Marine Landing at Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe (5 June 1896)

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tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, marine, aceh-war
aliasesMarine landing at Koeala Pantjoer, Marine landing at Lam-Baroe, Marinelandingsdivisie Lam-Baroe, 5 June 1896

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The Marine Landing at Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe (5 June 1896) was the amphibious assault by a Dutch marine landing division on the kampong of Lam-Baroe on the northern coast of the Atjeh residency, conducted in support of the operations in the IV and VI Moekims of 4 June–5 June 1896 to drive any Achehnese band toward the colonne of Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz advancing from Lamtih. The marines — disembarked at 8:30 a.m. via a boat-flotilla — landed at Lam-Baroe without a shot being fired, talso stelling, dismantled the versterkingen, cleared the breastwork west of Lam-Toetoe and the Oosterface of the Koeta west of Indra-Perwa, and withdrew at 11:15 a.m. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the landing was the first major amphibious operation of the June campaign and the operational prototype for the larger Ladoeng landing and Glé Broeë attack of 22 June–23 June 1896.

Background

By the first week of June 1896 the three-day offensive had broken Teungkoe Oemar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang and the Regeeringscommissaris was consolidating the Dutch position in the moekims adjacent to the area of operations. The operations in the IV and VI Moekims of 4 June–5 June 1896 were designed to clear the northern coastal stretch of the VI Moekims — the moekims of Lam-Tengah and Lam-Pagar — of Achehnese bands. The plan called for a convergent advance: a 1e colonne under Kol. Stemfoort from the south, a 2e colonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz from the east, and a marinelandingsdivisie from the north, at Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe. The combined effect was intended to compress the Achehnese bands in the VI Moekims and to deny them any avenue of escape.

The choice of Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe as the landing site was determined by the geography of the northern coast. The kampong of Lam-Baroe lay at the mouth of a river — the Koeala Pantjoer — that gave access to the interior of the VI Moekims. The Achehnese had constructed versterkingen at the kampong and a breastwork west of Lam-Toetoe, as well as fortifications on the Oosterface of the Koeta west of Indra-Perwa. These works controlled the coastal approaches and would have to be reduced if the marine landing was to be effective. The Dutch plan called for the marinelandingsdivisie to land, take stelling, dismantle the versterkingen, and — by threatening the Achehnese from the north — to drive any bende toward the colonne of Van Heutsz advancing from the east.

The Landing

The marinelandingsdivisie — a division of marines trained for amphibious assault — was embarked in the warships of the Dutch Navy operating off the northern coast. At 8:30 a.m. on 5 June 1896 the marines disembarked via a boat-flotilla — a fleet of ships’ boats, each capable of carrying a section of marines, rowed or sailed from the warships to the beach. The disembarkation was conducted in good order; the boats approached the beach in line; the marines waded ashore and formed up on the beach.

The Achehnese, recognising that the marine landing had turned their position, did not contest the disembarkation. No shot was fired. The marines advanced on Lam-Baroe, talso stelling, and proceeded to dismantle the versterkingen. The borstwering west of Lam-Toetoe was cleared; the Oosterface of the Koeta west of Indra-Perwa was cleared. The works were dismantled — a thorough demolition that prevented their re-occupation by the Achehnese. The marines withdrew at 11:15 a.m., having accomplished their mission in less than three hours and without loss.

The Coordination with the Land Colonne

The marine landing at Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe was coordinated with the advance of the 2e colonne under Van Heutsz, which had marched at 5 a.m. on 5 June 1896 from Lamtih to Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, and Lam-Baroe. The plan called for the marines, by threatening the Achehnese from the north, to drive any bende toward the colonne of Van Heutsz, which would engage and destroy them. The Achehnese, however, declined to be driven: they withdrew to the interior, preferring to preserve their forces rather than to risk engagement with two convergent Dutch forces. The marine landing, in this sense, achieved its political and operational purpose — the demonstration of Dutch reach and the dismantling of the coastal versterkingen — even though it did not produce the hoped-for engagement.

Significance

The Marine Landing at Koeala Pantjoer / Lam-Baroe on 5 June 1896 was, in operational terms, a small affair — a three-hour disembarkation with no engagement and no casualties. In strategic and doctrinal terms, however, it was the prototype of the larger amphibious operations that would follow in the second half of June. The Ladoeng landing of 22–23 June 1896 — a two-pronged attack on the Glé Broeë stelling east of Kroeng-Kali — would repeat the pattern of 5 June 1896 on a larger scale, with a sea-landing colonne under Lt.-Col. Hansen and a land colonne under Kol. Stemfoort converging on the same objective. The marine landing at Koeala Pantjoer also demonstrated, for the first time in the June campaign, the operational integration of the Dutch Navy and the Dutch Army in a single coordinated operation — an integration that would become the hallmark of the Atjeh-oorlog in its later phases. The absence of enemy resistance was, in its way, the most significant outcome of the landing: the Achehnese had recognised that the Dutch could now strike from any direction, land or sea, and that the coastal mukims were no longer a sanctuary.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, p. 241.

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