J. J. K. de Moulin — Generaal-Majoor (Major-General) of the Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger — was appointed Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden in the last days of June 1896 and assumed the office on 5 July 1896 at Oleh-leh, only to die of a zonnesteek (sunstroke) on 7 July 1896 at Lam-Pisang during his very first excursie — a reconnaissance into the IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba) which he had insisted on joining in person. His tenure of two days is the shortest of any Civiel en Militair Gouverneur of Atjeh, and his sudden death — ten 4 u. 45’ n.m., ter hoogte van Lam-Pisang, overleed de generaal De Moulin — threw the Dutch command into temporary confusion and restored Kolonel Stemfoort to the acting governorship for the next four months.
Appointment and Arrival at Oleh-leh
The appointment of Generaal-Majoor De Moulin to the governorship of Atjeh was telegraphically announced from Batavia in the last days of June 1896. In het laatst van Juni was van Batavia telegrafisch bericht ontvangen, dat de generaal-majoor J. J. K. de Moulin, benoemd was tot Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, en dat de nieuwe titularis den 3en Juli te Oleh-leh kon worden verwacht. The appointment represented the formal closure of the Vetter Regeeringscommissaris period and the restoration of the regular Civiel en Militair Gouverneur office — a return to the institutional arrangement that had been suspended when Lt.-Gen. Vetter had arrived as Regeeringscommissaris (Government Commissioner) on 7 April 1896 to deal with the Umar defection crisis.
On 2 July 1896, in anticipation of the new governor’s arrival, two Dutch colonnes — each of two companies of the 9e Bataljon under Kapitein J. A. M. M. von Schauroth and Kapitein H. Th. de Moulin respectively, each with some eight cavalrymen, hospital personnel and transport — had been dispatched from Lam-Peneroet on a brief machtsvertoon (show of force). The first visited the IX Moekims and drew some fire from the heights near Maneh; the second traversed the VI Moekims and found, in many kampongs, women and children already at work rebuilding burned houses at Djempit and Pantai Abee. By noon both colonnes were back at Koeta Radja. The new governor himself arrived only on the evening of 4 July 1896 aboard the steamer Reaal, and debarkeerde den volgenden dag — disembarked the following day, 5 July 1896 — at Oleh-leh. After the customary honours, nam de generaal onmiddellijk het bestuur van den wd. Civielen en Militairen Gouverneur, den kolonel Stemfoort, over, waarop deze hoofdofficier met dezelfde bootgelegenheid naar Batavia terugkeerde. Stemfoort’s brief first tenure as acting governor thus closed, and he departed for Batavia on the same steamer.
The Conference of 18 June 1896
Two days before his appointment was announced — on 18 June 1896 — Generaal-Majoor De Moulin had held a conferentie with Governor-General Van der Wijck at Buitenzorg, at which de te volgen gedragsregels (the rules of conduct to be followed) in Atjeh were laid down. The Notulen (minutes) of this conference are preserved as Bijlage II of Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel. The Governor-General opened by stating that, om aan het in Groot-Atjeh behaald succes blijvende waarde te geven, dient er naar gestreefd te worden, Tockoe Oemar in handen te krijgen of hem, althans de materieele middelen afhandig te maken, waarover hij nog beschikt — to give lasting value to the success achieved in Great Aceh, an effort must be made to capture Toekoe Oemar or at least to deprive him of the material means at his disposal. The geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) was to remain the kern (core) of the Dutch occupation; binnen de linie absolute order and peace were to prevail; buiten de linie, after the recent successful operations in the VI Moekims, IV Moekims, the Lam-Krakstreek, Montassik and the XXVI Moekims, sufficient ontzag (awe) for Dutch power had been inspired — but it was now above all important den hoofden en bevolking aldaar te doen begrijpen, dat zij ongestraft geene vijandelijkheden meer tegen ons kunnen plegen (to make the chiefs and population there understand that they can no longer commit hostilities against us with impunity).
The Governor-General further laid down that tot een postenstelsel, behalve dat van onze geconcentreerde stelling, niet mag worden overgegaan — no system of posts, other than that of the concentrated line, was to be undertaken; that the holding of any individual point could only be van voorloopigen aard (provisional); and that any permanent occupation beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) would require the decision of the Opperbestuur. When the Governor-General enquired whether a contra-guerilla could not be organised against the hostile bands, Generaal De Moulin replied that dit punt door hem zal worden overwogen (this point would be considered by him), but that, in his view, voor eene afdoende bestrijding der benden noodig is medewerking der bevolking zelve en vooral een goede spionnendienst — for an effective struggle against the bands, the cooperation of the population itself and above all a good spy service were necessary. Generaal de Moulin verklaart volkomen met de door den Gouverneur-Generaal ontwikkelde inzichten te kunnen instemmen — General De Moulin declared that he could fully agree with the views developed by the Governor-General. This conference, held two weeks before De Moulin ever set foot in Atjeh as governor, thus became the policy framework within which Stemfoort and Van Vliet would govern for the next six months.
The Excursie of 7 July 1896 and the Sunstroke at Lam-Pisang
The excursie (reconnaissance (excursie)) of 7 July 1896 was De Moulin’s first and only military operation in Atjeh. Voor den 7en d. a. v. werd eene excursie gelast, waaraan de gouverneur zelf wenschte deel te nemen — for the 7th of the current month an excursion was ordered, in which the governor himself wished to take part. The objective was the IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba) — the region beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) which the Dutch had identified as the next theatre of operations. The colonne, under Overste Hansen of the 3e Bataljon, included the 3e Bataljon itself, the 9e Bataljon, and supporting arms — and marched out from Lambaroe in the early morning.
By late morning the colonne had reached the broad sawah (rice plain) between Lam-Baroe and Lam-Gaboes, where, door een zonnesteek getroffen en ten 12 u. 30’ n.m. bewusteloos geworden — struck by a sunstroke and rendered unconscious at 12:30 PM — Generaal De Moulin collapsed. De bij de colonne Hansen aanwezige dokter, verleende onmiddellijk zijn hulp, ook die van Lam-Poelau werd te paard opgeroepen, maar het mocht den geneesheeren niet gelukken, den gouverneur weer tot bewustzijn te brengen — the doctor attached to Hansen’s colonne gave his assistance immediately, and the doctor of Lam-Poelau was summoned on horseback, but the physicians were unable to restore the governor to consciousness. The vijand did not press forward, and at 3:35 PM the 3e Bataljon, followed by the 9e Bataljon, resumed its march — but doordien het laatste zijn heuvelstellingen te vroeg verliet, echter niet, vóór dat de vijand nog teekenen van leven had gegeven — because the latter left its hill positions too early, the enemy gave signs of life. Ritmeester de Lannoy had already ridden at a trot to Lam-Djamoe with a patrol and gaf telefonisch van het gebeurde aan Koeta-Radja kennis — telephoned news of the event to Koeta-Radja. The various positions were zonder moeite ontruimd — evacuated without difficulty — but were immediately reoccupied by the enemy, on which account the artillery came into battery once more in the southern edge of Bineh-Kroeng. At the request of the rearguard commander, Kapitein Van der Haas, the battery was soon limbered up again and rode to Lam-Djamoe. Ten 4 u. 45’ n.m., ter hoogte van Lam-Pisang, overleed de generaal De Moulin — at 4:45 PM, near Lam-Pisang, General De Moulin died. Het lijk werd onverwijld naar Koeta-Radja vervoerd — the corpse was immediately transported to Koeta-Radja — and by 6:15 PM the last troops had entered Lam-Djamoe. The losses among the wounded were: luit.-adj. Hoekstein en luit. Meerburg, beiden licht — voorts 3 Eur. fus. en 3 Eur. cavaleristen — adjutant-Lt. Hoekstein and Lt. Meerburg, both slightly — besides 3 European fusiliers and 3 European cavalrymen.
Aftermath: Stemfoort Restored, the Telegram of 18 July 1896
The death of De Moulin was a political and administrative shock as well as a military one. With Stemfoort already en route to Batavia, the Civiel en Militair Gouverneur office was effectively vacant. Kolonel Stemfoort opnieuw tijdelijk met de functiën van Civiel en Militair Gouverneur belast — Colonel Stemfoort was again temporarily charged with the functions of Civil and Military Governor — and he returned to Koeta-Radja to take up the office on 11 July 1896. The Governor-General Van der Wijck then sent a telegram of 18 July 1896 — preserved in the Besluit (Decree (Besluit)) of Van Vliet’s later instruction as Bijlage II supplement — which eene nadere uiteenzetting zijner bedoelingen omtrent de verdere actie (a further exposition of his intentions regarding the further action) gave. The telegram laid down that de XXV Moekims moeten in haar geheel door ons beheerscht worden (the XXV Moekims must in their entirety be dominated by us); that woelgeesten en de hen volgende benden onschadelijk gemaakt, minstens verdreven (troublemakers and the bands following them must be rendered harmless, or at least driven out); that medegesleepte kampongbevolking en hare traditioneele hoofden te doen terugkeeren (the dragged-along kampong population and their traditional chiefs must be made to return); and that aan die hoofden mogen geen wapens worden verstrekt, en vuurwapens zelfs slechts tot zeer gering aantal in hun bezit gelaten worden (no weapons may be furnished to those chiefs, and firearms even may be left in their possession only in very small numbers). The death of De Moulin thus paradoxically hardened the Dutch policy: the framework of the 18 June conference was supplemented by the more explicit beheersching (domination) programme of 18 July 1896, and Stemfoort was left to carry it out.
Portrait in ATJEH ‘96
A portrait of Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin appears in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel opposite page 15, immediately before the opening of Hoofdstuk III. The portrait is one of the six portraits bound into the volume, and was clearly prepared in anticipation of De Moulin’s tenure as governor — making its presence, opposite the very page that records his arrival, a monument of tragic irony in the volume’s design. The Frontaanzicht van Ana’ Galoeng (front view of Ana’ Galoeng) opposite page 2 was likewise included as the visual record of the benteng (fort) which had been the hart van Groot-Atjeh and which the Dutch had stormed on the night of 28–29 June 1896 — the last major operation before De Moulin’s arrival.
Significance
The significance of Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin in the documentary record of the Atjeh-oorlog is that of the Civiel en Militair Gouverneur who never was — the governor whose two-day tenure is the shortest of any in the history of the office, and whose death by sunstroke during his first excursie (reconnaissance (excursie)) became one of the most remarked incidents of the war’s intermediate phase. His death had three immediate consequences: it restored Stemfoort to the acting governorship for a second tenure of four months (during which the systematic extension of the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) into the XXVI Moekims, XXII Moekims and IV Moekims was undertaken); it triggered the 18 July 1896 telegram of Van der Wijck which hardened the Dutch policy into a programme of beheersching (domination programme); and it placed the Notulen der conferentie van 18 Juni 1896 at the centre of the documentary record — for the Instructie (Instruction) which Stemfoort and Van Vliet received was explicitly framed as a continuation of the policy laid down at that conference. The brevity of De Moulin’s tenure, the pathos of his death by sunstroke in the open sawah between Lam-Baroe and Lam-Gaboes, and the ironic preservation of his portrait opposite the page recording his arrival, together make him one of the most memorable figures of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel.
See Also
- ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel (book by A. Kruisheer)
- J. W. Stemfoort
- C. P. J. van Vliet
- Jhr. C. H. A. van der Wijck
- J. A. Vetter
- Hansen
- Jhr. L. D. C. de Lannoy
- H. Th. de Moulin
- Civiel en Militair Gouverneur
- Defection of Teuku Umar (29 March 1896)
- Departure of Vetter (28 June 1896)
- Surprise of Ana’ Galoeng (29 June 1896)
- Death of Generaal-Majoor De Moulin (7 July 1896)
- Excursie to the IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba) (7 July 1896)
- Stemfoort’s Second Tenure as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur (11 July – 17 November 1896)
- Notulen der conferentie van 18 Juni 1896
- Lam-Pisang
- Lam-Djamoe
- Lam-Baroe
- IV Moekims
- Aceh War
- 1896
- 1913
Source
ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt., pp. 7, 15, 20–21, 162–167 (Bijlage II — Notulen der conferentie van 18 Juni 1896), 191, 222, 232.