The sweep of the IV and VI Moekims (815 July 1876) was a two-column Dutch operation through the IV and VI Moekims and the pass of Blang Kala, ordered by the civil and military commander, Major-General Wiggers van Kerchem, to drive the band of Toekoe Tjihiq Lamngga from the coastal country, to destroy enemy store-sheds and hiding places, and to found the post of Kroeëng Raba at the mouth of that river. The encircling march across the Kroeëng Raba on 13 July failed to catch Toekoe Tjihiq but placed the river mouth permanently in Dutch hands. It was described by H. F. Meijer in Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876 (1883).

Purpose

Since the fruitless Voigt expedition of June, reports placed Toekoe Tjihiq Lamngga near the bay of Kroeëng Raba, while small bands constantly visited the VI Moekims. Wiggers van Kerchem therefore determined to visit those districts and the adjoining mountains with a strong force, to drive the enemy out, destroy as many of his houses and store-sheds in the mountains as possible, and then to found a fortification near the bay of Kroeëng Raba, to protect the population of the IV Moekims better. Bad weather had drowned the sawahs and delayed the enterprise; when July promised better, the operation began. Each column counted three companies (each 4 officers and 100 non-commissioned officers and men), with the dressing-station personnel and forced-labourers; no artillery was taken. Captain F. C. E. Meijer of the General Staff, chief of the survey brigade, had been mapping the IV Moekims for some days guarded by a company, which now joined the 1st column.

The sweep

The 1st column under Major Diepenheim assembled at Boekit Seboen, the 2nd under Major Lubeck at Pakan Badak. On 8 July the 1st column’s three companies moved through kampong Lamlom and the northern slopes to Lampoe-Oek, searching the mountain edges and the so-called ravine of Goera; nothing was found but, here and there, a few houses, which were burned, and two captured Atjehers. Next day Lubeck moved up towards the plain of Blang Kala (blang meaning plain or sawah-field, as at Blang Daroe, Blang Kala, Blang Prija) to cover Diepenheim’s advance through the pass, and Diepenheim himself marched right through the pass to the saddle — the same spot where General Pel had bivouacked with his operating force on 16 January 1876 — where he found a difficult mountain path that led in western direction towards the sea. On 10 July both columns searched again: mountain, pepper gardens and beach, and nothing of the enemy was seen; only store-sheds and refuges found were burned. Meijer records that the guides even of the second day could not show a road to the sea round the west.

The plan against Toekoe Tjihiq Lamngga

Back at Boekit Seboen on 11 July, the report was confirmed that Toekoe Tjihiq Lamngga was at Leboe̍w (Leboe), south of kampong Raba. The plan ripened in the commander to catch him by a frontal diversion at the river mouth and an encircling march to his rear. A precise reconnaissance of the Kroeëng Raba — essential for the crossing — was made on 11 July by Captain F. C. E. Meijer and Captain Staat, guarded by a company: from Pakan Bing across the brook at Anaq Paja to Lamlom, then along the river. Near kampong Raba a place shown on the map was found where a raft crossing was easy: the river was 47 metres wide at mid flood, 3.7 metres deep, with no steep banks. A skirmish with Atjehers hurrying to the left bank near Loeknga — a wounded Ambonese fusilier and Atjehnese guide — betrayed the troops’ presence and warned the enemy.

The crossing of 13 July

In the afternoon of 12 July a company of the right half of the 5th battalion marched to the river mouth to bivouac on the right bank and lure the enemy into a fire-fight. On 13 July at half past five Major Lubeck marched with three companies of that half battalion, one company of barisan, the engineer detachment, mortar crews and ambulance to kampong Raba — delayed when the foot-bridge over the brook south of Anaq Paja had to be negotiated man by man. The kampongs Lamlom and Naga Oembang were still inhabited and quiet, but the people of kampong Raba left their houses when the engineers began to make a raft. One raft carried 12 men at a time, a second, made of beams of the kampong, only 6; the whole column did not stand on the left bank until about two in the afternoon. The covering company, seeing fugitive Atjehers, fired on them without needing to — and so made the troops’ presence known before the ring had closed.

During the night of 12–13 July the company at the river mouth had been fired on without effect and in the morning engaged the enemy — the needed frontal diversion — but at noon the firing at the mouth fell silent: the enemy, warned of troops in his rear, had left his position there. The plan, two hours short of completion, had failed. The General straightway decided to march directly on Leboe: kampong Raba was burned; Leboe, reached at three, held only two sheds whose pots with food still stood on the fire — the enemy had fled, probably to Lepong. The sheds were burned and the column reached the river mouth at five, bivouacking in kampong Moesang. The whole operation had cost one wounded man.

The founding of the post of Kroeëng Raba

The post had two purposes: as the right-hand supporting point of the strategic line Kroeëng Raba–Kroeëng Raja, by which the people of the interior of Groot-Atjeh were to be cut off from their sea supplies; and as better protection for the submitted IV Moekims against enemy attack. It would also let a civil official control imports from the sea. Major Diepenheim remained on the spot with three companies of the right half of the 5th battalion to protect the fortification work; the rest of the troops returned by Boekit Seboen to Kota Radja on 15 July.

The greatest obstacle was supply. A naval conference of 10 July had shown the difficulties: the station commander reported that in this season the bay of Kroeëng Raba was one of the worst anchorages of the west coast, the full ocean swell rolling in without pause, and dared not promise the help of a warship; total loss of guns and stores landed through the surf was possible. The hired steamer Marion, her master Mr. Osborne — a man full of zeal and good will, Meijer wrote, who had already done excellent service in Atjeh — did try: on 13 July at four in the morning she left the Olehleh roadstead with a naval escort, which had to turn back at King’s Point for wind and high sea; Osborne went ashore, rode on horseback to the bay at his own risk to see for himself, and at his own responsibility won leave to steam in. On the morning of 15 July in the bay, he could land nothing by sloop; he threw the engineering materials — bamboo, laths, asphalt felt — bundled and bound overboard to drift ashore; much of the cargo was lost, and when by afternoon the Marion began to drag her anchors he had to force her seaward under full steam and return to Olehleh. The fortification was therefore built chiefly from the materials of kampong Moesang itself.

Work began on 14 July under Captain of Engineers J. J. Staat, passed on 19 July to First Lieutenant of Infantry H. W. Nijenhuis, and by 28 July the commander was told the work could receive its garrison; on 26 July a company of the left half of the 6th battalion moved in. The armament, begun as two 8 cM. mountain guns, was changed on 21 July for two 8 cM. field guns.

Assessment

Meijer recorded the operation and its puzzles in full: the enemy, always informed, twice escaped; the military object — the post at the river mouth — was nevertheless achieved, and with it, on his reconnaissance of 25 July, Diepenheim visited Lepong and restored its people to the authority of their lawful chief, Toekoe Lampasei. The post became the standing base for patrol control along this part of the coast and the symbol of Dutch presence in a district where, as Meijer noted, the population stood between two fires and chose the neutrality that self-interest counselled.

See Also

Source

Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876, door H. F. Meijer (Breda: P. B. Nieuwenhuijs, 1883), chapter VII, pp. 209–224; sketch no. 5 (terrain between Kroeëng Raba and Lepong).