The Tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahattuchtiging van Sibreh en Rahat — on 29 June 1896 was the punitive burning of the kampongs of Sibreh and Rahat of the III Moekims Lamkrak, undertaken as the closing act of the surprise of Ana’ Galoeng of 29 June 1896. The 1e colonne under Luitenant-Kolonel Van Heutsz, having stormed the benteng (fort) of Ana’ Galonghet hart van Groot-Atjeh — with the klewang (cutlass (klewang)) alone, carried out the explicit instruction recorded by Kruisheer: het verbranden van de kampongs Rahat en Sibreh der VII Moekims Baid, en het vernietigen der eigendommen aldaar — the burning of the kampongs of Rahat and Sibreh of the VII Moekims Baid, and the destruction of the properties there. The tuchtiging — the standard Dutch punitive response to Acehnese resistance — was thus the visible demonstration, to the surrounding population, of the consequence of harbouring or supporting the Acehnese resistance at the benteng (fort) which the Acehnese had considered the hart van Groot-Atjeh.

The Instruction

The instruction for the tuchtiging was recorded by Kruisheer as part of the operational plan of the surprise of Ana’ Galoeng. The 1e colonne, under Van Heutsz, was given the explicit objective: Het zoo snel mogelijk, bij verrassing, vermeesteren van het door den vijand bezette Ana Galoeng, het verbranden van de kampongs Rahat en Sibreh der VII Moekims Baid, en het vernietigen der eigendommen aldaar. Na afloop den terugtocht aannemen via Ana’ Galoeng, Lambarih naar Lambaroe. The kampongs of Sibreh and Rahat were thus targeted as the geographical and political support base of the Ana’ Galoeng garrison — the villages whose population had built and garrisoned the benteng, and whose eigendommen (properties, including houses, livestock, and rice stores) were to be destroyed.

Kruisheer’s intelligence on the kampongs was as follows: Ana’ Galoeng was volgens berichten door ±50 man bezet, Passar Sibreh door 30-en Sibreh (Ba’ Seping) door 12 man. In Ba’ Tjerlaq, Blang Tjoct, Bockloet, Lambarih en Belang zouden zich geen vijanden ophouden. The estimated enemy strength at Passar Sibreh was 30 men; at Sibreh (Ba’ Seping) — the Sibreh proper, distinguished by its alternative name Ba’ Seping — only 12 men. The tuchtiging was thus directed primarily against the civilian infrastructure of the III Moekims Lamkrak, with the military garrisons of the kampongs already dispersed or dissolved by the storming of the benteng (fort).

The III Moekims Lamkrak

The III Moekims Lamkrak — also written Lam-Krak Moekims — was the small sagi (territorial confederation (sagi)) or territorial confederation of three mukims (parish-districts) lying immediately to the south and west of Ana’ Galoeng, of which Sibreh and Rahat were the principal kampongs. The III Moekims Lamkrak had been the object of the tuchtiging of 9–10 June 1896 in the first semester of the year — a two-colonne operation under Bisschoff van Heemskerck and Van Heutsz which had penetrated the Lamkrak region and destroyed its principal bentengs. The tuchtiging of 29 June 1896 was thus the second Dutch punitive expedition against the III Moekims Lamkrak in less than three weeks — a repetition which reflects the limits of the Dutch pacificatie (pacification) policy in the second semester of 1896, and the difficulty of converting a single military victory into a durable political transformation.

The Burnings and the Withdrawal

After the storming of the benteng (fort) and the close of the fighting inside the binnenruimte, the 1e colonne proceeded to the burning of Sibreh and Rahat. The detail of the burnings is not separately narrated by Kruisheer — the operation is recorded as the closing act of the surprise, and the terugtocht (retreat) was taken via Ana’ Galoeng, Lambarih, to Lambaroe on the morning of 29 June 1896. The 2e colonne under Soeters and the 3e colonne under Laceulle likewise withdrew to Lambaroe, having completed their respective cordon and patrol missions in the eastern and western arms of the operation. Branden en plunderen was voor deze colonne streng verboden — for the 3e colonne (Laceulle), burning and plundering was strictly forbidden — but the 1e and 2e colonnes were authorised to carry out the tuchtiging (punitive expedition) of the kampongs within their assigned areas.

Significance

The significance of the Tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahat in the documentary record of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel is that of the closing act of the surprise of Ana’ Galoeng — the punitive face of the Dutch pacificatie (pacification) policy, applied to the III Moekims Lamkrak for the second time in three weeks. The operation demonstrates the standard Dutch pattern of the second semester of 1896: the storming of a benteng (fort) by the maréchaussée and snelladers, followed by the verbranden (burning) of the surrounding kampongs and the vernietigen (destruction) of their eigendommen — a pattern which would be repeated, with variations, throughout the second semester. The tuchtiging of Sibreh and Rahat also established the geographical framework for the subsequent operations of the second semester: the III Moekims Lamkrak, lying between the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) and the XXVI Moekims and XXII Moekims, became the principal theatre of Dutch operations in the second semester, and the kampongs of Sibreh and Rahat — which would be reoccupied by the Acehnese and re-tuchtiged by the Dutch — became the recurring object of the slow, attritional warfare which characterised the post-De Moulin period.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt., pp. 1–14, 19–25.