The kroeng (Acehnese krueng) was the Atjehnese term for a river — the principal hydrographic features of Groot-Atjeh and the focus of much of the campaigning described in Onze vestiging in Atjeh. The kroengs of Groot-Atjeh — the Atjeh-rivier (Kroeng Aceh), the Kroeng Daroe, the Kroeng Raba, the Kroeng Raya, the Kroeng Tjoet, the Kroeng Broek — define the hydrographic geography of the theatre and shape the lines of communication, defence and supply on which the war was fought.

The Term and Its Geographic Significance

The kroeng was, in Borel’s account, the Atjehnese term for a river. The term appears in the toponyms of Groot-Atjeh — Kroeng Aceh (the Atjeh-rivier), Kroeng Daroe, Kroeng Raba, Kroeng Raya, Kroeng Tjoet, Kroeng Broek — and is the hydrographic counterpart of the kwala (river-mouth). The kroeng was both a feature of the terrain and a line of communication: the Atjeh-rivier was the principal line of communication between the Dutch vestiging at K. Radja and the sea, navigable by prauw and waterprauw as far as the Kraton; the Kroeng Daroe, a small river that split the Kraton into two halves, was a tactical feature of the operations around the Kraton; the Kroeng Raba, Kroeng Raya and Kroeng Tjoet were the rivers whose mouths on the west and north coasts defined the projected afsluitingslinie of Pel’s plan.

The Kroengs of Groot-Atjeh

The kroengs of Groot-Atjeh define the hydrographic geography of Borel’s narrative. The Atjeh-rivier (Kroeng Aceh) was the principal river — the line of communication between the Dutch vestiging and the sea at Oeleh Leh and Kwala Atjeh, navigable by prauw and waterprauw, but onbevaarbaar during the kwade moesson that broke on 31 May 1874. The Kroeng Daroe was a small river that split the Kraton into two halves; its crossing by generaal Verspijck’s omtrekkende beweging on 23 January 1874 caused “groot oponthoud.” The Kroeng Raba was the river on the west coast of Atjeh, with its mouth at the Baai van Kroeng Raba; it was the projected western end of the afsluitingslinie, and the kwala at its mouth was the proposed landing place of the Padangsche brigade — rejected by van Swieten out of “vrees.” The Kroeng Raya was the river on the north coast; it was the projected eastern end of the afsluitingslinie, and the site of the later sea-expedition under kolonel van der Heijden. The Kroeng Tjoet was the river on the north coast flowing into the lagune of Gigieng; it was the major contraband supply channel giving access to the XXVI Moekims, and its mouth was finally closed by the Dutch in 1876 by the establishment of posts at Kwala Gigieng and on the eiland Kota Pohama in the lagune. The Kroeng Broek was a smaller river whose banks were covered by the new fort at Kwala Titipandjang in 17 February 1875.

The Kroengs and the Campaign

The kroengs shaped the campaign in several ways. First, they were the lines of communication: the Atjeh-rivier was the principal Dutch line of communication, and its onbevaarbaarheid during the kwade moesson was, in Borel’s account, one of the strategic vulnerabilities of the Dutch vestiging. Second, they were tactical obstacles: the crossing of the Kroeng Daroe by Verspijck’s omtrekkende beweging caused “groot oponthoud,” and the marshy banks of the kroengs in the coastal lowlands obstructed the movement of columns and artillery. Third, they were the focus of the projected afsluitingslinie: the Kroeng Raba on the west coast and the Kroeng Raya on the north coast were the rivers whose mouths defined the line, and the closure of the Kroeng Tjoet mouth in 1876 was the most significant single step in the execution of Pel’s plan. The kroengs thus define, in Borel’s account, both the geographic framework of the campaign and the strategic objective of the war.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 24, 30, 33, 42–44, 46, 49, 51, 56, 62–66, 89, 95, 102, 108, 111, 113, 119, 121–125, 131, 137, 141–142, 164, 176, 195, 200, 211, 213, 228, 246, 253, 263, 288, 298, 314, 323, 327.