The compagnie mariniers in Atjeh was the marine company of the Indische leger despatched to Atjeh in late October 1874 — a company that had previously lain in garrison at Padang Pandjang for six months. Its first real fight took place on 13 October 1874, during the battle outside the ooster-face of K. Radja, when a strong column under kapitein van der Straate tried to penetrate the wilderness before sunrise and was repulsed. The compagnie mariniers forms one of the small but recurrent threads in Borel’s account, illustrating both the chronic shortage of trained infantry and the slow professional maturation of troops learning the particular demands of Atjehnese warfare.

Origin and Despatch

The compagnie mariniers had been raised for service in the Netherlands Indies and had lain for six months in garrison at Padang Pandjang on Sumatra’s Westkust before being ordered to Atjeh. Its despatch in late October 1874 was part of the trickle of reinforcements that sustained the bezettingskorps under generaal Pel after the departure of the hoofdmacht under generaal Swieten on 26 April 1874. The marine company arrived in Atjeh alongside a steady stream of individual bataljons — the 6de bataljon (two companies with staff) arrived at K. Radja on 1 September 1874 from Padang, “with music at the head”; the 5de and 10de bataljons, ~500 strong each, arrived in December 1874 for the Longbatta operations. The mariniers thus entered a theater in which the bezettingskorps was still recovering from the crisis of May–June 1874, in which some companies could field fewer than 30 men of an original 125, and in which Borel judged that 500 kloeke Atjehneezen could have taken the Kraton.

First Fight: 13 October 1874

The compagnie mariniers’ first real fight took place on 13 October 1874, in the battle outside the ooster-face. On 12 October the Dutch had again lost ~10 dead and wounded clearing brush. On the morning of 13 October a strong column under kapitein van der Straate (180 men) tried to penetrate the wilderness before sunrise, hoping to find the far edge of the wood. The hope was disappointed: the wilderness extended so far the troops had to set up in its midst. At 6 AM the woodcutters began, but the Atjehneezen discovered them and attacked from all sides. “Mariniers, in their first real fight, wasted ammunition and had to give up position,” Borel records. The whole covering force had to retire; by 8 AM the enemy’s fire was overwhelming. Pel ordered retreat to the Kraton. Only when artillery on the zuider- and ooster-bastions opened fire were the Atjehneezen stopped. The day cost several dead and wounded and proved, in Borel’s words, that the enemy was “complete master of terrain near the zuider- and ooster-facen.” After this, clearing work was halted. The episode is one of the few moments at which Borel speaks slightingly of a Dutch unit’s performance, and it functions in his narrative as a cautionary example of how raw troops, however brave, squandered their fire in the conditions of Atjehnese woodland fighting.

Later Service

The compagnie mariniers remained in Atjeh through the campaigns of 18741875 and beyond. Borel mentions the marine (in the broader sense, including the ships’ crews) as having provided zee-bescherming of the stelling-Pel throughout the occupation, and as having performed the bombardment of Pasangan on 15 August 1878 — the naval bombardment that brought about the submission of the vassal coastal state and that Borel cites as a model for the aanvallende stelsel. The compagnie mariniers’ presence in Atjeh is also recorded in connection with the first enemy shelling of K. Radja on 24 August 1874 — when enemy brought lilla’s and at least one cannon onto a covered position and fired at the Dutch flag flying high over the Kraton, and Dutch fire from the 12 c.M. achterlaadkanonnen at Pakan Atjeh silenced the enemy guns — and in connection with the occupation of the ooster-benteng of 17 August 1874, when kapitein van Randwijk seized the grafheuvel east of Pakan Atjeh at double-quick pace by surprise. The compagnie mariniers is thus one of the small regular units whose sustained service in Atjeh Borel implicitly credits, even when he records their earliest and least successful engagement.

See Also

Source

Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 184–186, 191, 202, 204–206, 235, 339, 357.