Three-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896

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tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliasesThree-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896, Operatiën tegen de VI Moekims (23 May 1896), Bestorming van Oemar's stelling, Three-day offensive against Umar, 23–25 May 1896

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The Three-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896 — the operatiën tegen de VI Moekims and the bestorming van Oemar’s stelling — was the major three-day combined-arms offensive ordered by the Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, against Teungkoe Oemar’s fortified stelling around Lam-Asan, Lam-Pisang, Tjot Tjako, Boekit Seboen, Lam-Tjroeng, and Lam-Poelau, the central military event of the first semester of the Atjeh-oorlog and the strategic reversal of the disaster provoked by the defection of 29 March 1896. The offensive was executed by a complex of colonnes — the Bergcolonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz, the Colonne Lamtih under Lt.-Col. van Vliet, the Colonne Djeroe Loeng under Maj. Veeren, the Colonne tegen de XXII Moekims under Maj. Okhuizen, and the Reserve Colonne under Maj. Jacobs, with overall command vested in Kol. Stemfoort — and culminated in the storming of Tjot Tjako on 23 May 1896, the capture of Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s house on 24 May 1896, and the bestorming of the Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau on 25 May 1896. By the evening of 25 May 1896 Oemar’s warriors had retreated behind the Kroeng-Raba and his house at Lam-Pisang had been destroyed with dynamite, tar, and petroleum.

Background

By the third week of May 1896 the Regeeringscommissaris had completed the evacuation of the buitenlinie, the formal dismission of Teuku Oemar of 26 April 1896, the proclamation of 27 April announcing military operations, and four weeks of sustained bombardment of Umar’s stellingen from the battery at Lam-Djamoe. The Dutch forces were concentrated and ready. The Achehnese — pinned between the land bombardment at Lam-Pisang and the naval demonstration in the Kroeng-Rababaai — were tired, their communications disrupted, and their works degraded.

The Dutch intelligence picture of Oemar’s stelling was exhaustive. A detailed reconnaissance — preserved in the source as an intelligence summary organised by left wing, centre, and right wing — listed every versterking, loopgraaf, and benteng with location and estimated occupation. Lead was hidden in wells at Bineh Kroeng; men from Pedir were stationed at Bt. Kesoemba; Oemar himself was hiding south of the heuvelrug; the people of Lam-Pagar had a warlike reputation; Panglima Gimba held the left wing; Pa Karim Lampagar was at Lam-Pagar; T. Mat Amin — an Islamic scholar — held a sector; Teungkoe Pantai Glima and Imam Djempit were also named. The stage was set for the assault.

The Dutch order of battle was divided into five colonnes. The Bergcolonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz — Chef van den Staf Kapt. van Daalen — comprised 10 brigades maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland (4 officers, 189 men), the 3e Bataljon under Maj. Hansen (15 officers, 403 men), engineers under 1e Luit. Ruzette, train, ambulance, reserve munition, and a section of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers. Its mission was the storming of Tjot Tjako. The Colonne Lamtih under Lt.-Col. van Vliet comprised the 12e Bataljon under Lt.-Col. Soeters (18 officers, 240 European, 205 native), the 14e Bataljon under Maj. van der Noordaa (16 officers, 142 European, 312 native), a cavalry platoon under Lisnet (32 European), two sections of mountain artillery under Kapt. Nauta, and engineers under Kapt. Zelle. The Colonne Djeroe Loeng under Maj. Veeren comprised the 9e Bataljon (14 officers, 500 men), engineers under 1e Luit. de Rochemont, a section of mountain artillery under Deibert, a cavalry platoon under 1e Luit. Happé (32 sabels), and an ambulance under Diephuis. The Colonne tegen de XXII Moekims under Maj. Okhuizen (who also commanded the 6e Bataljon) comprised the 6e Bataljon (14 officers, 467 men including 243 European), a section of mountain artillery under Steenkamp, and an ambulance under van Leent. The Reserve Colonne under Maj. Jacobs comprised 12 officers, 253 European and 176 native, plus two sections of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers and a cavalry platoon. Overall command vested in Kol. Stemfoort.

First Day — 23 May 1896: The Storming of Tjot Tjako

On 23 May 1896 the Bergcolonne under Van Heutsz marched from Ketapan Doea at 3:30 a.m. to surprise the enemy. The voorhoede under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland — 10 brigades maréchaussée and a peloton of the 3e Bataljon — advanced via the footpath north-west of Ketapan Doea. At 5:20 a.m. the climb of Tjot Tjako began in two groups: lieutenants Vis and Wagener on the eastern slope, lieutenants Stoop and Dijkstra on the north-eastern side. The enemy raised alarm cries and rolled stones down on the climbing Dutch. At 5:43 a.m. lieutenants Wagener and Vis, with the maréchaussée Wongsodikromo (No. 33780) and Todikromo (No. 28097), plus lieutenant Rijnen and European fusiliers, reached the summit. Lieutenant Vis then drove approximately 30 armed Achehnese from their schietstellingen on the north-eastern slope. By 6:40 a.m. the entire colonne was on top; the enemy was driven from Tjot Tjako. From the summit, repeater-rifle fire was directed on Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s house, causing some 50 persons to flee south.

Sergeant Grebner, on his own initiative, attacked the western ridgeline, drove off the enemy (leaving one dead), and occupied the southernmost top — an action that caused Lam-Pisang and Bineh Kroeng to be evacuated. Van Heutsz sent a series of four messages to the commander: the first at 6:40 a.m. reporting that Tjot Tjako was not climbable for artillery; the second at 8:17 a.m. requesting reserve munition, drinking water, and ice; the third at 9:15 a.m. — the crucial fourth message (received by the bevelhebber only at 11:15 a.m.) — reporting that Lam-Pisang was abandoned and that the troops could advance. This fourth message reversed the bevelhebber’s initial decision, taken on the advice of the Regeeringscommissaris by telephone, to halt operations for the day.

Concurrently, the Colonne Lamtih under van Vliet engaged the enemy at Lam-Manjang and Lam-Isi. The 12e Bataljon under Soeters talso position at Lam-Manjang but was held down by enemy fire; the 14e Bataljon supported. The Colonne Djeroe Loeng under Veeren advanced on Lam-Asan. The 7e Bataljon under Maj. Jacobs advanced along a narrow footpath and came under heavy fire from the south-eastern rand of Lam-Asan: 2e lieutenant Ramaer and several men were wounded, and the service horse of Majoor Jacobs was killed. Without waiting for the “voorwaarts” signal, Jacobs ordered the 1e compagnie under Kapt. van Gemmingen to attack. The compagnie crossed 200 m of muddy sawah with élan, led by 1e luit. Verstege; kapitein van Gemmingen, korporaal Egeter, and hoornblazer Bollegraaf were first into the versterking. The 3e compagnie under Kapt. Scheuer covered the flank. The reserve compagnie under luit. Roijen followed. The north-eastern rand of Lam-Asan fell similarly to the 9e Bataljon. The bevelhebber Stemfoort came in person with his staff to inspect. The first day ended with the Dutch in possession of Tjot Tjako and Lam-Asan, and with Oemar’s forces retreating south. The bivak of the 7e Bataljon was heavily fired on from Lam-Doerian from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m.; a shrapnel shell hitting the enemy versterking face ended the fire.

Second Day — 24 May 1896: The Capture of Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s House

On 24 May 1896 the Colonne Laceulle — newly formed under Lt.-Col. C. J. Laceulle of the 5e Bataljon (12 officers, 364 men), with two sections of mountain artillery (Vrijdag, van der Waarden), two cavalry platoons under Ritmeester de Lannoy (3 officers, 64 riders), and engineers under Kapt. Zelle — marched from Lam-Djamoe at 6 a.m. Pre-dawn, the Bergcolonne (maréchaussée) occupied the southern top from which so much fire had come the day before, plus a stelling in the saddle with the lone tree; from these positions the maréchaussée could observe the entire valley below. The bridge in the road to Pakan-Badak (broken by the enemy) had to be repaired by the engineers (1½ hours). Three companies of the 14e Bataljon marched toward Lam-Isi and from there to Lam-Gemoek and Lam-Roekam.

The cavalry under de Lannoy reconnoitred toward Lam-Pisang. At 8:30 a.m. the first shots came from the south-western kampongs. Laceulle advanced to the northern rand of Lam-Goe-Oe. Heavy fire came from a versterking in the south-western rand. At 9:46 a.m. the cavalry reported the gebergte west of Gemi-Roi strongly occupied; at 9:56 a.m. many enemy were descending toward Lampoih-Eumpei; at 10:06 a.m. Pasar Oleh-Gli, Rimah’s, and Gemi-Roi were ontruimd; at 10:13 a.m. Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s house were reported onbezet but under heavy fire from the west. At 10:20 a.m. the order came to advance to the south corner of Gemi-Roi — already reached. The 1e compagnie of the 5e Bataljon under Kapt. Boer advanced with the 1e sectie under 1e Luit. de Jongh. Heavy fire from west and south-west opened as the sectie left Pasar Oleh-Gli. The colonne-commandant ordered the 4e and 2e compagnie to cross the dyke at fastest pace, with artillery in battery on the dyke answering enemy fire.

At 10:35 a.m., 1e luit. M. D. J. de Jongh — accompanied by only three the rest in the rawah or wounded — was the first to reach Oemar’s verblijf at Lam-Pisang, immediately followed by sectie 4e compagnie under Kapt. Linck, then a small cavalry detachment. A hoornblazer of the 3e Bataljon on the eastern hills blew the “Wilhelmus” to announce the capture. A patrol under luit. Happé pulled down an Achehnese flag. The text explicitly corrects a popular legend that credited the cavalry (wachtmeester Jonker) with being first; the official text credits de Jongh, noting the cavalry legend was “minder juist” (less accurate). Some small cannons, furniture, and the correspondence of Umar were captured. unhusked rice stocks in various houses were burned. Oemar’s house was subsequently destroyed with dynamite, tar, petroleum.

The Colonne v.d. Noordaa — three companies of the 14e Bataljon (11 officers, 324 men), with Kapt. Kronouer of the General Staff attached — occupied Lam-Roekam and Lam-Oedjoeng. A failed night surprise attempt on Lam-Tiroeng / Boekit Seboen closed the day.

Third Day — 25 May 1896: The Bestorming of Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau

On 25 May 1896 Kol. Stemfoort planned to drive the enemy from the hill-position Boekit Seboen–Lam-Poelau–Lam-Tjroeng–Daman. Three battalions with auxiliary weapons participated. The enemy stelling was threatened by artillery fire in front and on the left flank, plus feint attacks; the main attack was to be a flanking movement on the right flank. Reinforcements were brought up: the 12e Bataljon, 1½ companies of the 7e Bataljon, two companies of maréchaussée, two cavalry platoons, one engineer peloton, two sections of mountain artillery, and three ambulances.

At 6:30 a.m. the cavalry under de Lannoy marched from Lam-Djamoe to reconnoitre toward Boekit Seboen. The 9e Bataljon talso stelling along the foot of the gebergte near Lam-Pisang. At 7:55 a.m. the enemy fired from a top approximately 70 m high; the 9e Bataljon occupied it. At 9:30 a.m. 2½ companies of the 7e Bataljon under Jacobs were placed at Veeren’s disposal. At 10:45 a.m. optical signal communication with Ketapan Doea was established. The cavalry found Lam-Goe-Oe-Zuid (Lam Oekoe) onbezet; the northern rand of Beradin was weakly held; about 6 enemies left the southern rand versterking and fled to Lam-Poelau; a band of about 25–30 men on Boekit Seboen fired on luit. Happé’s patrol. Beradin was assigned to the 5de compagnie of the 12e Bataljon under Kapt. Drijber. The cavalry’s initial report was wrong — Drijber’s compagnie was met by maintained crossfire from kampong, versterking, and western hills. Thomson led a stormhandeling on the versterking with about 10 men; the hoornblazer Karel, Beekman, and van den Wollenberg distinguished themselves. Drijber was wounded, with 12 minderen. Five artillery sections opened fire on enemy positions.

The 6e Bataljon under Okhuizen was ordered to outflank and attack the enemy position at Daman and Lam-Tjroeng. The 3e compagnie (kapitein Janssen) was to approach Lam-Tjroeng over the hills covered, the 1e compagnie along the foot of the gebergte. Janssen marched through scorching cogon grass to a small versterking at Daman. After a few salvoes, the 1e peloton under 1e Luit. Keetell stormed. The 12-man garrison fled toward Lam-Tjroeng. The 2e luit. Lamster was first into the Lam-Tjroeng versterking when it was attacked next. By 11:45 a.m. the entire stelling Daman–Lam-Tjroeng–Lam-Poelau was ontruimd by the enemy.

The afternoon was devoted to the destruction of the enemy’s kampongs. The cavalry was ordered to continue reconnaissance to Lama-Paja, Lam-Gaboes, and Anak-Paja, and, if onbezet, to burn them. The 12e Bataljon under Soeters marched to Djirat with orders to burn all kampongs on the return. Soeters also had the 5e compagnie burn Lam-Caboes and the 2e compagnie burn Lam-Paja. The maréchaussée under Graafland reached Anak-Paja and burned the houses. At Djirat, de Lannoy decided to also investigate Lam-Kroet and Lho-Nga. About 10 enemies posted on the right bank of the Kroeng-Raja fired on the cavalry, preventing closer reconnaissance of the bridge. Soeters sent the order: “Keer terug, en steek so molike Lho-Nga on fire” (Return, and, if possible, set Lho-Nga on fire). After burning about 10 houses, de Lannoy halted the burning — considering battle-readiness — and returned to Boekit Seboen. To make the punishment as complete as possible, the bevelhebber at 1 p.m. sent a compagnie of the 5e Bataljon from Lam-Poelau to Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, and Lamlon; at 1:50 p.m. a peloton of the 6e Bataljon to Noesa — all to destroy those kampongs.

By the evening of 25 May 1896 the task was accomplished: Oemar’s warriors had retreated behind the Kroeng-Raba; Umar’s house at Lam-Pisang had been destroyed; the stellingen of Tjot Tjako, Boekit Seboen, Lam-Tjroeng, Daman, and Lam-Poelau were in Dutch hands; the kampongs of Anak-Paja, Djirat, Lho-Nga, Lam-Caboes, Lam-Paja, Mantjang, Lam-Baroe, Lamlon, and Noesa had been burned. Stemfoort decided to hold the captured positions overnight and to retire under cover of darkness to Lam-Pisang, where they would stay until the next morning.

Significance

The Three-day Dutch offensive of 23 May–25 May 1896 was the strategic reversal of the disaster provoked by the defection of 29 March 1896. In three days of hard fighting the Dutch had broken Umar’s stelling, captured and destroyed his house at Lam-Pisang, driven his warriors behind the Kroeng-Raba, and burned the principal kampongs of the VI Moekims. The offensive also marked the emergence of Van Heutsz as the pre-eminent field commander of the Atjeh-oorlog — the architect of the Bergcolonne’s night march on Tjot Tjako and the recipient of the crucial fourth message that reversed the bevelhebber’s initial decision to halt. The Dutch casualties of the three days — though not enumerated here in full — were heavy, and the Achehnese had not been destroyed: Umar himself had escaped south, and his warriors would continue the war for years to come. But the strategic initiative had been recovered, the prestige of the Dutch arms restored, and the conditions set for the tuchtiging of the Lam-Krak mukims of 9 June–10 June 1896 and the Ladoeng landing of 22 June–23 June 1896. The three-day offensive was, in this sense, the high point of the Vetter interregnum and the principal military achievement of the first semester of 1896.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 179–235.

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