Colonne Schmidt campaign against the Tiriō Teungkoes (1910-1911)

The colonne Schmidt campaign against the Tiriō Teungkoes (1910-1911) was the two-year counter-insurgency operation conducted by luitenant (later kapitein) Schmidt of the Marechaussee — a small colonne of forty-one militairen (Schmidt himself included) and twenty-five dwangarbeiders (all Buginese convicts serving as dragers) — that destroyed the Tiriō bende, the last organised armed resistance in Aceh, in the bergland ten Oosten of Tangsé. Beginning in 1910 with the hunt for the small, highly mobile band of Peutoeha Gam Masén and concluding on 3 December 1911 with the killing of the fifteen-year-old Tgk. Tjhi Ma’at by the korporaal Nussy — aided by Rampisela and Koentjoeng — the campaign earned Schmidt the Eresabel for 1910 and the M.W.O. 3e klas for 1911, and was the military precondition for Generaal Swart’s handover of a peaceful Aceh to a civilian Gouverneur in 1918.

The theatre and the colonne

The Tiriō Teungkoes operated in a bergland defined by two valleys and two mountain ranges. “De valleien van Tangsé en Geumpang tegen de hellingen van de Goenoeng Alimon en de Peuët Sagoë op” formed the eastern side; “ten Westen in het stroomgebied van de Kroeëng Seukoeleh” formed the western side. “De bergen niet zo hoog” but “weinig streken, waar het zwaarder en moeilijker begaanbaar is.” The theatre was therefore a small, almost impassable quadrant of central Aceh.

The colonne was correspondingly small: forty-one militairen (Schmidt included) and twenty-five dwangarbeiders — all Boeginezen, all convicts — who served as dragers for the patrouilles. The soldiers were drawn from across the Marechaussee’s ethnic mix: Ambonezen, Menadonezen, Javanen. The dardanellen|dardanellen — the two voorste Marechaussees at the front of any patrol — were the point of the spear.

The diplomatic track: the letter from the three hoofden

Schmidt’s methods combined military pressure with diplomatic outreach. At Generaal Swart’s request, the three voornaamste Atjehse hoofden — two Sultans-family members and Panglima Prang Polim (who had surrendered to kapitein Colijn) — wrote a letter urging the Tiriō Teungkoes to submit. “De Teungkoes bespraken de brief, doch besloten tot het einde te vechten; hen zou geschieden naar Allah’s wil.” The letter failed; the doctrinal prang sabi conviction of the Tiriō family overrode the political authority of the Sultan’s former army commander.

The diplomatic track: the widow’s intercession

Schmidt then tried a second diplomatic channel: the tante (widow) of the young Tgk. Tjhi Ma’at — the widow of Teungkoe Asan Oeleë Toetooë, whom Schmidt’s brigades had killed only months before. Teungkoe di Teupin Radja reassured Schmidt that she would not hold her husband’s death against him: “dat haar echtgenoot in de heilige strijd is gevallen door zijn eigen vrije wil; u was slechts het werktuig in Allah’s hand, dat hem het paradijs deelachtig deed worden.” The widow — “een eerbiedwekkende Atjehse vrouw, reeds op leeftijd” — went into the bergen; no patrouilles were to operate in that richting while she was there. She returned without needing to search: many Atjehers knew where the boy was, but “het verraden van een heilig man als een Tiriō Teungkoe is een zonde, die men niet straffeloos kan begaan.” The answer she brought back was Tjhi Ma’at’s: “Zijn Vader was als geloofsgetuige gevallen, hij zou in diens voetstappen treden. Allah’s wil zou geschieden.”

The killing of Peutoeha Gam Masén (May 1911)

The first major military succes of the colonne came in May 1911, after about four-and-a-half months of searching. Spoorzoekers found the bekas of Peutoeha Gam Masén’s fourageurs near the Kroeëng Seukoeleh, mixed with the sporen of neushoornjagers. The colonne followed. The first omsingeling of a ladang caught only an old woman, a child, and a man from the Westkust who had been forced to join the band — he was willing to give inlichtingen and acted as gids, but during the ten-day search he recognised nothing. The second attempt succeeded: the Amb. sergeant 2e kl. Van Drongelen “maakte met zes man een omtrekking en zette de rand af” and the ladang was omsingeld within half an hour. Gam Masén was summoned to surrender; he refused, “hij trok zijn reuntjong, de Atjehse kris” and threw himself on the two voorste Marechaussees — the dardanellen|dardanellen of the luitenant. “Nussy schoot en Enoch werkte af met de klewang.” The leader was neergelegd.

The overval on the schuilplaats (May 1911)

Later in May, the colonne overvalled the schuilplaats of the Tiriō bende. The brigade of Baas Molier was ordered with Enoch to silently kill with the klewang an Acehnese coming from the ladang along the path; a couple of nervous soldiers opened fire and the schuilplaats was gealarmeerd. The assault went in anyway. Nussy, Gomies, Liklikwatil, Enoch, Kamagi, Paliaman and Oesoel climbed the steile waterral under fire; on the rand Gomies was shot at from “vijf pas afstand” and missed. Baas Molier “kreeg een man met een donderbus te pakken”; Nussy and Paliaman “namen nog drie man voor hun rekening.” At the other side of the schuilplaats Raoe and Sopakoea attakeerden up a steep heuvel and captured a Beaumontgeweer. Eleven vijanden were killed. Tgk. di Boekét was mortally wounded and died later; Tgk. Tjhi Majét was killed in the chase that followed, his corpse carried to Tangsé and his bandages torn into hundreds of pieces as holy relics.

The killing of Habib Teupin Wan (September 1911)

“In September 1911 sneuvelde de grote en heilige Habib Teupin Wan; slechts de jonge Tgk. Tjhi Ma’at was er over van heel de Tiri bende.” With the sayyid’s death, only the boy was left.

The killing of Tgk. Tjhi Ma’at (3 December 1911)

On 3 December 1911, sporen were found in verschillende richtingen. Korporaal Nussy, alone after his spits turned back, gave the vogelgeluid signaal and waited. Three armed Acehnese approached; the voorste was Tgk. Tjhi Ma’at, who aimed his revolver at Nussy. Nussy shot first; the bullet hit him in the borst. He fell but rose and fled. The second was killed outright. “Rampisela en Koentjoeng legden de man neer, terwijl ook de derde nog werd ingehaald.” Tjhi Ma’at was brought down and became sjahid. “De Tiri-bende was niet meer.”

The aftermath: Teukoe Dagang

After the destruction of the Tiriō bende, some forty onverzoenlijken “sloot zich aan bij de bende van Teukoe Dagang en bij die van T. Haroen.” Teukoe Dagang, one of the hoofden van Tangsé, refused to submit to Schmidt because Schmidt had once threatened to bury him next to a hoofd he had murdered. He escaped every search for over a year — the book’s example that “ook voor de allerbeste patrouilles het succes nooit verzekerd is.”

Decorations

“Hij kreeg dan ook voor 1910 de Eresabel en voor 1911 de M.W.O. 3e klas.” Schmidt’s two decorations recognised the two successive years of the campaign: the Eresabel (honorary saber) for distinguished combat leadership in the first year, and the M.W.O. 3e klas for the closing year in which the bende was finally destroyed. Nussy received the M.W.O. 3e klas for the campaign.

Significance

The colonne Schmidt campaign is the military climax of Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L. and the last great counter-insurgency operation of the Aceh War. Its significance in the book is fourfold. First, it is the moment at which the last organised Acehnese armed resistance was destroyed — the precondition for the handover of Aceh to a civilian Gouverneur in 1918. Second, it is the book’s clearest example of the colonne method — small, highly trained patrouilles operating with local intelligence against a religiously motivated resistance — that had been developed in Aceh since the Van Heutsz era. Third, it is the book’s clearest example of the doctrinal difficulty of fighting a prang sabi: the religious resisters could not be brought in by political authority, because their doctrine overrode the political authority of the Sultan’s former army commander. Fourth, it is the book’s clearest example of the moral weight of the dardanel system — the point-man who, like Nussy, went ahead alone and shot first.

Source

Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L., by G. W. T. Dames, Maj. Inf. K.N.I.L. b.d. (‘s-Gravenhage: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1954), chapter “De colonne Schmidt.” Dames notes in the Nawoord that he drew on the printed report of Schmidt himself and on Hotz.

tags	event, war, colonial, aceh, knil, marechaussee
aliases	Colonne Schmidt, Colonne-Schmidt, De colonne Schmidt, Tiriō campaign, Tiri-bende campaign

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