The three-day battle in the Beradin pass — de drie-daagsche veldslag in den Beradin-pas — was the Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896 against the positions of Toekoe Oemar between the Boekit Kasoemba and the coast, which carried Lampisang, Beradin and Boekit Seboen and drove the enemy back to the Kroeng Raba. P. H. R. Beuming devoted the fourth sketch of Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh to the operation, which he presented as the afrekening — the reckoning — with the man whose defection of 29 March 1896 had brought the Dutch into their difficulties.
Prelude: the defection and the flight to Pakan Badak
When after 29 March 1896 the untrustworthiness of Toekoe Oemar came to light — thanks, Beuming writes, to the communications of Toekoe Ketjik Oemar, by which the traitor’s design was fortunately discovered in time — the sluwe vos (cunning fox) understood very well that his alliance was at an end. Pretending that he and his panglima’s had been discourteously treated by the civil officials, he had taken refuge at Pakan Badak. At that place, in the immediate neighbourhood of Lamdjamoe, a Dutch post had already stood during the administration of Governor Pel, but had been abolished after 1884 for strategic reasons.
Apparently not well knowing how to set about returning to favour, Umar tried by every possible pretext to explain his conduct and assured the Governor in his letters that he was still the sobat baas — the best friend — of the Companie. He himself, however, prudently remained in his own territory.
At the same time as Toekoe Oemar, Toekoe Hoesin Longbata also took the enemy’s side, and with him the III Moekims Lamkrak and the IV Moekims Ateuh, together with the moekims Hoho and Lamdjamoe of the V Moekims Montassik, declared against the Dutch. To gather a great force about him, Toekoe Oemar had the wife of the acting hoeloebalang of the IX Moekims, Nja Mohammed, carried off to Lampisang in order to compel that chief to join him.
Anxiety and tension prevailed over the fate of the enclosed forward posts, for there were no troops available to relieve them. All available men were needed to occupy the posts of the geconcentreerde linie and to secure Koeta Radja and Oleh-leh.
The fortification of Nesoeh and Gedah
Nesoeh and Gedah, two quarters of Koeta Radja lying outside the Kraton, were strongly fortified. Nesoeh especially, with its extensive row of wooden houses on the south side, lay wholly unprotected and turned towards the most hostile front. Beuming explains that Nesoeh was the quarter where the dwellings of the senior officers lay — spacious handsome houses with pavilions, surrounded on both sides by a fine garden. To protect this quarter a breastwork and wooden fence were erected at the weakest point, by the guard-house and the laboratory of the artillery, and the whole quarter was then surrounded by a heavy entanglement of barbed wire.
Reinforcement and the arrival of Vetter
At last, after a time of tension, two companies of the 17e Bataljon, in garrison at Padang, arrived at Oleh-leh on 3 April 1896 under the command of Majoor Soeters. The men of the 17e Bataljon were distributed without delay over the posts Blang, Lamdjamoe and Ketapan Doea, by which the troops temporarily quartered there became available again.
The struggle was in full swing. Shots rang continually from the surrounding kampongs and in the distance the guns of the forward posts thundered. Between Tjot Iri and Lampermé the tram was regularly fired on. To secure against nocturnal surprises, ambushes were laid every night in the terrain between the road to Ketapan Doea and Oleh-leh, and this strip was fantastically lit by the electric searchlight of the warships.
On 7 April the Java troops were received with great joy. With them arrived the army commander General Vetter and Majoor Breijer as his adjutant, while Kolonel Stemfoort likewise arrived from Padang to act as military commander.
The excursion of 8 April to Biloel and Lamkoenjit
The very next day the Dutch proceeded to restore communication with Biloel and Lamkoenjit. In this excursion took part the 3e, the 14e, two companies of the 9e Bataljon, sections of mountain artillery, the necessary engineer troops and two platoons of cavalry. Under heavy fire from the enemy and overcoming stubborn resistance, they succeeded in reaching Biloel and Lamkoenjit, and the garrison of Lamkoenjit was reinforced.
Meanwhile came the report that Toekoe Oemar was advancing with 4,000 men. Because the troops already had a heavy task behind them, the commanding officer thought it advisable to take up the retreat, so that Biloel could not be further reinforced. The march had cost heavy sacrifices: killed were the captain of infantry F. P. A. Geluk, three European and four native fusiliers; wounded were the 1st lieutenants J. H. Hoeksteijn and R. ten Seldam, together with ten European and thirteen native fusiliers.
Preparations: the siege battery at Lamdjamoe
To bring the terrain before Lampisang, Toekoe Oemar’s territory, thoroughly under artillery fire, various preparatory measures were taken at Lamdjamoe. A siege battery had been thrown up, consisting of a breastwork of sandbags connecting on both sides with the benting and the railway embankment. On the corners two blockhouses were erected and a horizontal barbed-wire entanglement was added for protection. The pieces present were eight mortars of 20 cm, six guns of 12 cm A. and six field pieces of 7 cm — twenty muzzles in all. To observe the effect of the projectiles better and at the same time to spy out the foreground, an extraordinarily high sentry-box had been erected.
The navy was also to take part in the bombardment of Lampisang: the warships Koningin Wilhelmina, the Tromp and the Sumbawa, armed respectively with 22, 32 and 6 pieces of 28, 21 and 17 cm, were to open fire at the first signal from Oleh-leh and the Kroeng Raba bay.
Meanwhile on 26 April the 10e Bataljon and three companies of the 5e Bataljon embarked at Semarang, and on the following day the 4th company of that corps, the 2nd battery of mountain artillery, one platoon of cavalry and two sections of engineer troops.
The ultimatum and the bombardment of 27 April
These preparations did not remain hidden from Toekoe Oemar. Apparently not feeling at ease, he wrote yet another letter to the headquarters at Koeta Radja in which he again gave assurance of his unshakeable loyalty and tried to dispose the administration favourably towards him. The Regeeringscommissaris put the untruth of his assertion to him and set him a short term to deliver up the arms and munitions he had received, to raze the fortifications he had constructed and to submit.
When after this letter he let nothing further be heard from him, he was dismissed by decision of the acting Governor of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden as Panglima Prang-Besaar of the Government and as hoeloebalang of Lepong, and in the early morning of 27 April 1896 a powerful fire from all pieces of the land and sea forces was opened on Pakan Badak, Pasar Oleh Gli and Lampisang.
The royal telegram
Beuming records that on 27 April 1896 General Vetter received a telegram from Amsterdam reading: Diner gisteren brachten hulde krijgsmacht Atjeh; geestdriftig toegejuicht. Met beste wenschen waardeering en volle vertrouwen volgen troepen en operaties. WILHELMINA EN EMMA — at yesterday’s dinner homage was paid to the armed forces in Atjeh; enthusiastically cheered. With best wishes, appreciation and full confidence we follow the troops and operations. See Telegram of Wilhelmina and Emma to General Vetter (27 April 1896).
That all who then formed part of the land and sea forces in Atjeh were deeply sensible of this high proof of appreciation from their beloved sovereigns, Beuming writes, scarcely needs mention. The telegram brought new enthusiasm into the ranks.
The razing of the forward posts
Before the decisive blow, the former Dutch forward posts — Sennelop, Lamsoet, Anak Galoeng, Lambarih, Biloel, Lamkoenjit, Kroeng Gloempang, Tjot Rang, Toengkoep and the blockhouses lying between them — were razed after their garrisons had been relieved, an operation in which again many losses on the Dutch side were to be lamented. New reinforcements from Java had arrived; all attention could now be given to the decisive blow.
Plan of attack
Accurately informed of the position of Toekoe Oemar, the available troops marched out in complete silence at about two o’clock in the night of 23 May to begin the forward movements in the early morning. Besides a reserve of the 5e Bataljon, a section of artillery and two platoons of cavalry which remained at Koeta Radja, numbers of men from the last-arrived troops were told off to defend the encampments at Koeta Radja and Oleh-leh.
Against the enemy’s main position, which extended from the Boekit Kasoemba to the coast, the Dutch were to operate with different columns, in order at once to command a broad strip of terrain and, by a converging movement of the wings or flank troops together with a forward pressure of the centre, to drive the enemy in a south-westerly direction.
According to the reports received, the enemy position was formidably strong and divided over several lines. Each line was formed by the kampongs put in a state of defence, surrounded by numbers of great and small bentings and trenches. Umar too, Beuming observes, remained true to the Acehnese tradition and sought his strength in the making of formidable positions. His men were all well armed with breech-loading rifles and amply provided with munitions.
The disposition of the Dutch troops before the action was as follows: the 12e and 14e Bataljon at Lamtih; the 9e Bataljon with one section of artillery and engineer troops at Blang; while the main force, consisting of the 3e and 6e Bataljon, eight brigades of marechaussée, the koloniale reserve, two platoons of cavalry, four sections of mountain artillery, two detachments of engineer troops, the train and the ambulance, was drawn up at Ketapan Doea. The 7e Bataljon with artillery and cavalry was held in reserve behind Ketapan Doea.
The general plan was that the 12e and 14e Bataljon should attack and occupy the enemy’s left wing to draw attention from the main body; the part posted at Blang should take the kampongs before that post and then take position at Lampasi; and the great or main attack should be made by the force from Ketapan Doea. The mountains east of Lampisang were to be climbed; the 3e Bataljon and the marechaussée — ons keurkorps, the Dutch élite corps — under Overste Van Heutsz were to occupy the Glé Poetih, while the 6e Bataljon and one section of artillery took position in the kampongs south of Ketapan Doea to prevent the enemy pressing up from the III Moekims Daroe.
First day, 23 May: the climbing of the Glé Poetih
The attack began with a forward movement of the Van Heutsz column. While the 6e Bataljon took position about 900 metres south of Ketapan Doea and the artillery brought a fortification on the Boekit Kasoemba under fire, the climbing of the Glé Poetih — Beuming glosses the name as Blankenberg, white mountain — was begun.
With very great difficulty the 3e Bataljon and the 2nd mountain battery succeeded in climbing the very steep slopes. De kranige Amboineesche fuseliers van het 3e gaven hierbij de stoutste stukjes van durf te zien; ze klommen letterlijk als apen tegen de rotsen omhoog — the gallant Ambonese fusiliers of the 3rd showed the boldest feats of daring, climbing literally like apes up the rocks. On arrival, preparations were at once made to lay out a defensible bivouac; but the space on the summit proved too small to hold all the troops, so that a section of artillery with the horses and mules had to be sent away.
By the climb a splendid position had been won that dominated the whole terrain and lay opposite Lampisang. Scarcely having taken position, the artillery began to bombard the surrounding enemy positions in tremendous fashion. Het waren gewoonweg prachtschoten, die van den Glé Poetih vielen — they were simply magnificent shots that fell from the Glé Poetih, and the effect in the enemy bentings was frightful.
While the guns thundered, the 6e Bataljon occupied a position at Lampasi (south). Meanwhile the 9e Bataljon had advanced and made itself master of kampong Adjoen Tobal; resistance here was very great and many losses fell on the Dutch side.
The most stubborn fighting was on the enemy’s left wing. The 12e and 14e Bataljon were engaged in a violent firefight and met strong resistance; at the cost of very many losses Lamtengah, Lammanjang and Lam-isi were taken in succession.
The Koloniale Reserve at Lamtengah
The koloniale reserve, which came into action here, bore itself gallantly. At Lamtengah especially it had a hard time, and its commander, de sympathieke kapitein Drijber, was wounded in arm and leg. He refused to be carried to the ambulance and, borne in a tandoe, continued to command in the midst of his brave men. This rare proof of courage in the beloved commander so transported the men that they threw themselves on the enemy with a thundering hurrah. Ze waren gewoonweg onweerstaanbaar, die Nijmeegsche jongens — they were simply irresistible, those Nijmegen lads.
The rifle fire from the knodsen — the barrack term for the 6.5 mm repeating rifles — brought death and destruction into the enemy ranks. Unable to withstand this murderous fire, after a furious hand-to-hand fight the benting was taken, in which several Acehnese were killed. Beuming records the epithets the Acehnese shouted at the Dutch in the struggle: anjing blanda (Dutch dog) and kafir makan babi (Christian dog that eats pork). In the benting the Dutch found a great number of Beaumont rifles that had in their time been issued by them to Toekoe Oemar.
Darkness fell and the troops occupied their bivouacs; the 3e, 6e and 9e Bataljon bivouacked entire, while of the 12e and 14e only two companies remained on the field. Great kampongs were chosen for the bivouacs and the night passed quietly. The day’s victorious advance had cost the Dutch a good 160 men in dead and wounded; on the enemy’s side more than 500 men had been killed or wounded.
Second day, 24 May: the taking of Lampisang
On 24 May the advance was made on the main object of the march, Lampisang. The 5e Bataljon, which had meanwhile also been called up, advanced along the high road on Lampisang; the 6e and 9e Bataljon operated along the foot of the mountains, while the 12e Bataljon advanced from Lamtengah on Lamroekan and then occupied Lamoedjong and Lamgoe.
The high road to Lampisang was barred at Lambelang by an artfully constructed heavy breastwork, which was taken after violent resistance. Foot by foot the enemy defended every strip of terrain, but he was always forced with tremendous losses to yield.
At last Lampisang was reached. The enemy, terribly harassed by the Dutch artillery and rifle fire, had sought safety in headlong flight. The dwelling of Umar — een prachtig huis hem indertijd door het Gouvernement ten geschenke gegeven, a splendid house given him in his time as a present by the Government — was found empty. A feeling of satisfaction took possession of the Dutch when they at last reached the territory of the traitor, and Beuming leaves the reader to guess what fate befell his possessions. The photograph of the house in the book is captioned as having been destroyed by bombs and shells when the treason came to light, and levelled with the ground during the march to Lampisang.
Third day, 25 May: Beradin, Boekit Seboen and the Kroeng Raba
Bivouac was again taken, and on 25 May the last part of the march was undertaken. Resistance was now no less violent, and the Dutch received much fire especially from the enemy-occupied bentings lying in the mountains; an overwhelming artillery fire brought it to silence.
Beradin was taken by the 12e Bataljon, while the western and eastern mountain ridges were occupied by the 9e and 7e Bataljon respectively. So they approached Boekit Seboen, where the resistance reached its climax. Here were two very strong enemy bentings, which were taken after an easterly turning movement by the 5e Bataljon. Out of one of these bentings a band of about a hundred Acehnese attempted a klewang attack, raising a monotonous Koran chant; scarcely in the open field, they were shot down to the last man.
Driving all before them and laying the enemy kampongs in ashes, the troops pressed forward to the Kroeng Raba. The object of the march was completely attained: everywhere the enemy had been driven from his positions and the whole territory of Toekoe Oemar destroyed and burnt als een welverdiende straf voor zijn laaghartig verraad — as a well-deserved punishment for his base treason.
Result
The retreat of the troops took place undisturbed, and whatever had escaped attention was now destroyed as well. On 26 May all troops were back at Koeta Radja. The success was great, but bought at the cost of many sacrifices: a good 200 of the Dutch had been killed or wounded, and the losses on the enemy’s side were estimated at more than 1,000 men in dead and wounded. According to spies’ reports Toekoe Oemar had taken refuge in Lepong.
With this march the disturbances of 1896 were, if not ended, at least for the time brought to a stand. However Umar may for a moment, relying on his treason and reckoning on a weak resistance, have cherished the hope of crushing the Dutch, he had after this march undoubtedly gained the conviction that de Bandera Wolanda — the Dutch flag — never yields from the place where it has been planted at the cost of so many precious human lives.
See Also
- Teuku Umar
- Lampisang
- Beradin
- Boekit Seboen
- Glé Poetih
- Boekit Kasoemba
- J. B. van Heutsz
- J. A. Vetter
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Drijber
- Koloniale Reserve
- Telegram of Wilhelmina and Emma to General Vetter (27 April 1896)
- Bombardment of Lampisang 27 April-23 May 1896
- Kroeng Raba
- 23 May
- 25 May
- 1896
Source
Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, met speciaal vervaardigde kaart en toepasselijke photo’s, bewerkt door P. H. R. Beuming, oud-onderofficier van het Ned.-Indische Leger (Amsterdam, December 1911; uitgegeven ten bate van het te stichten Herstellingsoord voor Rijks-Ambtenaren). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br N 82-144
Acknowledgement of sources. The material in this article derives from Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, met speciaal vervaardigde kaart en toepasselijke photo’s, bewerkt door P. H. R. Beuming, oud-onderofficier van het Ned.-Indische Leger (Amsterdam, December 1911). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.