The zeehoofd (sea-pier, sea-head, landing jetty) was the permanent pier or jetty that the Dutch projected for the debarkeerplaats (landing place) at Oeleh Leh — the principal point of communication between the Dutch vestiging at K. Radja and the sea. The failure to build a zeehoofd at Oeleh Leh in time was, in Borel’s account, “the single most damaging failure of preparation” of the entire occupation: the lack of a pier forced the lightering of guns, horses, stores and men through the surf, an operation that exposed them to the enemy’s fire, to the kwade moesson, and to the liggelden (demurrage) of the Indische Stoomboot-maatschappij’s ships.
The Projected Zeehoofd
The zeehoofd was, in Borel’s account, the permanent pier or jetty that the Dutch projected for the debarkeerplaats at Oeleh Leh. The pier was to allow the direct landing of troops, guns, horses and stores from the transports anchored at the roadstead, without the laborious and dangerous lightering through the surf that the absence of a pier imposed. The projected zeehoofd was to be constructed first of bamboo — a temporary measure — and later of more substantial pile construction, with a railway connecting it to the hoofdplaats at K. Radja. The field railway between K. Radja and Oeleh Leh — the spoorweg K. Radja–Oeleh Leh — was largely completed by 1875 and in volle werking (full operation) by 1878, but the zeehoofd that should have fed it was, in the critical months of 1874 and 1875, a bamboo improvisation that could not bear the traffic.
The Failure and Its Consequences
The failure to build a substantial zeehoofd at Oeleh Leh in time was, in Borel’s diagnosis, the single most damaging failure of preparation of the entire occupation. The lack of a pier forced the lightering of guns, horses, stores and men through the surf — an operation that Borel, who as an artillery officer personally supervised the debarkation of the guns at Oeleh Leh, describes in detail. The lightering exposed the men and materieel to the enemy’s fire from the boschrand, to the surf that often made debarkeeren “hoe langer hoe moeilijker,” and to the kwade moesson that broke on 31 May 1874 and rendered the Atjeh-rivier onbevaarbaar. The kwade moesson proved the “fout” of not building a zeehoofd at Oeleh Leh months earlier: the moment was foreseen when communicatie with the ships on the reede would be “geheel gestremd” (entirely cut off). The bandjir of December 1874 that flooded K. Radja for eight days compounded the disaster. The lack of a zeehoofd also fed the liggelden (demurrage) of the Indische Stoomboot-maatschappij’s ships: every day at anchor beyond the first 24 hours cost the government ƒ 1,200, and the Baron Sloet van de Beele alone cost almost ƒ 17,000 in demurrage in June 1874.
The Later Construction
The zeehoofd was eventually constructed — first as a bamboo improvisation, later as a more substantial pile pier on iron screw-piles for railway wagons — but only after the critical months of 1874 and 1875 had passed. The genie (engineer corps) was “steeds ijverig bezig” building kazernen, hospitalen, magazijnen, officiers-woningen, koelie-kampementen and the spoorweg, but the zeehoofd was, in Borel’s account, late. By 1878 the spoorweg K. Radja–Oeleh Leh was in volle werking, the lighthouse at Poelolo Bras had been completed on 20 June 1875 and solemnly inaugurated a month later, and the telegraph link between K. Radja and Oeleh Leh and to Java was in operation. The zeehoofd was, in Borel’s account, one of the works that the Dutch eventually completed — but only after the failure to complete it in time had cost the bezettingskorps the crisis of May–June 1874 and the cholera catastrophe of February 1875. The lesson Borel draws is that the Dutch had systematically neglected the infrastructure of the vestiging — the zeehoofd, the spoorweg, the artesian well at K. Radja — in favour of the afwachtende houding and the schop en spade (spade and shovel) works that van Swieten had preferred. The zeehoofd was, in Borel’s reading, the symbol of the strategic error: the failure to secure the line of communication between the vestiging and the sea, on which the entire occupation depended.
See Also
- Oeleh Leh
- Indische Stoomboot-maatschappij
- Liggelden
- Crisis at Kota Radja (May–June 1874)
- Cholera catastrophe at Kota Radja (February 1875)
- Bandjir flood of Kota Radja (December 1874)
- Strategische driehoek (Atjeh)
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Pel
- G. F. W. Borel
- 1874
- 1875
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 30, 65, 93–95, 103–104, 112–113, 121–123, 125, 132, 144, 150–162, 181–182, 195, 224, 263.