Captain van Steenveld was a Dutch kapitein of the Indische leger and commandant of the oosterwacht post outside Kota Radja, who reported on 8 October 1874 that the Atjehneezen were digging approach trenches (loopgraven) toward the Dutch works — the intelligence that triggered the battle outside the ooster-face of 13 October 1874 and exposed the enemy’s growing mastery of the terrain around the zuider- and ooster-facen.
The Approaching Trenches
In the second half of September 1874 the Atjehneezen, resisting the Dutch clearing of the wildernis around the zuider- and ooster-facen with growing determination, had begun to naderen — to dig approach trenches — under cover of the dense bamboe-doeri and nipa-bosch. On 17 September 1874 several thousand rounds had been fired on both sides; bullets rained on the batteries and inside the Kraton. On 8 October 1874 van Steenveld, from his post at the oosterwacht, reported that the Atjehneezen were digging approach trenches — a development that, if left unchecked, would have brought the enemy within storming distance of the ooster-face. The news was the immediate trigger for Pel’s decision to send a strong column under kapitein van der Straate to clear the wildernis before sunrise on 13 October 1874.
The Battle of 13 October 1874
On the morning of 13 October 1874 van der Straate’s column of 180 men tried to penetrate the wildernis before sunrise, in the hope of finding the far edge of the wood. The hope was disappointed; the wildernis extended so far that the troops had to set up in its midst. At six o’clock the woodcutters began, but the Atjehneezen discovered them and attacked from all sides. The mariniers, in their first real fight, wasted ammunition and had to give up their position. The whole covering force had to retire; by eight o’clock the enemy’s fire was overwhelming. Pel ordered retreat to the Kraton. Only when the artillery on the zuider- and ooster-bastions opened fire were the Atjehneezen stopped. The day cost several dead and wounded and proved that the enemy was “complete master of the terrain” near the zuider- and ooster-facen. After this, clearing work was halted. Van Steenveld’s report had been accurate, and the battle it provoked showed how dangerous the Atjehneesche nadering had become.
See Also
- Battle outside the ooster-face (13 October 1874)
- Kapitein van der Straate
- Compagnie mariniers in Atjeh
- Generaal Pel
- Kota Radja
- Bamboe-doeri versperringen
- Stormvrijheid
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. p. 207.