The Acehnese attack on Penajoeng (11 April 1874) was the massed daylight assault launched by a body of some 400 to 500 “zeer net uitgedoste” Atjehneezen — reinforced by hulptroepen from the coastal region of Pedir — on the Dutch omheining at Penajoeng on 11 April 1874, the day on which thousands more Atjehneezen waited in the boschrand to rush in once the wall was carried, and which was defeated only by the Dutch artillerie, whose fire stopped the advance, and by a half bataljon that flanked the attackers and drove them back behind the Pedir-dijk at the cost of a few enemy dead. Borel treats the attack as the clearest possible refutation of van Swieten’s forthcoming claim that the war was “geëindigd.”
The Build-Up
In the weeks before 11 April 1874 the Dutch had noted a steady build-up of Atjehnees forces in the interior. The padi-snijden concession of February–March had been followed, as Borel had predicted, by a sharp resumption of hostilities: the moment the last bundle of rice was cut, the Atjehneezen had reappeared “behoorlijk met hunne zware geweren gewapend” and opened a “levendig vuur.” Now, in early April, came news that hulptroepen from the coastal region of Pedir — the north-coast kingdom that had not yet been reduced — were marching south to reinforce the local Atjehnees confederations around the Kraton. The daylight raid on the bivouak of 13 January 1874 had been the work of a few dozen swordsmen. The attack of 11 April 1874 would be a concerted operation by a substantial army.
The Attack
On 11 April 1874 the Atjehneezen appeared “in grooten getale.” A band of 400 to 500 men, “zeer net uitgedoste” — very neatly dressed, in their best clothes, as if for a ceremonial occasion — advanced on the omheining at Penajoeng. Their intention, Borel writes, was to close with the wall and spring over it “met de klewang” — with the sword in hand. Behind this vanguard, thousands more Atjehneezen waited in the boschrand to rush in once the wall was carried. The plan was a coordinated assault in two waves: the first to break the Dutch line, the second to exploit the break.
Around noon the situation became “dreigend” enough that the alarm was sounded. The Dutch artillerie — the same vesting-artillerie that van Swieten would shortly ship back to Java — opened fire. The effect was immediate. The neat lines of the Atjehnees vanguard, exposed on the open ground before the omheining, broke under the fire of the guns. At the same time a half bataljon of infanterie was sent out to take the attackers in flank. Caught between the artillerie in front and the flanking infanterie on their side, the Atjehneezen broke and fled behind the Pedir-dijk, leaving a few dead on the field.
Borel’s Judgement
The defeat of the attack was, in its way, a tidy tactical success. The Dutch had lost few men, the Atjehneezen had lost the field, and the omheining at Penajoeng had held. But Borel reads the episode as evidence of precisely the opposite of what van Swieten would claim in his afscheidsrede of 23 April 1874. The enemy was not “geheel verslagen en ontmoedigd.” He was capable of putting 400–500 men in the field for a coordinated assault, supported by thousands more, and reinforced by hulptroepen from a hundred miles away. The artillerie that had saved the day was, within weeks, to be sent back to Java. The country that was supposed to be pacified was, in fact, mobilising. The noodlottige échec at Lampoe Oek five days later would confirm the lesson.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Penajoeng
- Pedir-dijk
- Acehnese attack on Penajoeng bivouak (13 January 1874)
- Battle of Lampoe Oek (16 April 1874)
- Padi-snijden on the Langkroek sawah (1874)
- Van Swieten declares the Aceh War ended (1874)
- Vesting-artillerie in Atjeh
- Klewang
- Jan van Swieten
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 54–56.