Omtrekking

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tagsconcept, dutch, colonial, military, tactics, flanking, aceh-war
aliasesomtrekkende beweging, flanking movement Atjeh, encircling tactic, overoude Indische tactiek, omtrekking tactic

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The omtrekking (flanking and encircling movement; also omtrekkende beweging) was the “overoude Indische tactiek” (age-old Indian tactic) of flanking or encircling an enemy position rather than attacking it frontally — a tactic that, in Borel’s account, “almost always yields surprising results.” The omtrekking was the characteristic Dutch tactical method of the Atjeh-oorlog, and the omtrekkende beweging of 23–24 January 1874 by generaal Verspijck that delivered the deserted Kraton to the Dutch was the largest single example.

The Doctrine

The omtrekking was, in Borel’s account, the “overoude Indische tactiek” — the age-old Indian tactic — of flanking or encircling an enemy position rather than attacking it frontally. The doctrine was the Indian equivalent of the European principle of marcher au canon (marching to the sound of the guns) and of the envelopment that the German pursuit after Sédan in 1870 had made canonical. The Atjehnese stellingen — typically concealed behind bamboo-doeri thickets, with the strongest face toward the most likely approach — could rarely be reduced by frontal assault without heavy casualties. The storming of the Mesigit on 6 January 1874 — undertaken “tegen alle Indische traditiën in, zonder noemenswaardige voorbereiding, alleen in front, waar ze natuurlijk het sterkst was” (against all Indian traditions, without noteworthy preparation, only in front, where it was of course strongest) — had cost the Dutch 220 dead and wounded, and had only been salvaged by luitenant-kolonel Pel’s flanking move that entered the Mesigit unopposed. The lesson Borel draws is categorical: frontal assault against an Atjehnese stelling was a waste of men; the omtrekking was the proper Indian method, and “almost always yields surprising results.”

The Omtrekkende Beweging of 23–24 January 1874

The largest single omtrekking of the Atjeh-oorlog was the omtrekkende beweging of 23–24 January 1874 by generaal Verspijck. After “hevig vuur,” Verspijck began the omtrekkende beweging from Kota Goenoengan around the zuider- and ooster-facen to reach the Atjeh-rivier. The crossing of the Kroeng Daroe caused “groot oponthoud.” Verspijck encountered “geen noemenswaardigen tegenstand.” On the morning of 24 January 1874 the omtrekkende beweging continued. At 11 AM the last mortier granaat was fired. Verspijck reached the Atjeh-rivier; all works fell “zonder slag of stoot.” An afdeeling climbed the low borstwering and discovered, “tot niet geringe verbazing,” that they were inside the Kraton — which was “op een grijsaard en een zieken Atjehnees na, geheel verlaten.” “Het lot van den Kraton was dus beslist.” The whole operation, Borel judged, could have been done “na weinige dagen” if regelmatig conducted; instead it took a month — a delay that allowed the Atjehnese hoofdmacht to withdraw unbroken and that Borel indicts as one of the strategic errors of the second expedition.

The Smaller Omtrekkingen

The smaller omtrekkingen of Pel’s campaigns of 1874–1876 were many. The battle of Garouw of 28 June 1874 — when Romswinckel attacked the well-laid fortification at Garouw, surrounded it, and after brave resistance took it — was a typical example. The battle of Soerian of 26 July 1874 — when Pel’s colonnes managed to surround a band inside a benteng near Soerian and, because they refused to surrender, killed them to the last man — was another. The three-colonne operations of the great offensive of December 1875 – February 1876 — three colonnes in verbond moving against the VI, IV and IX Moekims, advancing in wigvorm (wedge formation) so as to converge on the objective from multiple directions — were, in effect, large-scale omtrekkingen. The lesson Borel draws is that the omtrekking was the proper Indian tactic against Atjehnese stellingen, and that its neglect — in favour of frontal assault, of the afwachtende houding, or of the posten-systeem — was one of the principal tactical errors of the war. The omtrekking was, in Borel’s account, the tactical complement to the mobiele colonnes and to the kappen en branden that he advocated: the means by which the Dutch could overcome the Atjehnese enemy without squandering their men in frontal assaults.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 14–17, 23–34, 39, 46, 57, 64–67, 75–83, 116–118, 162–163, 176–178, 200–206, 228–237, 296–323.

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