresabel, who had personally served in Atjeh; he supervised the debarkation of the guns at Oeleh Leh and traced the new zuider-face battery on the morning of 14 August 1874 under a twelve-shot Atjehnese salvo that missed him and his officer only by inches. In his Voorberigt he disclaims “partijschap” and acknowledges the work’s “gebrekkig en onvolledig” character, but insists on the duty to render “de feiten en toestanden naar waarheid.” His aim was to spread “meerdere kennis betreffende de Atjeh-aangelegenheden” at a moment when the war had “weder zoo geheel op den voorgrond” returned.
Structure and Contents
Borel divides the Atjeh-oorlog into five periods: (1) the first expedition under Generaal Köhler; (2) the second expedition under van Swieten down to the inneming en bezetting van den Kraton; (3) the tijdperk der afwachtende of defensieve houding; (4) the return to the aanvallende tactiek; and (5) the periode van stilstand in which the book is written (1878).
The first chapters rehearse the failure of Generaal Köhler before the Kraton in April 1873, the onzalige enquête that followed, and the assembly of a vastly stronger expeditionary force on Java and Sumatra’s Westkust in November 1873. Borel then narrates, with heavy critical commentary, the landing at Pedro-punt (6 December 1873), the bloody reconnaissances at Lemboe on Christmas 1873, the storming of the Mesigit (6 January 1874), the nineteen-day bombardment and the omtrekkende beweging of 23–24 January 1874 that delivered the deserted Kraton to the Dutch. The central chapters indict van Swieten for declaring the war ended, for recalling the achterlaadgeschut to Java, for the padi-snijden concession, and for the échec at Lampoe Oek on 16 April 1874, after which he pronounced his afscheidsrede (“Ik beschouw den oorlog met Atjeh als geëindigd”) and departed on 26 April 1874.
The later chapters are a vindication of Kolonel Pel, who inherited the zeer gebrekkige stelling and rebuilt it through a long series of operations — the battle of Lampoeloe (20 June 1874), the battle of Garouw (28 June 1874), the battle of Soerian (26 July 1874), the conquest of Lemboe (7 November 1874), the disastrous battle of Longbatta (31 December 1874), and the great offensive of December 1875 – February 1876 — culminating in his sudden death at the Lamjoeng bivouac on 24 February 1876. The book’s final chapters describe the reversion to the passive system under Wiggers van Kerchem, the enemy breakthrough of June 1878 during van der Heijden’s absence at Gedoeng, and Borel’s own proposal for an Indische Brigade.
Critical Stance and Sources
Borel writes as an artilleryman and a participant-observer, freely attributing the prolongation of the war to named commanders. He repeatedly invokes foreign analogues — the Germans at Sédan (1870), the Russians before Plevna (1877), the French expedition against Algiers (1830) — to press the argument that victories must be pursued and that the Atjehneezen, “uit eene geheel bijzondere stof gekneed,” could be subdued only by the kracht der wapens and never by proclamations, gifts, or passive posts. He cites the Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken booklet distributed to officers before the second expedition, generaal Booms’s critique, generaal Knoop’s judgement that the second expedition was “slechts ten deele gelukt,” and the brochure of gep. luit. kol. de Rochemont.
Significance
The work remains a principal Dutch primary source for the military conduct of the Atjeh War between 1873 and 1878, valued for its detailed tactical narratives, its candour about Dutch reverses (notably the Lampoe Oek échec and the Longbatta disaster), and its partisan but well-documented defence of Generaal Pel. Its proposed Indische Brigade anticipated later metropolitan reinforcements, and its characterisation of the Atjehnees volkskarakter — “woest, dapper, vrijheidlievend” — fixed a Dutch military stereotype that would be echoed by later colonial writers.
See Also
- G. F. W. Borel
- Aceh War
- First Aceh Expedition (April 1873)
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Fall of the Kraton (24 January 1874)
- Generaal Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Köhler
- Stelling-Pel
- Afwachtende houding
- Indische Brigade (proposed)
- Een vaderlandsch belang (Borel, 1878)
- Kaart van Groot-Atjeh (Borel)
- 1873
- 1874
- 1875
- 1876
- 1878
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie, Ridder van de Militaire Willemsorde, begiftigd met de Eresabel, enz. Met twee kaarten. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. (Voorberigt, pp. V–VI; chapters 1–17, pp. 1–363; table of contents and map legends, pp. 364–381.) Finished at ‘s-Gravenhage, 27 August 1878.