The Operations in IV and VI Moekims (4–5 June 1896) — a two-colonne Dutch descent on the northern coastal stretch of the VI Moekims — was a combined-arms operation mounted in the first week of June 1896 to clear the moekims of Lam-Tengah and Lam-Pagar of Achehnese bands and to close the Blang Kala-pas, executed by a 1e colonne under Kol. Stemfoort (12 brigades maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland, the 3e, 6e, and 9e Bataljons, two companies of the 14e Bataljon, one company of the 15de Bataljon, two cavalry platoons under Ritmeester Jhr. de Lannoy, two bergbatterijen, two engineer detachments, and four ambulances) marching at 4 a.m. on 4 June 1896 from Lam-Djamoe to the IV Moekims, and a 2e colonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz marching at 5 a.m. on 5 June 1896 from Lamtih to Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, and Lam-Baroe. Simultaneously, a marine landing division was to land at Koeala Pantjoer on 5 June 1896 to drive any Achehnese band toward Van Heutsz’s colonne. The operation’s first engagement, on 4 June 1896, saw the spits under inlandsch korporaal Brodjo encounter a ~30-man bende near Beradin at 50 m distance; the bende fled with 2 dead, one of whom was subsequently identified as Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta.

Background

By the first week of June 1896 the three-day offensive had broken Teungkoe Oemar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang and the razing of Lam-Asan was complete. The Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, now turned his attention to the northern coastal stretch of the VI Moekims — the moekims of Lam-Tengah and Lam-Pagar — which remained a centre of Achehnese resistance. The geography of the operation was exacting: the Raja gebergte (the Raja mountain range) ran along the southern edge of the operational area, and the Blang Kala-pas — the principal pass through the gebergte — was the conduit through which Achehnese reinforcements from the south could reach the coastal mukims. The Dutch plan called for a convergent advance: the 1e colonne under Stemfoort would advance from Lam-Djamoe into the IV Moekims, search the kampongs on the southern slopes of the Raja gebergte, take the versterkingen, close the Blang Kala-pas, and block any Achehnese bende coming from the south; the 2e colonne under Van Heutsz would advance from Lamtih to Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, and Lam-Baroe, taking and clearing versterkingen on the way; and a marinelandingsdivisie would land at Koeala Pantjoer on 5 June 1896 to drive any bende toward Van Heutsz’s colonne.

The 1e Colonne under Stemfoort

The 1e colonne under Kol. Stemfoort was a substantial force. Its composition was: 12 brigades maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland (4 officers, 12 European under-officers, 207 minderen); the 3e Bataljon; the 6e Bataljon; the 9e Bataljon; two companies of the 14e Bataljon; one company of the 15de Bataljon; two cavalry platoons under Ritmeester Jhr. de Lannoy; two bergbatterijen of two sections each; two engineer detachments; four ambulances; and dwangarbeiders. The colonne marched at 4 a.m. on 4 June 1896 from Lam-Djamoe to the IV Moekims. The assignment was to search the kampongs on the southern slopes of the Raja gebergte, to take the versterkingen, to close the Blang Kala-pas, and to block any Achehnese bende coming from the south.

The Engagement at Beradin — 4 June 1896

The first engagement of the operation came on 4 June 1896. The spits (advance-guard) under inlandsch korporaal Brodjo — a native NCO of the maréchaussée — encountered a bende of approximately 30 men near Beradin at a distance of 50 m. Brodjo, demonstrating the initiative for which the native NCOs of the maréchaussée were celebrated, ordered his men to kneel, delivered volleys, and attacked. Both front brigades supported the attack. The bende fled with 2 dead, leaving behind breech-loading rifles. It was subsequently learned that one of the dead was Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta — also known as Toekoe Hoesin Lehong Bata — the bendehoofd of Lam-Goet whose residence had been the target of the tuchtiging of Lam Goet of 14 April 1896. The death of Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta was a substantial blow to the Achehnese resistance in the central mukims and a small but satisfying reversal for the Dutch, who had failed to kill him at Lam Goet itself.

The 2e Colonne under Van Heutsz — 5 June 1896

The 2e colonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz marched at 5 a.m. on 5 June 1896 from Lamtih to Lam-Pagar, Lam-Badak, and Lam-Baroe. The assignment was to take and clear the versterkingen on the way. The people of Lam-Pagar had, in the intelligence summary of the three-day offensive, been noted for their “warlike reputation” — a reputation that the 2e colonne would now have the opportunity to test. Simultaneously, a marine landing division was to land at Koeala Pantjoer on 5 June 1896 — the Lam-Baroe — to drive any Achehnese bende toward Van Heutsz’s colonne. The combined effect of the convergent advance — the 1e colonne from the south, the 2e colonne from the east, and the marinelandingsdivisie from the north — was intended to compress the Achehnese bands in the VI Moekims and to deny them any avenue of escape.

The Marine Landing and the Coordination

The marine landing at Koeala Pantjoer on 5 June 1896 was, in its way, the most novel element of the operation. A marinelandingsdivisie — a division of marines trained for amphibious assault — was disembarked at the kampong of Lam-Baroe via a boat-flotilla at 8:30 a.m. No shot was fired; the versterkingen were dismantled; the breastwork west of Lam-Toetoe and the Oosterface of the Koeta west of Indra-Perwa were cleared. The marines withdrew at 11:15 a.m. The landing demonstrated the Government’s capacity to project force from the sea and to coordinate land and naval operations in a single theatre — a capacity that would be expanded, three weeks later, in the Ladoeng landing of 22 June23 June 1896.

Significance

The Operations in IV and VI Moekims of 4 June5 June 1896 were, in tactical terms, a success: the bende of Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta was broken and its leader killed; the versterkingen of the coastal stretch were dismantled; and the marinelandingsdivisie demonstrated the Government’s capacity for amphibious operations. In strategic terms, the operations were part of the consolidation phase that followed the three-day offensive — a sustained effort to clear the residual Achehnese resistance from the moekims adjacent to the area of operations. The death of Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta — the bendehoofd of Lam-Goet — was a particular satisfaction, given his survival of the tuchtiging of Lam Goet two months earlier. The operations also marked the operational debut of the coordinated land-sea pattern that would characterise the rest of June — a pattern that would culminate, three weeks later, in the Ladoeng landing and the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 232–242.