The kraton (institution) was the sultan’s fortified palace — the political, religious and military centre of the Atjehnese sultanate, and the seat of the Sultan’s authority. The Kraton of Atjeh — the particular kraton that fell to the Dutch on 24 January 1874 — was a sprawling earthen-walled fortress between the Mesigit and the Atjeh-rivier, containing the Sultan’s palace, the old burial place of sultans, and a large kerkhof (cemetery). Borel treats the occupation of the Kraton as a “grote strategische fout” — the fount of all the subsequent errors that he indicts.

The Kraton as Institution

The kraton was, in the Atjehnese (and broader Southeast Asian) political tradition, the sultan’s fortified palace — the physical embodiment of the Sultan’s authority and the political, religious and military centre of the sultanate. The kraton was at once a residence (for the Sultan and his court), a religious centre (containing or adjacent to the principal mesigit), a military fortress (with walls, grachten and borstweringen), a burial place (of the Sultan’s ancestors), and an administrative centre (from which the sultanate’s affairs were conducted). The kraton was, in effect, the Atjehnese equivalent of the European citadel or capital — the place whose capture signified, in the political imagination of the age, the conquest of the sultanate itself. The Kraton of Atjeh was the largest and most important kraton of the Atjehnese sultanate; its fall to the Dutch on 24 January 1874 was, in the Dutch political imagination, the symbolic act of conquest.

The Kraton of Atjeh

The Kraton of Atjeh was, in Borel’s account, a sprawling earthen-walled fortress between the Mesigit and the Atjeh-rivier. The walls were an earthen borstwering some four metres high, hidden by bamboo-doeri thickets — not the thick stone walls that the Dutch, relying on the Beknopte beschrijving published by the Departement van Koloniën, had believed them to be. There was a natte gracht (wet moat) on the northern and western sides and a dry gracht on the southern and eastern sides. Inside the walls were the Sultan’s palace, the old burial place of sultans, and a large kerkhof (cemetery). The Kroeng Daroe — a small river — split the Kraton into two halves. The Kraton had been the seat of the Sultan’s authority for centuries; Borel describes Atjeh as “een rijk met een roemrijke geschiedenis dat eeuwen lang onafhankelijk geweest was.” The Kraton fell to the Dutch on 24 January 1874 — “op een grijsaard en een zieken Atjehnees na, geheel verlaten” — when generaal Verspijck’s omtrekkende beweging reached the Atjeh-rivier and an afdeeling climbed the low borstwering.

The Strategic Error

Borel treats the occupation of the Kraton as a “grote strategische fout” — the fount of all the subsequent errors that he indicts. By occupying the Kraton, the Dutch committed themselves to an inland vestiging at K. Radja — a position that required the maintenance of a long line of communication to the sea through the strategische driehoek Kwala Atjeh–Kota Radja–Oeleh Leh, that was exposed to the enemy’s fire from the surrounding boschrand, and that was rendered untenable by the kwade moesson, the cholera and the bandjir. A coastal point — Oeleh Leh or Marassa — combined with a blockade, would, Borel argued, have achieved the same end at a fraction of the cost. The occupation of the Kraton was the original error from which the afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture), the crisis of May–June 1874, the Longbatta disaster and the cholera catastrophe of February 1875 flowed. The Kraton — by 1875 a “vervallen” structure — became the Dutch hoofdplaats, the centraal reduit of the stelling-Pel, and the symbol of the Dutch vestiging that Borel’s book anatomises.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 24, 27, 32–50, 58–60, 89, 96, 99, 102–107, 111, 116–122, 124–128, 131–135, 203, 225, 254–256, 264, 322.