The Padangsche brigade was the third brigade of the second Dutch expedition against Atjeh, left in its entirety at Padang on the west coast of Sumatra by generaal van Swieten in December 1873, in defiance of the advice of his tweede bevelhebber generaal Verspijck. Borel calls the decision to leave the brigade behind “eene groote strategische fout” — the single most consequential error of the expedition’s opening phase — because it forfeited the chance to take the Kraton by pincer movement and allowed the Atjehnese hooffdmacht to withdraw unbroken. The Padangsche brigade’s eventual arrival in Atjeh in January 1874 came too late to influence the fall of the Kraton and found the Dutch already committed to van Swieten’s afwachtende houding (wait-and-see posture).
Composition and Role
The Padangsche brigade was one of the three brigades fully equipped for the second expedition against Atjeh, the others being the 1ste brigade under Verspijck and the 2de brigade under kolonel Pel. Its composition included regular infanterie, a veld-batterij, and — when its elements finally reached Atjeh — the mariniers en Afrikanen (marine corps and African, i.e. West Indian, troops) who arrived on 20 January 1874 and the 6de bataljon Infanterie that arrived on 1 February 1874. The brigade was meant to be landed together with the others at the landing at Pedro-punt on 6 December 1873 and to participate in the operations against the Mesigit and the Kraton. Instead, van Swieten — who “geloofde” that two brigades would suffice — judged the third surplus to requirements and left it at Padang, where it lay idle while the campaign unfolded without it.
The Strategic Error
The strategic significance of the decision is set out by Borel in his opening chapters. Verspijck had proposed landing the Padangsche brigade at the Kroeng Raba-baai — the baai on the west coast south of Oeleh Leh — for a pincer movement on the Kraton from two sides. Van Swieten rejected the proposal out of “vrees.” “Drie jaren later bewees de generaal Pel het tegendeel” — Pel’s march through the binnenland in January 1876 proved that the route was feasible, the distance being less than 3 uren in a straight line. By leaving the brigade at Padang, van Swieten not merely forfeited the chance of a decisive envelopment; he left the enemy’s retreat route from the Kraton open. When generaal Verspijck’s omtrekkende beweging of 23–24 January 1874 finally reached the Atjeh-rivier and delivered the deserted Kraton to the Dutch — “op een grijsaard en een zieken Atjehnees na, geheel verlaten” — the Atjehnese hoofdmacht had already withdrawn unbroken. The Padangsche brigade’s absence was thus, in Borel’s account, the original error from which the prolongation of the war flowed.
Belated Arrival and Aftermath
Elements of the Padangsche brigade belatedly reached Atjeh in January 1874 — the mariniers en Afrikanen on 20 January 1874, the 6de bataljon Infanterie on 1 February 1874 — but by then the Kraton had already fallen and the nineteen-day bombardment was over. The brigade’s arrival did not alter van Swieten’s strategic outlook: by 15 February 1874 he had “stak het zwaard voor goed in de scheede” and applied the afwachtende houding; the Javaansche hulptroepen of Mangkoe Negoro and Pakoe Alam, a veld-batterij, one company of vesting-artillerie and the achterlaadkanonnen van 12 c.M. were sent back to Java. The Padangsche brigade’s components were absorbed piecemeal into the bezettingskorps and into the reinforcements that sustained Pel through 1874 and 1875. The 6de bataljon’s two companies with staff arrived at K. Radja on 1 September 1874 from Padang, “with music at the head.” Borel returns to the Padangsche brigade throughout the book as the prime example of how the failure to concentrate force at the decisive point — the lesson of Sédan (1870) and of the Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken booklet — prolonged the Atjeh-oorlog by years.
See Also
- Indische Leger
- Bezettingskorps in Atjeh
- Generaal Verspijck
- Jan van Swieten
- Generaal Pel
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Landing at Pedro-punt (6 December 1873)
- Fall of the Kraton (24 January 1874)
- Kroeng Raba-baai
- Tactische aanbevelingen en wenken (1873)
- 1873
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 9, 12, 14, 20–22, 33, 35–36, 48, 58, 195.