Surprise of Ana' Galoeng (29 June 1896)

The Surprise of Ana’ Galoeng — Verrassing van Ana’ Galoeng op 29 Juni 1896 — was the three-colonne night attack by Dutch forces under Luitenant-Kolonel Van Heutsz (1e colonne), Luitenant-Kolonel G. F. Soeters (2e colonne) and Luitenant-Kolonel C. J. Laceulle (3e colonne) on the benteng (fort) of Ana’ Galong in the early hours of 29 June 1896, which opened the second semester of 1896 in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel. The post — het hart van Groot-Atjeh (the heart of Great Aceh) — had been the former main residence of Teungkoe di Tiro, who also died there, and had been conquered by Teuku Umar’s legion on 30 November 1893 during the subjection of Teuku Umar. The Dutch had retaken the post briefly but abandoned it again, and by mid-1896 it had been reoccupied and refortified by the Acehnese with de stevige verticale ijzerdraadversperring van onzen ouden post (the sturdy vertical barbed-wire entanglement of our old post) still in good order. The operation — the most ambitious Dutch verrassing (surprise) of the second semester — was launched on the night of 28–29 June 1896, the very night after the departure of Lt.-Gen. Vetter as Regeeringscommissaris.

Strategic Background

By the close of the first semester of 1896 the Dutch counter-offensive had achieved its principal immediate objectives — the breaking of the sieges of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, the destruction of Umar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang, and the tuchtiging (punitive expedition) of the Lam-Krak and Montassik regions — but the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) of Koeta-Radja remained the limit of effective Dutch control, and Umar himself remained at large in Lepong. The benteng (fort) of Ana’ Galoeng, which the Dutch had abandoned early in the year, had been reoccupied and refortified by the Acehnese, and its garrison — initially estimated at circa 50 man but in reality closer to 200 — controlled the principal route from Koeta-Radja to the interior of the XXVI Moekims and the III Moekims Lamkrak. The recapture of Ana’ Galoeng was thus both a military necessity — to deny the Acehnese a forward base within striking distance of the geconcentreerde linie — and a political gesture — to retake the hart van Groot-Atjeh which had been lost in the Umar defection of 29 March 1896.

The Three Colonne Plan

The plan of the operation, as recorded by Kruisheer, divided the Dutch force into three colonnes. Volgens de instructie moest de 1e colonne de tuchtiging ten uitvoer leggen, de 2e haren terugtocht op den linker- de 3e op den rechteroever der Atjeh-rivier dekken. The 1e colonne, under Luitenant-Kolonel Van Heutsz, was tasked with the surprise storming of Ana’ Galoeng itself: Het zoo snel mogelijk, bij verrassing, vermeesteren van het door den vijand bezette Ana Galoeng, het verbranden van de kampongs Rahat en Sibreh der VII Moekims Baid, en het vernietigen der eigendommen aldaar. Na afloop den terugtocht aannemen via Ana’ Galoeng, Lambarih naar Lambaroe. The 2e colonne, under Luitenant-Kolonel Soeters, was to eene opname-stelling in den Oostrand van Ana Baté en Glieng kiezen, die in het noorden aangeleund was legen den Ana’ Galoengdijk en verder een deel van den noordrand van Kling bezetten — to take up a position in the eastern edge of Ana Baté and Glieng, leaning in the north against the Ana’ Galoengdijk and further occupying part of the northern edge of Kling. The 3e colonne, under Luitenant-Kolonel Laceulle, was to zich vastzetten in den Oostrand van Lam-Oe — to fix itself in the eastern edge of Lam-Oe — and to patrol the kampongs between Tjot Goet and Belang, levelling the enemy fortifications of Tjot Goet, Tjot Gloempang and Lamsoet. Branden en plunderen was voor deze colonne streng verboden — burning and plundering was strictly forbidden for this colonne.

The hour of departure was set at midnight of 28–29 June 1896 for the 1e colonne from Koeta-Radja, at 5:30 AM for the 2e colonne from Lambaroe, and at 6 AM for the 3e colonne also from Lambaroe. Extra-treinen zorgden voor het overbrengen naar dien post — extra trains provided the transport to Lambaroe. Ana’ Galoeng was volgens berichten door ±50 man bezet, Passar Sibreh door 30-en Sibreh (Ba’ Seping) door 12 man. In Ba’ Tjerlaq, Blang Tjoct, Bockloet, Lambarih en Belang zouden zich geen vijanden ophouden. Een paar bruggen waren algebroken. The intelligence thus estimated the enemy strength at Ana’ Galoeng at 50 men — but at 2:30 AM, on the point of departure, the Civiel Gezaghebber at Lambaroe communicated revised intelligence: volgens de laatste berichten binnen Ana Galoeng geen 50, maar 200 vijanden zaten, en dat de wallen, met de stevige verticale ijzerdraadversperring van onzen ouden post, nog in goeden staat verkeerden. The news was den voorhoede-commandant onaangenaam — unpleasant to the advance-guard commander — above all because middelen om het stekeldraad door te knippen, niet medegenomen waren en zoo was het te voorzien, dat de vernieling ons verliezen zou berokkenen (means to cut the barbed wire had not been brought along, and so it was to be foreseen that the destruction would cause us losses).

The Night March on the Ana’ Galoengdijk

The 1e colonne marched out along the Ana’ Galoengdijk — the raised road or dyke which led from the Dutch lines to the benteng (fort). By 4 AM the advance guard had reached Blang Tjoet; het laatste bruggetje voor Ana’ Galoeng bleek afgebroken: daar het terrein aan weerszijden droog was, leverde dit geen bezwaar op (the last little bridge before Ana’ Galoeng proved to be broken: since the terrain on either side was dry, this presented no difficulty). Toen de voorste compagnie van het 3e Bataljon (de snelladers) deze brug voorbij was, zond de colonne-commandant haar vlug naar voren, om de inmiddels reeds afgemarcheerde maréchaussée’s in te halen en bij den aanval op de benteng te steunen (when the forward compagnie of the 3e Bataljon — the snelladers, or rapid-fire compagnie — had passed this bridge, the colonne-commandant sent it rapidly forward, to overtake the already-advanced maréchaussée and to support them in the attack on the benteng (fort)).

The order of march on the dyke was: voorop de 5e, 6e, 7e en 8e brig. onder den 1e luit. W. Stoop; [then] C. Wagener; [then] den commandant der maréchaussée’s met den luit. Vis en vier maréchaussée’s; dan de 10e, 11e, 12e, en 9e [brig.]; ten slotte de 1e luit. G. K. Dijkstra met de 4e, 2e en 3e brig., den trein en de 1e brig. als dekking trein. At the head of the snelladers compagnie marched 1e Luit. K. J. C. Rijnen; with the 2nd peloton of 1e Luit. C. G. Meerburg was joined Kapitein J. H. P. van Aken, and 2e Luit. B. Tammes was attached as section commander. Op circa 4 à 500 M. van Ana Galoeng, marcheerden drie brigades van luit. Stoop ten W. van den dijk in linie op, de 4e bleef in reserve daarachter, ten einde aldus behoedzaam tegen de W.- en Z.-face op te rukken — at about 400–500 metres from Ana’ Galoeng, three brigades of Lt. Stoop deployed in line west of the dyke, the 4e remaining in reserve behind them, in order to advance cautiously against the west and south faces. De afdeeling Wagener ging aan de oostzijde van den weg zoo gedekt en stil mogelijk, in marschcolonne, onder langs den dijk, om met 3 brigades aan de noordzijde binnen te dringen, terwijl de 6e brig. zich naar de oosterface zou wenden. De afdeeling Dijkstra met de 1e brig. bleven, evenals de commandant van het korps, op den dijk doormarcheeren. The plan was thus a four-face assault on the benteng: Stoop against the south and west, Wagener against the north and east, Dijkstra and the korps-commandant at the main gate.

The Assault with the Klewang

Den maréchaussée’s was gelast, de verrassing te doen plaats hebben zonder vuren, dus uitsluitend met de klewang — the maréchaussée were ordered to carry out the surprise without firing, that is, exclusively with the klewang (the Dutch cutlass). Aan de officieren was evenwel vrijheid gelaten, hiervan af te wijken, zoo zulks dringend noodzakelijk bleek — the officers were nevertheless given the liberty to deviate from this, if it should prove urgently necessary. Een blaffende hond dreigde nog een oogenblik de naderende troepen te zullen verraden. Duidelijk teekende de benteng met het verhoogde schilderhuis boven de poort, zich in het heldere maanlicht af — a barking dog threatened for a moment to betray the approaching troops. Clearly the benteng (fort) with its raised watch-house above the gate stood out in the bright moonlight.

Met spoed werd de omsingeling volbracht en bijna gelijktijdig begon aan alle vier facen de vernieling en overklimming der verticale stekeldraadversperring — the encirclement was rapidly completed and almost simultaneously the destruction and climbing-over of the vertical barbed-wire entanglement began on all four faces. Zooals verwacht, gemakkelijk ging ‘t niet, meermalen te vergeefs, beproefden de maréchaussée’s hunne klewangs op het taaie draad — as expected, it did not go easily; repeatedly in vain the maréchaussée tried their klewangs on the tough wire — met het nadeelige gevolg, dat de bezetting gealarmeerd werd en voor een deel op de banketten, de bastions en in het verhoogde schilderhuis verscheen en 4 u. 45’ v.m. het vuur op de onzen opende (with the disadvantageous consequence that the garrison was alarmed and partly appeared on the banquettes, the bastions, and in the raised watch-house, and at 4:45 AM opened fire on our men).

The Fighting Inside the Benteng

Van de afdeeling Stoop kwamen de 6e en 7e brigade over de versperring en bereikten met hun afdeeling-commandant de borstwering aan de zuiderface, tusschen de zich daar bevindende coupure en het Z. W. bastion — from Stoop’s detachment the 6th and 7th brigades came over the entanglement and reached with their detachment-commandant the parapet of the south face, between the coupure there and the SW bastion. Een talrijke vijand ontving hen hier, doch werd met de klewang teruggeslagen — a numerous enemy received them here, but was driven back with the klewang (cutlass (klewang)). De maréchaussée’s Tichelaer, No. 21345, Walewangko, No. 9487, Kainama, No. 29609, en Kariostiko, No. 34424, drongen door de coupure naar binnen en zetten daar op eigen gelegenheid den strijd voort — the maréchaussée Tichelaer (No. 21345), Walewangko (No. 9487), Kainama (No. 29609), and Kariostiko (No. 34424) pushed through the coupure inward and there continued the fight on their own initiative. The 8th brigade kwam voor het Z. W. bastion terecht, waaruit zoo hevig geschoten werd, dat zij er niet in slaagde hier binnen te komen — came up before the SW bastion, from which such heavy fire was delivered that it failed to enter. De luit. Stoop haar hachelijken toestand waarnemend, riep middels fluitsignaal de als reserve achtergelaten 5e brigade ter harer hulpe. Onmiddellijk gaf deze aan den oproep gehoor, en met vereende krachten drong men toen ook daar door en verjoeg den vijand naar de binnenruimte, echter ten koste van één doode en wat gewonden onzerzijds — Lt. Stoop, observing their precarious situation, called by whistle-signal the 5th brigade, held back in reserve, to their aid. Immediately this one responded to the call, and with combined forces they too forced their way through and drove the enemy into the interior — at the cost, however, of one dead and some wounded on our side.

De afdeeling Wagener, die aan de noordzijde de versperring beklom, kreeg bij de poort, waar zich de commandant bevond, aldra steun van de brigades Dijkstra, waarop hij zijn eigen brigades oost- en westwaarts van dien ingang deed verspreiden — Wagener’s detachment, which climbed the entanglement on the north side, soon received support at the gate, where the commandant was, from Dijkstra’s brigades, whereupon he spread his own brigades east and west of that entrance. De Ambt. mar. Singah, No. 19714, klom langs een der stijlen van de poort naar boven, hielp ook zijn brigadecommandant, den Eur. serg. Reis, No. 21748, over de versperring en liet zich toen naar binnen vallen — the Ambonese maréchaussée Singah (No. 19714) climbed up one of the gate’s uprights, helped his brigade-commandant, the European Sergeant Reis (No. 21748), over the entanglement, and then let himself drop inside. Tegelijkertijd werden twee kleine mannen, da Costa, No. 35135, en Semplok, No. 20427, door de kameraden over de versperring getild — at the same time two small men, da Costa (No. 35135) and Semplok (No. 20427), were lifted over the entanglement by their comrades. Onder hevig vuur van de borstwering, openden deze beiden nu de poort, waardoor ook de anderen binnen de versperring kwamen — under heavy fire from the parapet, these two now opened the gate, through which the others too came inside the entanglement.

The peloton snelladers of Lt. Rijnen had de maréchaussée’s op den voet gevolgd en onder den commandant ten deele de borstwering O. van de hoofdpoort beklommen — had followed the maréchaussée closely and partly climbed the parapet east of the main gate under the commandant. Aanvankelijk van slechts vier minderen vergezeld, stuitte die officier binnen de benteng op een grooten drom vijanden, die onmiddellijk geattaqueerd en teruggedreven werd. Daarbij sneuvelde de Eur. serg. Verhey, No. 24109 — initially accompanied by only four subordinates, that officer encountered inside the benteng (fort) a large throng of enemies, who were immediately attacked and driven back. In that fighting the European Sergeant Verhey (No. 24109) fell. De rest van het peloton voegde zich weldra bij hun commandant — the rest of the peloton soon joined their commandant.

The Personal Combats and the Wounding of Luit. Rijnen

In de binnenruimte der versterking ontstond nu een verwoed gevecht, waarbij men over en weder van vuur- en blanke wapens gebruik maakte — in the interior of the fortification a furious combat now arose, in which on both sides firearms and cold steel were used. Velen onderscheidden zich in dezen strijd — many distinguished themselves in this fight. De Amb. mar. Daga, No. 31724, redde eerst den luit. Stoop het leven en sprong toen luit. Wagener, die het met een viertal Atjehers te kwaad had, te hulp — the Ambonese maréchaussée Daga (No. 31724) first saved Lt. Stoop’s life and then sprang to the aid of Lt. Wagener, who was in trouble with four Acehnese. Kort daarop werd die officier in den duim verwond en opnieuw besprongen: gelukkig kwam toen luit. Rijnen juist opdagen — shortly afterwards that officer was wounded in the thumb and attacked again: fortunately Lt. Rijnen then arrived on the scene. Deze schoot en sloeg een drietal vijanden neer, verwondde een vierde maar kreeg zelf een geweerschot in de dij, dat hem voorover deed vallen — he shot and cut down three enemies, wounded a fourth, but received himself a rifle-shot in the thigh, which caused him to fall forward. Zich willende oprichten gaf een vijand hem een klewanghouw in den rug en maakte een ander zich gereed hem verder af te maken — seeking to raise himself, an enemy gave him a klewang (cutlass (klewang)) blow in the back, and another prepared to finish him off. Luit. Wagener vond toen gelegenheid zijne rekening te vereffenen en met hulp van de Eur. fus. Geurden, No. 34009, de Bock, No. 33458, en Iterson, No. 36355, en wat maréchaussée’s werden de aanvallers teruggedreven — Lt. Wagener then found the opportunity to settle his account, and with the help of the European fusiliers Geurden (No. 34009), de Bock (No. 33458), and Iterson (No. 36355), and some maréchaussée, the attackers were driven back.

Luit. Dijkstra, meanwhile, had niet stil gezeten — had not been idle. Onder vuur, dat van onder en uit de huizen kwam, dreef hij een troep vijanden voor zich uit naar de zuiderface, waar de afdeeling Stoop zich toen juist op de borstwering vertoonde — under fire, which came from below and from the houses, he drove a troop of enemies before him towards the south face, where Stoop’s detachment was just then showing itself on the parapet. Zelf nam luitenant Dijkstra drie man voor zijne rekening en juist wilde hij een gewond maréchaussée weer op de been helpen, toen hij door een paar Atjehers werd besprongen — Luit. Dijkstra himself took three men to his account and was just about to help a wounded maréchaussée back to his feet, when he was attacked by a couple of Acehnese. Een werd door den Amb. Kalolo, No. 32182, gedood, de ander bracht den luitenant een krachtigen klewanghouw in de borst toe, en werd toen door toeschietende maréchaussée’s onschadelijk gemaakt — one was killed by the Ambonese Kalolo (No. 32182), the other dealt the lieutenant a powerful klewang (cutlass (klewang)) blow to the chest, and was then rendered harmless by maréchaussée who came running up.

The Death of Sergeant Verhey and the Wounding of Kapitein Graafland

In addition to the fall of Sergeant Verhey (No. 24109), Kapitein Graafland — who commanded the maréchaussée — kreeg reeds vóór het poortje in de ijzerdraadversperring een schot door zijn helmhoed, dat hem deed neertuimelen, zich oprichtend kreeg hij een tweede door het been — received, already before the little gate in the barbed-wire entanglement, a shot through his helmet that caused him to tumble; rising, he received a second through the leg. Ondersteund door een paar ondergeschikten, kwam hij met de 4e brigade de hoofdpoort binnen, maar was toen genoodzaakt in een tandoe te gaan liggen — supported by a couple of subordinates, he came with the 4th brigade through the main gate, but was then obliged to lie in a tandoe (palanquin). Even te voren sprong uit een huis een Atjeher van achteren op den kapitein toe. Hij werd betijds door den Amb. fus. Lappers, No. 39170, en den Eur. fus. Busch, No. 36099, opgevangen — shortly before, an Acehnese had sprung from a house at the captain from behind. He was caught in time by the Ambonese fusilier Lappers (No. 39170) and the European fusilier Busch (No. 36099). Zij brachten toen den gewonde weer achteruit naar de poort, waar beter voor zijn veiligheid gezorgd kon worden — they then brought the wounded man back to the gate, where better care could be taken for his safety.

The Tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahat

After the storming of the benteng — which had cost the Dutch one dead (Sergeant Verhey) and a number of wounded, including Luit. Rijnen, Luit. Wagener (thumb), Luit. Dijkstra (chest), and Kapitein Graafland (leg) — the 1e colonne proceeded to the second part of its mission: het verbranden van de kampongs Rahat en Sibreh der VII Moekims Baid, en het vernietigen der eigendommen aldaar — the burning of the kampongs of Rahat and Sibreh of the VII Moekims Baid, and the destruction of the properties there. This tuchtiging — the punitive destruction which had become the standard Dutch response to Acehnese resistance — was applied to the kampongs of the III Moekims Lamkrak in the immediate vicinity of Ana’ Galoeng. The tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahat was thus the closing act of the surprise operation — the visible demonstration, to the surrounding population, of the consequence of harbouring or supporting the Acehnese resistance at the benteng (fort) which the Acehnese had considered the hart van Groot-Atjeh.

The Withdrawal and the Cost

Na afloop den terugtocht aannemen via Ana’ Galoeng, Lambarih naar Lambaroe — after completion, the retreat was to be taken via Ana’ Galoeng, Lambarih, to Lambaroe. The three colonnes withdrew to the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) on the morning of 29 June 1896, having achieved the principal objective of the operation: the recapture and destruction of the benteng (fort) of Ana’ Galoeng. The cost — one dead and several wounded, including three officers — was, by the standards of the second semester of 1896, relatively light, and the operation was judged a success. Het eerste telegram bereikte den leger-commandant nog te Padang. Zijne Excellentie antwoordde met een gelukwensch en uitte zijne beste wenschen voor de gewonden — the first telegram reached the army-commandant still at Padang. His Excellency [the Governor-General] replied with a congratulation and expressed his best wishes for the wounded.

Significance

The significance of the Surprise of Ana’ Galoeng in the documentary record of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel is that of the opening operation of the second semester of 1896 — the operation which established the operational tempo for the post-Vetter, post-De Moulin period, and which demonstrated that the Dutch retained the capacity for ambitious multi-colonne night attacks even after the institutional upheaval of the Vetter departure and the De Moulin death. The operation’s success — achieved with the klewang (cutlass (klewang)) alone, in the face of a 200-man garrison and a sturdy barbed-wire entanglement — was a testament to the discipline and élan of the maréchaussée and the snelladers compagnie of the 3e Bataljon, and the personal courage of the officers Stoop, Wagener, Dijkstra, Rijnen, and Van Aken was recognised in the Dagorders granting military decorations for Atjeh ‘96. The tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahat which followed the storming — the burning of the kampongs of the III Moekims Lamkrak — was the visible face of the Dutch pacificatie (pacification) policy, and the operation as a whole established the framework within which the second semester of 1896 would unfold: the slow, methodical extension of effective Dutch control beyond the geconcentreerde linie, by means of repeated verrassingen and tuchtigingen, in preference to the permanent occupation of points beyond the line.

Account from Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh (1911)

P. H. R. Beuming devotes the fifth sketch of Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh to the operation under the title De overrompeling van Anak Galoeng, remarking that de détails van deze excursie zijn slechts aan weinigen bekend and that he would therefore try to give a businesslike description of them.

Occasion

After Toekoe Oemar had suffered a crushing defeat in the three-day battle in the Beradin pass, the turn came to the kampongs Sibreh and Rahat, which had still to be punished for the hostilities committed against the Van Blokland patrol and during the relief of the forward posts. When in the first days of June 1896 Lamkrak, het beruchte oord, was dealt with, many muttered that only half the work had been done, since Sibreh and Rahat did not share in the punishment and the benting Anak Galoeng, abandoned by the Dutch troops, was still in enemy hands. According to intelligence the Iman of Sibreh was lodged in it with 200 well-armed followers.

The Acehnese apparently believed that the Blanda’s would leave them undisturbed in possession of the former Dutch stronghold and could not in the least suspect that for them too the day of retribution was so near.

The order and the three columns

Scarcely had General Vetter left Atjeh on 28 June when Colonel Stemfoort summoned all corps commanders to the Government building in the afternoon. Such a summons, Beuming explains, meant: er wordt morgen op groote schaal uitgerukt.

Three columns were designated for the punishment of Sibreh and Rahat. The first, which had to perform the giant’s work, under the command of den beleidvollen Overste Van Heutsz, consisted of the Marechaussée, the 3e and the 6e Bataljon, led respectively by Captain Jhr. Graafland, Overste Hansen and Majoor Okhuizen. The second, under Overste Soeters, consisted of the half 7e, the 12e and 14e Bataljon, led respectively by Majoor Jacobs, Overste Soeters and Majoor Thomson. The third was under Overste Laceulle.

The first column was instructed to take Anak Galoeng by surprise and then to punish Sibreh and Rahat; the second to occupy the southern district towards Glieng and Indrapoeri and cover the retreat of the first column on the left bank of the Atjeh river; the third to do the same on the right bank.

The night approach

The Van Heutsz column marched out of the Kraton at twelve at night for Lambaroe, whence it began its nocturnal enterprise southward. Arrived at Lambarih, a benting the Dutch had earlier razed, they crept with great circumspection towards Anak Galoeng — want marcheeren kon het niet worden genoemd, for it could not be called marching. The marechaussée, strengthened by a platoon of fusiliers armed with repeating rifles, had to carry out the important enterprise.

All the corps officers took part: Captain Jhr. Graafland met zijn stoicijnsche kalmte, die door zijn soldaten op de handen gedragen werd; the gallant Lieutenant Dijkstra, die immer weinig sprak, maar veel uitvoerde; Lieutenant Wagener, who never failed to answer the roll when anything special was afoot; and Lieutenant Stoop. The corps had lost Lieutenant Vis on his appointment as controleur charged with the civil administration; but that this honourable post should keep him from the punishment of Sibreh and Rahat and the surprise of Anak Galoeng was too much for him, and he asked and obtained permission to take part. Beuming adds that little could that officer then suspect that three years later, in 1899, he would lose his life at the punishment of Toekoe Lhon. The platoon of fusiliers stood under the command of den dapperen luitenant Rijnen.

Slowly they went forward, creeping through the alang-alang. In the deepest silence Anak Galoeng was reached without the enemy noticing anything. Within the benting the enemy could be heard clearly praying from the Koran, een eentonig gezang, nu en dan onderbroken door het gillen van “Alah-lah ilah-lah.”

The forcing of the gate

The question was how to get in: the barbed wire, the bamboedoeri, the gate that could not be forced were insuperable obstructions. It was almost a quarter to five. Lieutenant Dijkstra had come with a handful of his brave men before the gate, where the Acehnese sentry stood asleep in a raised sentry-box, head bowed and both arms leaning on the muzzle of his rifle.

After vain attempts at various places to get inside, Dijkstra hit on een lumineus idee. With signs he made two Ambonese marechaussées standing beside him understand that he was strong enough to lift them over the gate. Zij hadden moeite hun hoera te weerhouden. With giant strength he lifted them over one after the other and placed them in de leeuwenkooi. Quickly the pin was removed from the beam closing the gate, the beam drawn off, the gate opened, and het angstaanjagend krijgsgeschreeuw der Amboineezen verkondigde wijd en zijd, dat een handvol dapperen van ‘t Indische leger den strijd op leven en dood waren begonnen.

The fight inside

It was then about five o’clock; the moon lit the surroundings only weakly and it was hard to distinguish friend from foe. To give an accurate description of that struggle, Beuming writes, is impossible: ieder die daar optrad doorleefde er een heldenleven. It was impossible for the Acehnese to leave his fortification, and he therefore fought there the fight for life and death.

Lieutenant Wagener received a gunshot wound through his left hand and was at the same moment set upon with the klewang, but Lieutenant Rijnen struck the assailant down. At the same moment Rijnen too was wounded by a shot in the hip and a klewang blow across the back; Wagener shot the enemy down with two well-aimed revolver shots and in his turn saved his colleague from certain death. Lieutenant Dijkstra received a klewang blow across the chest, but it went ill with the attacker, whom a formidable blow from an Ambonese rendered harmless.

Captain Graafland, surrounded by a few faithful men, moved among his gallant corps giving orders here and there, concealing that a gunshot wound had pierced his leg so as not to discourage the troop. The Acehnese fought like madmen and abused the Ambonese as moeka-Matjan — tiger-faces. De tijgergezichten bleven niet lijdelijk, maar sloegen er geducht op los.

Lieutenant Vis stood with his little troop outside at the only possible way out, to settle with the enemies who might try to save themselves by flight. But they did not yet come; he heard the deafening war-cry within, ‘t was om dol te worden, and with difficulty could he restrain his forty marechaussées.

Lieutenant Stoop was the only officer inside still unwounded, but his strength threatened to fail him. Several of the Dutch already lay powerless, the blood streaming from many wounds. Above the tumult sounded the characteristic voice of Captain Graafland, whose customary Anak-ke — my children — with which he often addressed his Ambonese made them well-nigh invincible. Maar ‘t was niet noodig, allen streden als helden. The wounded lieutenants thought no more of pain and loss of blood. The number of fighting Acehnese diminished by the second; men stumbled over the corpses.

Sergeant Vogel and the boy

Beuming preserves the episode of sergeant Vogel, whom the Ambonese called Oom-Pandjang, long uncle. Vogel became aware of half a dozen Acehnese and a small boy in an open hut; the benting was filled with such huts, which made the fighting more difficult. He summoned them to come out and surrender; they refused. Good counsel was dear: as little firing as possible was allowed, so as not to hit the comrades outside, and moreover Vogel wished at any price to save the child.

He had the hut set on fire and went inside. Under a rain of klewang blows, which he parried masterfully while dealing killing blows right and left, he seized the boy and dragged him, under a thundering cheer from his men, out of the hut. De jongen was gered, doch slechts voor een oogenblik. Toen men hem los liet, sprong hij de hut weer binnen en kwam met de anderen om in de vlammen. It grieved the good non-commissioned officer greatly that he had not been able to prevent this sad end.

The end of the action

It was about a quarter past five; no Acehnese showed himself any more. Lieutenant Vis was already in action with some sixteen enemies who wished to escape by the rear; he summoned them to surrender and, when they did not comply, they were cut down after a short hand-to-hand fight. So the fate of the enemies who had thought themselves safe in the former Dutch stronghold was decided within half an hour.

When the column commander had ophouden met vuren blown, the result could be surveyed. On the Dutch side five dead had fallen and four officers and twenty-nine other ranks were wounded; the enemy left 120 dead in Dutch hands. Of the officers only Lieutenant Rijnen was severely wounded, while the wounds of the twenty-nine marechaussées all proved not life-threatening. The officer of health had his hands full and all who were not wounded helped to bandage.

The march on Sibreh and Rahat

The first part of the instruction having been completely successful, the column set out to deal with Sibreh and Rahat; but the marechaussées could no longer be counted on and were sent back with the dead and wounded. When this band of heroes set itself in motion to march back to Lambaroe, barstte langs de geheele linie een donderend hoera los, als blijk van sympathie voor de kranige marechaussée’s — met recht het keurkorps van het Indische leger genoemd.

Encouraged by the brilliant success won in the early morning, the 3e and 6e Bataljon advanced victoriously, and by six o’clock a great part of the instruction had been fulfilled. De schrik zat er bij den vijand blijkbaar in, want nergens hield hij stand en vele Atjehers gaven zich met de wapens in de hand over.

Aftermath

That same day the fallen Acehnese were buried near Anak Galoeng. For a long time afterwards the Acehnese did not venture into the neighbourhood, and if they had unavoidably to pass it they kept as far off as possible, gedreven door een bijgeloovige vrees, because according to them een booze geest dwelt in the former Dutch stronghold — see Orang Setan. Beuming concludes that the Acehnese of Anak Galoeng, Sibreh and Rahat were thus punished for their treachery, and that the surprise of Anak Galoeng had become for them een spookbeeld, a spectre.

He adds that the events of 29 June 1896 gave the resistance a sensitive blow and had as their consequence dat zich onverwijld een aantal hoofden met hunne volgelingen ter onderwerping aan ons gezag aanmeldden — that a number of chiefs with their followers immediately presented themselves in submission to Dutch authority.

Account from the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930) — the corps’s first full deployment

the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië treats the action at Ana’ Galoeng as the first occasion on which the Korps Maréchaussée took the field “in zijn geheele samenstelling” — in its entire composition — and as the engagement in which it distinguished itself at once.

Until 1896 the maréchaussées had applied their strength chiefly to police and administrative functions inside the geconcentreerde linie; from that year they also entered the purely military field and began to seek out the enemy in his hiding places, a change of role the jubilee number credited to the initiative of the then captain Jhr. G. J. W. C. Graafland.

The corps’s strength on the day is given as three officers and 221 non-commissioned officers, corporals and men. Of the assault the account records only that, once the Maréchaussée had penetrated the versterking, “maakte zij er zich in een kwartier tijds meester van” — it made itself master of it in a quarter of an hour.

The editors placed the action at the head of the corps’s record of feats of arms, observing that “de historie van het Korps Maréchaussée is de geschiedenis van zijn bestaansrecht” — the history of the corps is the history of its right to exist — and noting that many pages of the works of Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, G. B. Hooyer, A. Kruisheer, J. C. J. Kempees and other writers on Atjeh were filled with the corps’s feats of arms.

Sources

ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt., pp. 1–14, 19–25, 222 (Dagorders).

Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh, met speciaal vervaardigde kaart en toepasselijke photo’s, bewerkt door P. H. R. Beuming, oud-onderofficier van het Ned.-Indische Leger (Amsterdam, December 1911; uitgegeven ten bate van het te stichten Herstellingsoord voor Rijks-Ambtenaren). Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Br N 82-144

Acknowledgement of sources. This article combines material from the publications cited above; the material newly added derives from Schetsen uit den strijd op Groot-Atjeh by P. H. R. Beuming (Amsterdam, 1911). Dutch passages are quoted in the original with an English rendering.

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.

tags	event, aceh-war, 1896, surprise-attack, ana-galong, groot-atjeh, kruisheer-vol3, hoofdstuk-iii, military-operation, night-attack, maréchaussée, snelladers, marechaussee, jubilee
aliases	Surprise of Ana' Galoeng (29 June 1896), Verrassing van Ana' Galoeng, Verrassing van Ana Galoeng op 29 Juni, the night attack on Ana' Galoeng, the surprise of Ana' Galoeng of 29 June 1896, Ana' Galoeng 29 June 1896, Bestorming van Ana' Galoeng, overrompeling van Anak Galoeng, the surprise of Anak Galoeng

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