The Attack of 11 April 1874 was one of several major Acehnese assaults on the Dutch positions at Kotta Radja during the period following the capture of the Kraton. The attack, launched against the Dutch fortifications at the former sultan’s stronghold, was repulsed with heavy Acehnese casualties and demonstrated that, despite the loss of the Kraton and the flight of the Sultan, the Acehnese fighting forces remained capable of mounting coordinated and determined offensives against the Dutch positions.
Background
Following the fall of the Kraton on 24 January and the proclamation of annexation on 31 January 1874, the Dutch forces under Van Swieten had established a network of fortified posts around Kotta Radja, including positions at Oeleh-leh, Blangoe, Oedjong Pelang Gatang, Mosapie, Soerian, and the “grafheuvel” (burial mound) east of the Kraton. These posts were well-garrisoned, well-armed, and maintained communication with the fleet and with each other.
The Acehnese, though driven from their principal stronghold, had not been defeated in the field as a fighting force. Leaders such as Panglima Polim continued to organize resistance, and the Acehnese mounted a series of attacks on the Dutch positions in March and April 1874.
The Attack
On 11 April 1874, Acehnese forces launched a concerted assault on the Dutch positions at Kotta Radja. The details of the attack — the specific objectives, the number of attackers, and the tactical course of the engagement — are recorded in Van Swieten’s account as part of the pattern of Acehnese offensives that characterized this period.
The attack was repulsed. Van Swieten noted that the Acehnese attacks before 26 April had never done the Dutch harm and had always been repelled with good success and little Dutch loss but heavy Acehnese loss. “The attacks of the enemy before the 26th have never harmed us,” he wrote, “and have always been repelled with good success and little loss for us, but much for the enemy.”
Tactical Assessment
Van Swieten’s analysis of the Acehnese tactics was revealing: the enemy’s aggressive strength was not great, but his means of defence were considerable. The Dutch commander Colonel Pel had been instructed to await the enemy’s attacks rather than seek them out: “They must inflict on him the losses he would cause us if we attacked his positions, which do not hinder us, which we do not need, and which we do not wish to occupy.”
This defensive posture — waiting for the Acehnese to exhaust themselves against fortified Dutch positions — was, Van Swieten argued, the correct strategy. The Acehnese suffered heavy losses in each attack, while the Dutch consolidated their position and extended their network of posts.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873-1874)
- J. L. J. H. Pel
- Jan van Swieten
- Panglima Polim
- Kotta Radja
- The Disastrous Battle of 16 April 1874
- Aceh War
Source
De waarheid over onze vestiging in Atjeh, door den Luitenant-Generaal J. van Swieten, Zalt-Bommel, Joh. Noman en Zoon, [1879], pp. 381–416 (Hoofdstuk VIII); Bijlage O, pp. 481–490.