The Capture of Kota Goenoengan (12 January 1874) was the operation conducted by the second Aceh expedition on 12 January 1874 — six days after the bloody storm of the Mesigit — along the western face of the Kraton to seize the high, walled burial grounds of Kota Goenoengan and the adjacent Kota Koeboeran, which, being “bijna niet verdedigd” (almost undefended), were taken without serious loss and at once converted into an observation post whose tall waringin-boom commanded the whole interior of the Kraton. Borel treats the ease of the capture as proof that the Atjehnees hoofdmacht had already melted away — and as the missed opportunity for an immediate omtrekkende beweging that would have spared the army a fortnight’s bombardment.
The Opportunity
After the storm of the Mesigit of 6 January 1874 the Dutch held the great voorwerk that guarded the northern face of the Kraton, but the Kraton itself still stood intact, its walls crowned with bamboe-doeri and its interior hidden from view. A “bevriend inlandsch hoofd” — a friendly native chief, presumably one of the coastal rajas who had submitted after the landing — advised the Dutch that the western face of the Kraton was covered by an old burial ground whose walls and waringin trees gave onto the Kraton interior, and that the position was lightly held. On 12 January 1874 a column was despatched along the western face to occupy the ground.
The Operation
The burial grounds of Kota Koeboeran and Kota Goenoengan proved to be “bijna niet verdedigd.” A few desultory shots were fired from the boschrand; the defenders, such as they were, melted away before the column could come to grips with them. The walled enclosure was occupied without serious loss. From the high waringin-boom that rose above the graves, Dutch officers could see down into the Kraton itself — the great open space, the sultan’s dwellings, the mosques, the Atjeh-rivier winding through. An observatie-post was at once established in the waringin, and from that hour the interior of the Kraton lay open to Dutch eyes.
Borel’s Critique
The ease with which the burial ground was taken was, Borel argues, decisive evidence that the Atjehnees hoofdmacht had already withdrawn from the Kraton. The enemy had concluded, after the fall of the Mesigit and the opening of the bombardment of 6 January 1874, that the works could not be held against an encircling attack; the defenders had been pulled back to the south and east, leaving only token forces on the western face. Had van Swieten seized the moment — had he launched the omtrekkende beweging from Kota Goenoengan at once — the Kraton would have fallen within days instead of weeks. Instead the army sat down to a nineteen-day bombardment while the enemy, unpressed on the western and southern faces, completed his withdrawal at leisure. Only on 23–24 January 1874 did Verspijck finally set the omtrekkende beweging in motion from the very burial grounds taken on 12 January. The same ground that had been “bijna niet verdedigd” on 12 January was crossed without “noemenswaardigen tegenstand” eleven days later. The capture of Kota Goenoengan, in Borel’s account, was the operation that proved the war could have been won a fortnight earlier than it was.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Kota Goenoengan
- Kraton of Atjeh
- Storming of the Mesigit (6 January 1874)
- Bombardment of the Kraton (January 1874)
- Fall of the Kraton (24 January 1874)
- Omtrekking
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Verspijck
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 39, 46.