H. N. A. Swart

H. N. A. Swart — Hendrik Nikolaas Albert Swart — known in the Acehnese idiom of the old hunter Datoek as Toean Gouverneur Swart — was a Dutch lieutenant-general of the infantry (Luitenant-Generaal der Infanterie) of the K.N.I.L. and colonial administrator who, as Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Dependencies from 1908 to 1918, restored conciliatory governance after the harsh policies of his predecessor Van Daalen had provoked the 1907–1908 inquiry and a fierce flare-up of armed resistance, and who finally handed a peaceful Aceh over to a civilian Governor in 1918 — thereby ending what G. W. T. Dames calls “the lingering disease: the Atjeh War” (“the lingering disease: the Aceh War”). He was the final military governor of Aceh, the Aceh-connoisseur whose ten-year administration — “order and peace were consolidated in that province” — was the phase that “brought the Aceh War to an end,” and who throughout his career “altijd en overal het meest voelde voor breken van het verzet zonder bloedvergieten” — “always and everywhere most preferred to break resistance without bloodshed”. J. Kreemer’s Atjèh (1923) catalogues the administrative reforms of his governorship — the restoration of the Hasil-reglement, the reform of wasé oelèëbalang, the removal of bestuursbemoeienis from private-law pepper contracts, and the rapid expansion of volksonderwijs — in detail. In the received memory of the late-colonial Dutch community of the Indies, Swart came to be known as the Pacificator van Atjeh (“Pacifier of Atjeh”) — a title fixed by the elegy of F. Kunst that laments the post-war destruction of his life’s work.

Note on nomenclature: One source — the Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen of 1914 — gives the initials as “H. N. N. A. Swart” (with two N’s); all other sources, including Dames, Lamster, and the Encyclopaedisch Bureau, give “H. N. A. Swart”. The biography Generaal Swart by du Croo and Kolonel Schmidt identifies him as Hendrik Nikolaas Albert Swart. The double-N form is almost certainly a transcription or OCR variant of the same name.

Early Career and the Case Against Van Daalen

Swart rose through the ranks during the Aceh War, serving as a young officer under Van Heutsz and earning praise for his energy and sound judgment. Hendrikus Colijn, who worked closely with him, described Swart as a “goed verstand, vlot en krachtig werker” (“good sense, fluent and powerful worker”) with a talent for handling people. When Van Heutsz proposed Van Daalen as his successor in the Aceh governorship in 1904, Colijn privately favoured Swart as the more suitable candidate, though he conceded that Van Daalen’s seniority and military experience made him the inevitable choice. Van Heutsz himself acknowledged Swart’s abilities but initially hesitated to promote him because of his relatively junior rank.

Service in Borneo and Celebes

In 1905, Van Heutsz appointed Swart as civil and military resident of the South and East Division of Borneo (South and East Division of Borneo), where he successfully suppressed a long-standing rebellion by reorganising the military patrols and restoring order without relying on unreliable Dayak auxiliaries; by 1906 the area was pacified. He was later appointed Governor of Celebes and its dependencies, where he oversaw the pacification of Boni, Kingdom of Loewoe, and other recalcitrant states, implemented the Korte Verklaring (Short Declaration), and established landschapskassen (territorial treasuries). His methodical approach earned him the respect of both the local population and the central government.

Succession to the Aceh Governorship, 1908

Following the Atjéh-enquête and Van Daalen’s resignation, Van Heutsz turned to Swart as the obvious successor, at a moment when the territory was still shaken by the 1907–1908 flare-up of armed resistance that Van Daalen’s harsh policies had provoked. Swart took office in 1908 and immediately reversed Van Daalen’s punitive measures: he restored the authority of the oelèëbalangs (Acehnese territorial chiefs), reduced the arbitrary fines and released unjustly imprisoned chiefs, and fostered cooperation between the administration and local leaders, while continuing the economic and infrastructural development Van Daalen had initiated, now within a framework of trust rather than coercion.

His response was double in character: first to demonstrate, in the early years of his administration, that Dutch overmacht (overwhelming power) remained unshakeable; then, having established that fact, to pivot to a strategy of reconciliation and trust-building. The volksleiders (people’s leaders) who had been held down by force were “steeds meer ook uit overtuiging aan onze zijde gebracht” — “increasingly brought to the Dutch side by conviction rather than coercion” — and the result was the periode van rust (period of rest) that allowed the tal van maatregelen ter bevordering van den economischen vooruitgang (“the many measures for the promotion of economic progress”) described in De Buitenbezittingen.

The Letter from the Three Hoofden (1910–1911)

Swart’s preferred method in the closing years of the Acehnese resistance was to bring moral and political pressure on the remaining resisters through the most authoritative Acehnese leaders rather than military force alone. At his request, “de drie voornaamste Atjehse hoofden” (“the three principal Acehnese chiefs”) — two members of the Sultan’s family, including Toeankoe Machmoed Radja Keumala, and the former Sultan’s legeraanvoerder (army commander) Panglima Polem (who had surrendered to kapitein Colijn) — wrote a letter urging the Tiriō Teungkoes to submit. “De Teungkoes bespraken de brief, doch besloten tot het einde te vechten; hen zou geschieden naar Allah’s wil” — “The Teungkoes discussed the letter, but resolved to fight to the end; what happens to them will be according to Allah’s will.” The diplomatic track failed; the colonne Schmidt was needed to finish the work militarily.

The episode is the clearest example of Swart’s preference for negotiation even when he had the military power to crush. He mobilised the most authoritative remaining Acehnese political and religious voices before resorting to the final military solution — a reflection of the verzoenende en vertrouwenwekkende politiek (conciliatory and confidence-building policy) that defined his governorship.

The Bestuursreorganisatie Sumatra (1913–1914)

As the highest-ranking Dutch colonial official in Atjeh during the critical period of the Bestuursreorganisatie Sumatra (1913–1914), Swart played a central role in articulating the unique governance challenges that the territory posed to the broader reform agenda. His detailed explanations of Atjeh’s indigenous administrative structures and his candid assessments of the prospects for zelfbestuur (self-governance) in the residency made him an indispensable voice in the bestuursvergaderingen (administrative meetings) convened by Regeeringscommissaris S. de Graaff at Koeta-Radja on 19 January 1914 and 20 January 20 January 1914.

Views on Atjeh’s Governance

Swart declared that the Gouvernement Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden could not have local zelfbestuur in the standard form because of the territory’s distinctive administrative composition. He explained that only Groot-Atjeh and part of the onderafdeeling (sub-district) Singkel constituted rechtstreeks bestuurd gebied (directly ruled territory), while the remainder of the governorate consisted of Inlandsche Zelfbesturen (Native Self-Governments, also referred to as landschappen). This meant that the conventional model of decentralised governance being proposed for other parts of the Netherlands East Indies could not be applied uniformly in Atjeh without significant modifications.

Regarding the appointment of indigenous officials, Swart stated that erfelijkheid (heredity) in Atjeh hoofd (head) appointments existed but was increasingly being set aside in favour of bekwaamheden (competence) as the decisive factor. He explained that while the local population was consulted and their recommendations were heard, these could be overridden if the rechthebbende (claimant) lacked the required qualifications for the position. Swart expressed confidence that with proper opleiding (training), within a small number of years the necessary Inlandsche bestuurskrachten (Native administrative forces) would be obtained in Groot-Atjeh. However, he also raised probing questions about the proposed administrative structure, asking whether the ambtelijk element (bureaucratic element) in the proposed Gewestelijke Raad Noord-Sumatra (Regional Council of North Sumatra) would be overly dominant, and whether the rank of Civiel Gezaghebber (Civil Authority Holder) would be open to military officers with ambition — questions that reflected his concern about maintaining an appropriate balance between civilian and military authority in a territory where the two had long been intertwined.

The Sagi System Explanation

One of Swart’s most significant contributions to the bestuursvergaderingen was his detailed explanation of the indigenous administrative hierarchy of Groot-Atjeh, prompted by De Graaff’s inquiry about institutions comparable to Palembang’s marga’s. Swart described a three-tiered system comprising three sagi’s, which he compared to Javanese regentschappen (regencies); peleebalangschappen, which he compared to districten (districts); and moekimschappen, which he compared to onderdistricten (sub-districts). The comparison to Javanese administrative units was deliberate, as it allowed officials whose experience was primarily in Java to grasp the scale and function of Atjehnese institutions through analogy with the more widely understood desa and regentschap system of Java. The three-sagi federation — of the XXV, XXVI, and XXII moekims — was the principal indigenous-administrative description on the basis of which S. de Graaff concluded that only Gewestelijk Zelfbestuur was feasible for Atjeh, rather than the local zelfbestuur proposed for other territories.

Swart closed the Koeta-Radja meetings by thanking Regeeringscommissaris S. de Graaff for the “heldere, zakelijke uiteenzetting” (“clear, business-like explanation”) of the reform plan. He expressed hope that this “grootsche plan” (“grand plan”) would soon be realised, signalling his general support for the reorganisation effort despite the reservations he had articulated about its application to Atjeh’s unique circumstances.

Cultural Initiatives

Swart’s governorship is also associated with the promotion of native craft industries. De Buitenbezittingen records that “op initiatief van Gouverneur Swart” (“on the initiative of Governor Swart”) a half-dozen handwerkscholen — handicraft schools — were founded in Groot-Atjeh and Pedir, where pupils received regular instruction in useful and decorative handicrafts, lace-making, weaving, and similar skills, typically taught by Menangkabau girls trained as assistant teachers on Sumatra’s West Coast. The aim was to influence “de ontwikkeling der Atjehsche vrouw” — “the development of the Acehnese woman” — and through her the condition of the entire people.

Kreemer’s account: the administrative reforms

Kreemer’s Atjèh (1923) catalogues, with dates and besluit numbers, the specific administrative reforms by which Swart reversed Van Daalen’s exactions and re-founded the governance of the Onderhoorigheden on the principle of zelfbestuur. They group themselves under five heads.

Restoration of the Hasil-reglement (1908)

Swart restored the Hasil-reglement on 30 June 1908 (Bt. N°. 55), reversing Van Daalen’s unfavourable reform of 23 October 1905. The restoration included ƒ345,288 total restitution — ƒ163,450 in direct damages and ƒ181,838 in withheld income and warranty — to the landschapshoofden who had been disadvantaged by Van Daalen’s treatment of Gouvernementsbestuursvestigingen as Gouvernementsgrondgebied.

Reform of wasé oelèëbalang (1910, 1915)

Swart’s besluit of 13 January 1910 N°. 1 reformed the wasé oelèëbalang back from Van Daalen’s 10%-of-value system to fixed amounts, halting the pepper decline that Van Daalen’s 1906 reform had caused. A further reform in 1915 (Bt. 13 September N°. 435) removed bestuursbemoeienis (administrative interference) from private-law pepper contracts entirely, leaving the relationships between pangkaj (financiers), peutoeha (garden-heads), and aneu’ seuneubö’ (planters) to the parties themselves.

Opposition to voorschotten (1908)

In his nota of 10 August 1908 (N°. 2704/22), Swart opposed Van Daalen’s interest-free advances scheme and direct credit by the administration, defending the principle of self-rule (zelfbestuur) in the Onderhoorigheden. His position prevailed, and the voorschotten scheme was discontinued.

Wegenfonds and boetenfonds

Swart ordered the wegenfonds (road fund) to cease on 1 September 1908. The boetenfonds (fines fund) that replaced it was then absorbed by the landschapskassen on 1 January 1912.

Expansion of volksonderwijs

Under Swart’s governorship, the volksonderwijs (native education) system expanded from the single moekimschool with 38 pupils established by Van Daalen in 1907 to 51 schools with 2,009 pupils by 1909, and ultimately to 258 schools with 15,476 pupils by 1919. However, the 1919 Schoolrapport by inspector A. Vogel concluded that this growth had been achieved through coercion, not natural demand, and that volksonderwijs was unpopular in true Atjèhsche areas.

The Ten-Year Administration and the Handover of 1918

In Merac’s Oost-Indisch Journael (1947), Swart is the figure whose ten-year administration consolidated order and peace in Aceh. “The history of Aceh, for example, repeatedly showed how the most effective ally of the Acehnese against the Government was the Government itself, which constantly struck a new direction, which constantly changed systems of administration, and only during the ten-year administration of the Aceh-connoisseur, General Swart, were order and peace consolidated in that province.” The same volume records Buyckjens’s testimony: “Under the administration of Governor Swart the Aceh War came to an end… then gradually regulated conditions entered, and everywhere peace, order, and security began to prevail.”

The cumulative effect of the colonne Schmidt, the killing of the last Tiriō leaders, and the steady pressure of the patrouilles was that by 1918 Swart could at last transfer a peaceful Aceh to a civilian Gouverneur. “Daardoor kon Generaal Swart in 1918 eindelijk een rustig gebied overdragen aan een civiel Gouverneur. Er was een eind aan the lingering disease: the Atjeh War.” — “Thereby General Swart was able in 1918 at last to hand over a peaceful territory to a civilian Governor. There was an end to the lingering disease: the Aceh War.” The forty-five-year war — from the Eerste Atjeh-expeditie of 1873 to the handover of 1918 — was over. The political closure that Swart achieved was distinct from the military closure of 1911; the seven years between them are the years in which the colonial army held a pacified country until the civil administration was ready to take over.

Datoek’s Sobat Kras

The old hunter Datoek of Blang Rakal counted Swart among his sobat kras (heavy friends): “I was a ‘heavy friend’ with Toean Kristoppel, and Toean General Van Heutsz, and Toean Scheepens, and Toean Darlang, and Toean Boreel, and Toean Governor Swart.” The Toean Gouverneur — the Acehnese idiom for the Governor — is the book’s — and Datoek’s — memory of Swart as the heavy friend of the old hunter: the Toean Gouverneur who was a sobat kras of the Acehnese hunter.

Swart and Dominee Thenu

One personal anecdote from G. W. T. Dames’s Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L. places Swart in an unexpected register. When Dominee Thenu, after his retirement in 1934, was received in audience by Queen Wilhelmina in the Netherlands, he was so taken by the honour that he refused to wash the hand she had shaken. “Lang heeft het geduurd eer hij de hand heeft gewassen, die door de Koningin was gedrukt” — “It was a long time before he washed the hand that had been pressed by the Queen.” For more than ten days, the only other hand Thenu allowed to shake his was that of Generaal Swart. The episode places Swart, alongside the Queen, in the small circle of figures whose touch the Soldaten-Dominee (Soldiers’ Dominee) counted as near-sacramental — a quiet marker of the esteem in which the rank-and-file of the colonial army held their general.

Later Career and Consolidation

After his term in Aceh, Swart continued to serve in senior colonial positions. He later became Vice-President of the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië) and played a key role in shaping colonial policy in the 1910s.

By the time De Buitenbezittingen was compiled, Swart could point to a territory in which, “na de hardnekkigen strijd” (“after the stubborn struggle”), the population was “vrijwel in zijn geheel” (“almost in its entirety”) working with Dutch power, and long-neglected agriculture was being taken in hand again. The cautious and gradual replacement of military by civil administrators, and the accompanying reduction of troop strength, were “een krachtig bewijs” — “powerful proof” — of the consolidation that, after years of stubborn struggle, had come “betrekkelijk snel en onverwacht” (“relatively quickly and unexpectedly”). By the time Van Heutsz left office in 1909, Aceh was largely peaceful, the success widely attributed to Swart’s conciliatory governorship.

Significance

Swart’s success in Aceh demonstrated that military capability alone was insufficient — a governor needed tact, patience, and a genuine respect for local institutions. His appointment marked the definitive shift from the coercive approach of Van Daalen to the collaborative model pioneered by Van Heutsz, and his governorship is often seen as the final consolidation of Dutch rule in Aceh after decades of conflict. In the narrative of Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L., Swart stands as the quiet counter-weight to Van Heutsz: where Van Heutsz is the conqueror whose systeem finished the war at the tactical level, Swart is the general who closed it at the political level.

Swart’s significance for the encyclopedia of Achehnese history is also twofold in the colonial memorial register. First, his role as Pacificator van Atjeh — fixed in the colonial memory by the title of the Kunst elegy — makes him the principal Dutch agent of the final pacification of Atjeh, the successor in that role to Van Heutsz (whose campaigns brought the war to its military conclusion) and to Pel, Van der Heyden, and Vetter in the central phase. Second, his 1914 testimony on the *sagi* system is the principal documented indigenous-administrative description of the Groot-Atjeh territorial-political structure on which the post-conquest colonial administrative debate rested. His career thus spans the military, the administrative, and the memorial phases of the Dutch engagement with Atjeh.

Account from Atjèh by J. Kreemer (Deel II)

Kreemer provides administrative details of Swart’s governorship (1908–1918) that complement the earlier sources:

Upon succeeding Van Daalen in 1908, Swart immediately restored the Hasil-reglement (the regulation governing import/export revenue) that Van Daalen had altered, issuing Gt. 30 June 1908 N°. 55, which required the restitution of ƒ345,288 to those who had overpaid under Van Daalen’s revised rates.

Swart reformed the wasé oelèëbalang from a percentage rate to fixed amounts by Bt. 13 January 1910 N°. 1, removing the incentive for oelèëbalang’s to restrict trade by substituting a flat sum for the ad valorem percentage.

By 1909, Swart had expanded volksonderwijs (public education) to 51 schools serving 2,009 pupils — up from 38 pupils in a single moekimschool under Van Daalen in 1907.

Swart formally opposed the voorschotten (advance-payment) scheme introduced by Van Daalen, registering his objection in nota 10 August 1908 N°. 2704/22.

The wegenfonds (road-maintenance fund) maintained by the oelèëbalang’s ceased on 1 September 1908, when its revenue function was transferred to the governmentfunds.

The boetenfonds (fines fund), maintained separately, was absorbed into the landschapskassen (territorial treasury funds) on 1 January 1912.

Account from Melati en rotan (1947) — the Pacificator van Atjeh elegy

The *Melati en rotan* collection of F. Kunst, published 1947 at Bandoeng, contains the elegy “Bij den dood van Generaal Swart, den pacificator van Atjeh” — “On the death of General Swart, the pacifier of Atjeh.” The title fixes Swart, in the colonial memory of the mid-twentieth-century Dutch community of the Indies, as the Pacificator van Atjeh — the officer under whose command the Atjeh-oorlog was brought to its definitive close. The poem, however, immediately complicates the title by lamenting not the death of the general but the destruction of his work:

“Wanneer wij treuren aan het graf van Swart, Die nu geland is aan Doods veil’ge kust En van een daadzwaar, roemrijk leven rust, Is ‘t niet om hem, die dwars door vreugde en smart Atjēh gedragen heeft in zijn groot hart En van volbrachten plicht zich was bewust, Toen ‘s Levens laatst bivakvuur werd gebluscht. Ons voegt geen rouw om hem, maar het is hard, Zijn levenswerk roek’loos te zien vernield: Het heil van ‘t land, waar hij zoovéél van hield, Chaos, waar hij eens orde en welvaart bracht, Het razen van den fanatieken haat, Waar vredestichten was zijn grootsche daad, En ergst van al Holland in blindheids nacht.”

The elegy’s three complaints — that the country’s well-being has been reduced to chaos, that fanatic hatred rages where Swart had brought peace, and that “Holland in night of blindness” has permitted the destruction — fix the poem’s occasion as the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian National Revolution, in which the colonial order established by Swart in Atjeh was visibly destroyed. The general’s death, in this frame, is the occasion for a lament on the destruction of the colonial achievement itself — a lament that turns the title of Pacificator van Atjeh from a celebration into an elegy.

Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)

The following account is drawn from the parliamentary history of the Dutch Second Chamber as narrated by Vermeulen in the colonial section of the 1955 fourth revised edition of Rengers’s *Schets*.

Swart — a Dutch colonel (overste) — is the officer whom the Raad van Indië recommended in 1905 for the post of military commander and governor of Atjeh, and whom governor-general Van Heutsz passed over in favour of Van Daalen. The episode is one of the most consequential personnel decisions of the pacificatie period: had the Raad van Indië’s recommendation prevailed, the “Wekeer” affair of October 1907 might never have occurred.

The 1905 nomination

When, in 1905, the post of militair commandant en gouverneur van Atjeh fell vacant — Van Heutsz having been elevated to the governor-generalship — the Raad van Indië considered the candidates and recommended Colonel Swart. Governor-general Van Heutsz overrode the recommendation: he persuaded the minister to appoint Van Daalen instead. The inspection tour Van Heutsz undertook in December 1907 — after the “Wekeer” articles — was to prove the Raad van Indië’s instinct sound: Van Daalen’s “verkeerde politiek gevoerd tegenover de hoofden” was the explicit finding of the June 1908 report.

The 1908 aftermath

The removal of Van Daalen in December 1907 and the June 1908 report installed in Atjeh the “vanouds beproefd gebleken stelsel van bestuur door middel van de hoofden, die men door tactvolle omgang aan het Nederlandse gezag moest binden” — the long-tried system of administration through the chiefs, who were to be bound to Dutch authority by tactful intercourse. Van Daalen’s maxim had been: “gij kunt die kerels niet vertrouwen, gij moet ze ook niet vertrouwen, gij moet ze slaan en drukken en dan zullen ze u gehoorzamen” — you cannot trust those fellows, you must not trust them, you must beat them and press them and then they will obey you. The Raad van Indië’s recommendation of Swart is the institutional record of an alternative policy — one that, in the event, was tried too late.

Significance

The Raad van Indië’s recommendation of Swart in 1905 is, in retrospect, the lost alternative of the Atjehnese post-conquest period. The decision of Van Heutsz to override that recommendation is the proximate cause of the Gajoe-Alas-Batak atrocities of 1904-1905 and of the “Wekeer” affair of October 1907.

Account from Atjeh by H.C. Zentgraff (1938)

Zentgraff portrays Swart as the governor who completed Van Daalen’s work by different means. He appears at no. 6 in the front rank of the 40-year jubilee photograph of the Korps Maréchaussée of 2 April 1930: “Luit. Gen. H. N. A. Swart”.

The Meurandeh Paja massacre, 26 January 1905

At the time of the Meurandeh Paja massacre of 26 January 1905, Swart was commandant te Lho Seumawé. He received news of the massacre lang vóór deze een der garnizoenen kon bereiken — long before the single fusilier who escaped could reach a garrison — because such messages ran through Atjeh als hazen (like hares), each keudé passing the message to a fresh runner so that as much as 80 km per day could be covered. Swart joeg met eene patrouille in den gemeensten marsch naar Meurandeh Paja, found the sixteen afschuwelijk toegetakelde (hideously mangled) bodies — most bearing the traditional kap in den hals bij den linkerschouder, the coup de maître of the Atjeher with the klewang — and had them buried in a massagraf. The investigation pointed to T. Tjhi Toenong as one of the authors; Swart liet dit op voorzichtige wijze doen by luit. Van Vuuren when T. Tjhi Toenong came to Lho Seumawé on 5 March 1905.

Authorisation of Schmidt’s Tiro pursuit, 1908

In 1908 Swart gave luitenant Schmidt, die juist mooi werk had gedaan in Geumpang en Teunom, the order zich geheel te wijden aan de opsporing, eventueel vernietiging, van de Tiro-oelama’s en hun benden. Before unleashing the vernietigingsapparaat, Swart made one last attempt to bring the Tiro-Tengkoes to submission: he had the three principal chiefs of Atjeh — Toeangkoe Machmoed, Panglima Polim, and Toeankoe Radja Keumala — write the letter of 18 Radjab 1325 (the Brief van 18 Radjab 1325) urging the Tiro-oelama’s to submit. The brief reached Tgk. Tjhi Majet; nobody was willing to give up the fight.

The false T. Radja Sabi, December 1913

In December 1913 the false T. Radja Sabi appeared at Lho Soekon. Kapitein Behrens of the 5e divisie at Leuhong examined him at length; the knaap viel door de mand; hij bekende een onderschoven object te zijn (fell through; he confessed to being a put-up job). Swart answered Behrens’s report: “nog niet de overtuiging te hebben dat de jongen niet T. Radja Sabi was” — still not convinced that the boy was not T. Radja Sabi. He ordered one-by-one confrontations with relatives and acquaintances; even after the boy’s confession. A few days later Swart belegde te Lho Seumawé eene vergadering of all the chiefs and pronounced: “De jongen is Teukoe Radja Sabi” — against which nobody protested. Zentgraff calls this één der grootste, en interessantste, mystificaties welke de Atjeh-historie kent.

Atjeh, door H.C. Zentgraff. Gedrukt bij Drukkerij “De Unie”, 1938, Batavia.

Origins, childhood and schooling

Swart did not come from a family of officers. His father, Klaas Swart, was a Groninger who worked in the Indies first in the cultures (plantation agriculture) and afterwards in the civil service; his mother was Cornelia Maria Johanna Maria Gouay. Born at Tjibitoeng, Swart retained only vague memories of his earliest childhood before, in his seventh year, his father’s administrative posting took the family to Soekadana in Borneo — a post under a lieutenant with a few European sergeants, from whom the boy learned “a little arithmetic and Dutch” until his ninth year.

In 1872 his father was pensioned. The family returned to the Netherlands by the sailing ship Kosmopoliet II, a voyage of 121 days round the Cape, touching at Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, Ascension and Saint Helena — where Swart heard the name Napoleon for the first time in his life. They landed at Brouwershaven, lived for a time in Rotterdam, and finally settled at Kampen. There Swart went to school for the first time, under the schoolmaster Van Duijl, entering the lowest class with a brother three years his junior. During a free quarter of an hour he wandered into the sixth class, saw a problem in decimal fractions on the blackboard, took a piece of chalk and solved it; the master of the fourth class saw him and Swart was promoted at once to the sixth.

When Swart was twelve, Van Duijl — “a clever, good teacher, whom Swart still vividly remembered” — decided to teach him French so that the boy could enter the H.B.S. (Hogere Burgerschool). He succeeded. In the highest class he sat the entrance examination for the K.M.A. at Breda: it was settled between him and his two brothers that all three would become officers of the Indies army. Swart passed, but was ranked eighty-second when only the first seventy-two were admitted.

From volunteer soldier to officer

Swart chose the solution many took in that period: adspirant-onderofficier. On 16 October 1880, aged seventeen, he engaged as a volunteer soldier for six years, with a bounty of eighty guilders, in the battalion of the 8th Regiment of Infantry then garrisoned at Deventer. He deliberately avoided the alternative, the Instructie Bataljon at Kampen, because he did not wish to walk about as a private in front of the comrades who had passed for the K.M.A.

He was made corporal on 16 March and sergeant on 30 October. Being a few days too young to sit the examination for the Hoofdcursus within the year, he was obliged to remain two years on the course at Arnhem; after six years in all he passed out through the Hoofdcursus as an officer with a middling examination number. He re-engaged for a year on 16 October 1886 and on 21 November 1886 was appointed 2de luitenant in the infantry of the army in the Netherlands Indies by royal decree no. 18 of 24 November 1886.

As a sergeant Swart once met King Willem III, during a summer detachment in the camp of Millingen. Commanding a forage column to Apeldoorn on a sweltering day, he had unbuttoned his tunic and unfastened his belt when he recognised the King approaching on foot.

He sailed for the Indies on 7 May 1887 aboard the s.s. Zuid-Holland, arrived at Batavia on 17 June 1887, and was posted on 22 June to the 6th Battalion.

First Atjeh service and the Militaire Willemsorde, 1890

Swart’s first contact with Atjeh came in 1890, when he was attached as 2e luitenant to the expeditionary 6th Battalion of Infantry at Idi on the east coast. On 11 June 1890, in the attack on the enemy positions on the left bank of the Idi river, he led the 2nd section of the 2nd company — the section with the least difficult ground to cross — and was first into the fortification on the summit of the Boekit Roembia, followed immediately by an Ambonese corporal and an Ambonese fusilier.

Swart’s own recollection, given to du Croo at the age of seventy-nine, was characteristically plain: “I was lucky that day. I was then serving with the 2nd Ambonese company. And with four Ambonese I was the first man in. But as I sprang over the parapet into the stronghold I at once had a shot through the left upper arm” (“I was lucky that day … but as I jumped over the parapet into the benteng I at once had a shot through my left upper arm”). The Ambonese behind him had a finger shot away. The battalion band played, the colours were planted, the Wilhelmus rang out; Van Teijn and Van Heutsz came into the fortification and Van Heutsz tapped him on the shoulder: “you brought that off, my boy!” (“you brought that off, my boy!”). The artillery commander Rost van Tonningen — later army commander — said to him: “Swart, come and have a glass of beer with me!”

Having been dressed by the officier van gezondheid J. A. Tamson, Swart resumed command of his section and took part in the rest of the day’s operations. He remained with the troop movements with his arm in a sling and returned to Magelang after six weeks. By royal decree of 30 August 1891 no. 2 he was appointed Knight 4th Class of the Militaire Willemsorde for his conduct at various encounters with the enemy in Atjeh during 1890.

Du Croo drew attention to two peculiarities of this episode. The first was that six weeks of Atjeh service “dat is alles!” — that was the whole of it — for a man who would become one of the Indies’ foremost Buiten-mannen (Outer-Provinces men); until his promotion to captain in the transitional year 1898 Swart obstinately remained on Java and in the vredesgarnizoenen (peace garrisons). The second was that in those young years the pull towards the buitengewesten was simply absent: Swart preferred to lay “een draagvlak” for later years, to learn everything he could within the military framework, with the Hoogere Krijgsschool in the background.

The Korps Pupillen at Gombong, 1891–1894

On 20 August 1891 Swart, still a second lieutenant, was transferred to the Korps Pupillen te Gombong, in the lonely heart of Central Java, and carried à la suite of his arm. He was promoted 1ste luitenant on 7 April 1892 with the stipulation that he remain at the Korps Pupillen.

The school — long since forgotten, as du Croo remarked — existed to receive the children of soldiers killed in action or pensioned who could not be properly brought up at home; almost exclusively children of men below officer rank were admitted. Some three to four hundred blue-clad pupillen were housed in three companies: the 1st for boys of fifteen to seventeen, the 2nd for twelve to fifteen, the 3rd for six to twelve. Each company had two lieutenants and the necessary cadre, with a captain as corps commander. The boys attended the ordinary primary school under supervision during normal school hours; the afternoon was given to sport, gymnastics and craft instruction (tailor, carpenter), the last introduced for those found unfit for military service at the age of seventeen, who could then find a living as artisans.

Swart, who besides his myopic astigmatism was afflicted with “an unusual interest in education”, kept a large and warm place in his memory for the school. When a boy asked him one day whether he could become an officer — “Hm, well, are you really clever enough for that?” said Swart; “Yes indeed, but can you not help me?” — the lieutenants conferred and the result was a cursus for boys eligible for more extended education. Swart’s verdict: “A really good institution; I have always regretted that it was abolished and that the boys were then distributed among the orphanages” (“A really good institution; I always regretted that it was abolished and the boys then distributed among the orphanages”). Throughout his long service he repeatedly and with great pleasure met old and successful pupillen, often as non-commissioned officers and often with the M.W.O. or an honourable mention; a colonel who headed the Topografische Dienst and a well-known buiten-werker had been his pupils at Gombong.

Staff and adjutant years, 1894–1898

On 27 October 1894 Swart was transferred to the Subsistentenkader at Semarang; on 29 March 1895 he was appointed adjutant of the 11th Battalion; on 11 December 1895 he was honourably relieved of that post and transferred to the Subsistentenkader at Batavia. On 23 January he was transferred to the IInd Division of the Departement van Oorlog (Head Bureau of Infantry). By decree no. 13 of 15 September 1898 he was awarded 825 guilders for translating into Malay the Uittreksel uit de Recrutenschool together with the principal duties and rules of conduct of the soldier and of the group commander in action. He was promoted Kapitein on 24 July 1898.

Captain in Atjeh, 1898–1900: “Swart and his Jans”

On 22 November 1898 — in the midst of the hard fighting and continuous extension of Dutch authority under the new governor Van Heutsz — Swart was posted to Atjeh for the second time, as captain in the 7th Battalion of Infantry, then quartered with three companies at Sigli and one company in a bivouac some hours outside it. That detached company, composed of Sundanese — a people with few representatives in the army — was assigned to him.

At Sigli he found Van Heutsz, appointed general in November (the Commander’s Cross of the M.W.O. followed in January 1899), and paid his respects. Van Heutsz’s greeting became famous in Swart’s own retelling: “Now then, you had better see what you can do with your company; you have been a long time on Java in all those posts, so now show that you are of use in the field as well” (“Now then, you had better see what you can do with your company; you have been a long time on Java in all those posts, so show that you are of use in the field too”).

Swart got on excellently with the cheerful and capable Sundanese, marched out often with them, especially in the Padang Tidji district and to several places where troops had never been before. He was not an easy chief: a hot-tempered man who could bellow and rage, who set high demands and maintained strict discipline, but who could inspire his men, who was strictly just and who took uncommon care of “een potje” — the cooking pot. Honest and warm-hearted, he stood up where necessary for his subordinates.

When the 7th Battalion returned to Java, Swart was transferred on 30 May 1899 to the 12th Battalion at Sigli, whose 1st company had been dispirited. Its Javanese soldiers — Jannen in barrack idiom — promptly gave the small, thickset, slightly round-shouldered captain his recognition-name: “de Bult” (“the Hunchback”), a name that carried a certain appreciation. A sergeant of the company wrote to an evacuated comrade, sergeant M. Schouten: “And now we have only a little captain!” (“Now we really have a captain!”). Of that Jannen-company without élan Swart made an élite unit, and with it earned the third class of the Militaire Willemsorde.

The decisive action came during the expedition to Pasè led by Van Heutsz in 1899. On 21 June 1899, in the operations at Geudong, his company was sent to the front line to support the marechaussée and was halted by the greatly swollen Pasè river. Despite heavy enemy fire at short range, Swart at once took energetic measures for the crossing, went over the river, gathered some seventeen soldiers on the right bank and with great skill and boldness drove the superior enemy with heavy loss from his position to the south by a flank attack, holding the captured position until more troops arrived.

Swart’s own account preserved the human detail: crossing on improvised rafts he found beside him, to his surprise, lieutenant Mac Gillavry of Van Heutsz’s staff, who had come along without his knowledge. They worked their way cautiously along the bank towards the missigit (mosque), reached the edge of the fortification, and at Swart’s signal “voorwaarts” leapt over the wall into the midst of a garrison certainly two hundred strong. The surprise robbed the defenders of their courage; after a short but violent fight they fled. Across the water Van Heutsz was seen with his staff, shouting “who is that commander there and with how many men is he posted?” — to which Swart shouted back: “Captain Swart with eighteen men, but he requests reinforcement!”

In another engagement against a fortification on the river he pushed a man in front of him through the pagger and ordered an attempt on the parapet; they got over it and the enemy, with nowhere else to go, had to swim. During the fight Swart felt something against his belly and found he had taken a contourschot which had not penetrated; the doctor treated it in the evening after his wounded had been dressed — “you got off lightly there” (“you got off lightly”), the doctor said.

Two further wounds are recorded in his stamboek: at the storming of the kampong Bambi in Pidië a grazing shot above the right temple on 8 May 1899, and at the taking of the positions on the Glé Risé a bloedbuil (blood blister) on the belly from a thrown stone on 21 November 1899. For his distinction in the operations in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden between 1 June 1899 and 31 December of that year he was promoted Knight 3rd Class of the Militaire Willemsorde (“Military William Order”) by royal decree of 13 July 1900 no. 29.

Leave, marriage and return, 1900–1901

Swart remained continuously on operations in Atjeh until May 1900, when he was transferred to Buitenzorg in connection with his application for leave. There he heard indirectly that, though barely two years a captain, he had already been declared fit for major. His corps commander nevertheless “tested” the prospective leave-taker according to the rules of the trade — battalion school, field service, drill, administration — until he embarked on 18 July aboard the s.s. Lawoe and disappeared for a year. He had been granted a year’s European leave on 6 July 1900 with retention of claim to promotion.

During that leave he noted two particulars: he was appointed to the commission charged with conducting the officers’ examination at the K.M.A., and he married. The examination lasted some weeks on end, so that Swart even obtained an extension of leave. One memory remained: riding back to his hotel with the chairman of that part of the commission after a field-service exercise, he discovered just before the hotel that he had lost his M.W.O. The examinees were marching behind them, and to Swart’s great joy one of the young men had found the decoration — the same young man who had that morning given the worst examination of the day, provoking a comrade’s remark: “Well, old chap, that is the best turn you have given away today!”

He married on 22 May 1901 Miss Victorina Maria Geertruida Stadlmair, then twenty-three years old. Swart had asked to be reposted to Atjeh at the end of his leave; at Padang he learned that the request had been granted — but the newly married officer had been given a station to which his wife was not permitted to follow him. So it was that on 17 September 1901 Swart arrived in Atjeh for the third time, alone. He returned from leave on 21 August 1901 aboard the s.s. Koning Willem III and was posted to the 12th Battalion.

Du Croo underlined the paradox: Swart was a young captain, he had earned an exceptionally high distinction as a fighting officer, he had drawn the attention of Van Heutsz, he was thirty-eight years old — “but as an administrator he had never yet appeared anywhere.” His greatest and most fruitful gift, his uncommon aptitude for pacificeerend bestuurswerk, had remained unnoticed and therefore unused for more than fourteen years of service.

Marechaussee and civil authority: Poelò Raja and Lho’ Seumawè, 1902–1905

Swart’s ambition on returning to Atjeh was placement with the Korps Marechaussee — and he admitted frankly that what mattered to him in such a placement was the goede tempat, the station to which a wife might follow. On 8 February 1902 a vacancy arose; Swart was transferred to the 1st Garrison Battalion of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden and assigned as commander of the 5th Division of the Korps Marechaussee at Lho’ Nga. On 27 March 1902 he was charged with the government of the division of the XXV Moekims with the southern settlements (Afdeeling Groot Atjeh).

On 17 July he was relieved of the government of the sub-division Sagi of the XXV Moekims and southern settlements and charged with the government of the sub-division Poelò Raja with the title of Civiel Gezaghebber (Civil Authority). “And there, on Poelò Raja and in July 1902, the real administrative work began for Swart” — there, du Croo wrote, Swart’s real administrative work began: a relatively small island, virtually pacified, but with an extensive field for action on the mainland where numerous known band-leaders practised the main prang (war-game) with their followers. For communication between station and mainland Swart even disposed of a ship of war, which he used above all for nocturnal crossings and thus for surprise.

On 12 October 1903 he was honourably relieved of the government of Poelò Raja and charged with the government of the sub-division Lho’ Seumawè, the assignment being described as temporary; on 24 October 1903 he was extraordinarily promoted Majoor for outstanding deeds and for extraordinary military talents demonstrated in action. On 3 April 1905 he was honourably relieved of the government of Lho’ Seumawè.

Swart’s administrative principles

Du Croo set out the guiding principles Swart formulated for administrative work in scarcely subjected districts, where pacification had to be built up from below.

In the first place: only by giving trust can trust be obtained, but the administrator must always keep before his eyes the reputation of the Acehnese in the matter of vertrouwen. Therefore: keep both eyes well open and ask always whether the man is worth trusting. The application of this principle meant that the good chiefs at once and clearly felt that Swart was well disposed to them; from such chiefs he could obtain anything, and with such chiefs it was ultimately possible to reach an initial form of self-government — du Croo cited T. Tjhi’ Peusangan as the example.

In the second place: he demanded and himself provided proper administration of justice, in which correct sentences were pronounced according to principles of law that the Acehnese understood — that is, a decision as just as possible “with regard to the adat (“customary law”)”*, always with the spiritual adviser, the oelama, behind the green table. Such justice caused the Acehnese to judge the toean who presided over the Moesapat to be adil (just). And whoever truly stood recorded as adil could, as an administrator, achieve much if not everything.

In the third place: Van Heutsz had rightly wished that roads be laid out everywhere. Such road-building, as a rule combined with heerendiensten, naturally aroused reluctance among an extremely indolent population accustomed to perpendicular footpaths — but where it was well executed and not carried out as a show-piece it reached far above the immediate daily convenience of the toean, because it opened up a hermetically closed country, brought better and faster traffic, and so promoted trade and mutual intercourse.

A fourth principle was travel without military escort, a hobby-horse of Swart’s and a conception Van Daalen did not share; Van Daalen even forbade administrators to visit their territory without military cover. In 1902 this had already caused friction between Swart as gezaghebber in Lho’ Kroeët and Daja and Van Daalen as his assistant resident. Van Daalen noted the prohibition on Swart’s journal; Van Heutsz in his turn noted “that Swart could judge this better than he or I could, that appreciation ought to be shown from higher authority in the matter, and that there could be no question of a prohibition where Swart was concerned.”

The first clash with Van Daalen

The very first personal contact between Swart and Van Daalen in the administrative sphere — and precisely on the point where Van Daalen stood diametrically opposed to a healthy, ethical pacificator, namely the treatment of the chiefs — marked their difference of view clearly. Van Daalen, as acting Assistant Resident of the Onderhoorigheden, visited Poelò Raja and took part in a patrol. The patrol met an oelèëbalang with his retinue, who paid his respects in the customary and, to Swart’s mind, entirely proper manner. Van Daalen nevertheless remarked that this chief had shown insufficient respect, which Swart could not see. Van Daalen lectured him: “look here, you are a full-blooded European and you do not feel that; but with me it is different. We have more sense of these things. Respect is…”

Borneo and Celebes, 1905–1908

On 3 March 1905 Swart was temporarily charged with the civil and military authority in the residency of the South and East Division of Borneo, under the title of Civiel en Militair Resident, at a salary of 1,250 guilders a month. He was promoted Luitenant-kolonel on 24 October 1905 with the stipulation that he remain charged with that authority. In one year he brought about a complete reversal in Borneo; the pacification of the Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling was accomplished in 1905–1906.

On 9 July 1906, under article 43 of the Reglement op het beleid der Regeering in Nederlandsch-Indië, he was temporarily charged with effect from 3 September 1906 with the civil and military authority in the Gouvernement Celebes en Onderhoorigheden, at 1,500 guilders a month, with the title of Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Celebes en Onderhoorigheden and simultaneously Military Commander of Menado and Timor en Onderhoorigheden. There he oversaw the pacification of Celebes and, as the closing piece of his eastern service, the undertaking against Bima and Soembawa in 1908 — an operation carried out with a handful of marechaussée and described by du Croo as a classic example of rapid and conclusive pacification. He was promoted Commander of the Militaire Willemsorde (“Military William Order”) by royal decree of 2 September 1909 no. 41 for the Soembawa operations of 16 February to 9 May 1908, and appointed Knight in the Order of the Netherlands Lion by royal decree of May 1909 no. 7.

Appointment to Atjeh, 1908

By decree of 4 May 1908, with thanks for his many and weighty services in Celebes, Swart was appointed Military Commander of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden and simultaneously Governor of that province, with the title of Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden at 1,500 guilders a month. He took over the government of Atjeh on 10 June 1908.

The appointment was contested. Dr. Snouck Hurgronje published in the Nieuwe Courant of 16–19 June 1908 a hostile judgement: asked whether the new governor’s appointment offered any guarantee of better policy, “We must answer this question decidedly in the negative.” As a troop commander Swart was valued by the most competent, but by no means placed on a level with Van Daalen; in knowledge of Atjeh and the Acehnese he could not stand in Van Daalen’s shadow. Snouck concluded that Swart was “by no means the man to give Atjeh … the combination of means of pacification derived from sound principles of government with the unavoidably hard measures that must break the resistance. It may well be that he would be in favour of it; behind it he is not, and behind it he will not come.”

Minister Idenburg wrote candidly to Van Heutsz: “I do not know Swart … I accept on your authority that he is excellent; but for the work of pacification he is no more cut out than Van Daalen, though his character is perhaps somewhat gentler.” Van Heutsz answered with an equally sharp defence of the man he had chosen, and the compromise reached was the supervisory visits of the member of the Council of the Indies Liefrinck.

Before departure Swart stayed at the palace at Buitenzorg, where Van Heutsz — feeling himself so often a prisoner of that palace — took him incognito to Batavia for an evening at the Restaurant Versteeg opposite Hotel De Nederlanden, “Haroun al-Rashid and his vizier”; the disguise failed, as ever more polite passers-by came to look at the Governor-General. Van Heutsz’s parting words were: “one thing more … you have only to see to it that what happened to Van Daalen does not happen to you!” Swart answered: “I have a different character from Van Daalen.” “Accoord,” Van Heutsz replied, “I count on it, then, that Atjeh will come right. And then we shall say no more about it.”

Taking over the government, 1908

Swart took over the civil government from Assistant Resident Rijckmans, Van Daalen having already departed. His account of the first weeks is preserved in the biography: “Then I went at once by tram with Colijn eastward as far as Langsa, to get an impression for myself.” He discussed everything with Colijn, who had been attached to him as adjunct regeeringscommissaris voor de decentralisatie for the first months, and together they determined what should be brought to the notice of the Governor-General; Colijn then wrote the letter.

At Lho’ Seumawè Swart held a meeting with all the oelèëbalangs of the eastern part. Discussing the situation, he pointed out that in various landschappen there were again djahats. One of the chiefs then took the floor and answered curtly: “not only are there evildoers everywhere, but we ourselves are evildoers too!” — a reply that, as du Croo observed, characterised the state of affairs exactly. There followed the discussion of the disastrous application of the system of fines and the withholding of the chiefs’ incomes, which certainly amounted to a couple of hundred thousand guilders. Swart informed them that whatever in his opinion had been wrongly withheld would be returned at once and without more ado; but the fines and withholdings rightly imposed he regarded as a waarborgsom (security) for their good conduct, returnable only after a year or more of good behaviour, depending on the landschap, and otherwise irrevocably forfeit.

At the same meeting he raised the unceasing attacks on the tramway, which had become the rule: “I firmly count on it that those attacks are finished from today. Should that not be the case, then I can assure the territorial chiefs that I shall make them feel it severely!” He did not say how or what or where, but they knew him from the time when he had been major at Lho’ Seumawè. They answered “you can rely on it” — and from then on the tramway line there was no longer destroyed. In Keureutòë he met Christoffel and told him: “you see to it that the resistance in this part is brought to an end, and you may act very severely in doing so.” Christoffel answered: “that will be put in order, Colonel.”

Swart’s verdict on what he found was grim: “The situation greatly disappointed me and proved far less favourable than I had thought, because — and it is painful to have to say this — government had been carried on by superiors who lacked the gift of governing.” By the reports of the administrative officials there were certainly five to six thousand men in resistance, if not more, and they were everywhere again.

Relatively few men had to be removed from their functions; against many he had to intervene, but he then gave them a probationary period. “If in that time they really changed, and conformed entirely to my views, then they could stay; if that was not the case, then out they went irrevocably.”

The Liefrinck inspections

For two successive years Swart received the visits of Liefrinck, member of the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, sent as a kind of toeziende voogd (supervising guardian) to ensure that he would not do what Van Daalen had done. Swart’s own comment was dry: “I had little trouble from him, but he had, to be honest, little insight into the matter either.” He put a good lieutenant’s house near the Governor’s residence at Liefrinck’s disposal and accompanied him on tour in a directors’ carriage of the tramway, stopping at every halt so that the oelèëbalangs could pay their respects.

At one halt in Pidië Swart noticed that one of the chiefs was not properly dressed. The man first paid his respects to Liefrinck; when he came to Swart, Swart pointed out his clothing and his deficiency of hormat, refused to receive him and sent him away: “on the return journey, when I come by again, you may pay your respects.” Liefrinck asked in astonishment: “how can you do such a thing? I had not even noticed it!” — “Quite so, but those things do strike me,” said Swart, “and I do not receive the chiefs in that way.” After two years it was clear that Swart could manage perfectly well without the supervising guardian.

Promotions during the governorship

Swart was extraordinarily promoted Kolonel on 31 March 1909 for outstanding military deeds and extraordinary military talents; Generaal-majoor on 18 November 1911; and Luitenant-Generaal on 6 September 1912. He was promoted Adjutant in Extraordinary Service to Her Majesty the Queen by royal decree no. 65 of 7 April 1916, and appointed Grand Officer in the Orde van Oranje-Nassau by royal decree of 27 August 1921 no. 49. The Eereteeken voor belangrijke krijgsbedrijven was awarded him for Atjeh 1873–1890, Atjeh 1906–1910, South Celebes 1905–1908 and the Lesser Sunda Islands 1905–1909.

The Nieuwe Courant chronicler of Atjeh affairs — reprinted in the Sumatra Post of 25 November 1912 — read the promotion to lieutenant-general as “the confirmation of a policy which from its beginning meant a true revolution, a reversal of ideas concerning our administrative task in the north of Sumatra.”

Method: men, orders and correspondence

Swart’s method as governor was to choose men, give them precise tasks, and hold the threads himself. He sat in his office at Koetaradja — “the small, thick-set figure who now had to leave the leading in the field to others, who held only the threads in his hands” — and with each ring of the telephone could expect news that might break a piece out of his construction. He had adopted Van Heutsz’s motto “alles kan” (“everything is possible”) (“everything is possible”).

Three of his subordinates he placed above the rest: Dijkstra, Scheepens and Schmidt. He placed Dijkstra and later Scheepens at Sigli, the most important troop command on the north coast; the principal bivouac in the plain of Pidië, Lam Meulò, he put under captain Jhr. Boreel; when resistance revived in the Gajò Loeös after some painful setbacks of the infantry garrison he sent the 1st Division there under the General Staff captain Muurling, with his two Atjeh lieutenants Snell and Van Eck.

To energetic marechaussée lieutenants he gave special assignments that pricked their ambition and virtually compelled them to succeed. The best known was the commission given to Schmidt in December 1909 and executed on 3 December 1911, after two heavy patrol years in continuous complete independence, when the last surviving Tirò Teungkoe, the young Tgk. Ma’at, fell.

He corresponded privately with his most trusted collaborators, a practice for which he was criticised. Du Croo defended it by citing Idenburg’s letter to Van Heutsz of 15 September 1908: “the advantage of private correspondence is that it is personal and that one can say exactly what one thinks about a matter.” Extracts from Swart’s letters to Schmidt of 26 December 1909, 26 September 1911, 9 December 1911 and 10 August 1913 are printed in the biography.

Character, manner and anecdote

Du Croo devoted a whole chapter to the anecdotes that circulated about Swart, in which “truth and fancy were often mixed together.” He was quick-tempered and irascible, capable and just, strict but benevolent, above all a good and fatherly chief for the good. He habitually began nearly every sentence with “en”, which so puzzled one of the Tangsé chiefs that the man asked Schmidt whether the Governor was angry when he said “en” — “And, Teukoe, is all well?” — until reassured by the translation of the word into Acehnese.

He was fond of the soerat, the written certificate the Acehnese prized: “Carolus, give the man a certificate,” he would say to his adjutant Karel de Vaynes van Brakell Buys, who would write “The Acehnese Joesoef of the village of So-and-so in Pidië is known to me” and Swart would sign — hundreds of such soerats, du Croo suspected, were still kept as poesaka (heirlooms).

He was an enemy of debts. When a patrol commander who had not drawn his 100-guilder monthly intelligence allowance for fifteen months proposed to spend the accumulated sum, Swart ruled: “I shall have that paid out to you in Holland at 100 guilders a month” — and when the man protested, “heb je me verstáán?” He was also devoted to zwartzwier, jugged duck; a nine-day inspection tour in which every post served it produced the sigh “Carolus, I can’t bear to look at that stuff any more!”

Farewell and departure, 1918

On 12 August 1918 Swart was appointed, with effect from September 1918, Vice-President of the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, and honourably discharged from military service with a pension of 9,000 guilders a year, suspended for the duration of his Vice-Presidency. On 2 September 1918, at a solemn gathering in the Governor’s residence, he handed over the government to his designated successor, the civilian Governor resident Van Sluys.

In his farewell address Swart noted that he had been Governor of Atjeh far longer than any of his predecessors, and that with the laying down of his office “an important piece of Atjeh history” was closed, since there would now be an absolute separation of civil and military authority as existed in all other provinces. He admitted his shortcomings but declared himself convinced that the pacification was now established, and that it had “come brilliantly through the test of the last four years.” Against the charge that he had shunned publicity and practised secrecy he protested: “I never kept anything hidden; I have never been afraid of criticism.”

He left Atjeh in the early morning of 22 September 1918 from Oelèë Lheuë, where crowds had come by car and special train. The band played the Wilhelmus; Mrs Swart received flowers; the couple boarded the sloop of H.M. Serdang and went aboard the s.s. Nias, saluted by three cheers and the military salute of the Serdang’s crew.

Vice-President of the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1918–1922

Swart departed for Batavia on 22 September 1918 to take up the office of Vice-President of the Council of the Netherlands Indies, the second-highest post in the colony. It was not usual for a general to be called to it; but this general had also been an administrator in the barely opened buitengewesten, whose development had become a principal task of the Government.

Du Croo declined to treat these three years in depth and quoted instead two press notices. The Java-Bode of 18 October 1921 recalled that the ethical press had feared the appointment, but concluded that “if there has been one man who in turbulent times proved better informed of the native political currents than anyone else, it was General Swart”; hoewel militair gebleven, “he set a strong administration above a rule of force.” The paper noted his interest in the Volksraad, whose sittings he often attended: “A man who, after a career through the autocratic schools of the Outer Possessions, followed the rise of parliamentarism with so much interest proved that he understood the voice of the times.”

The Locomotief — the paper known as the most ethical, which had disapproved of the appointment — wrote that “like a soldier faithful at his post, Lieutenant-General H. N. A. Swart … remained under arms as long as the country had need of him,” and that it had been at royal insistence that the then Governor of Atjeh, wishing after more than thirty years of colonial service to repatriate, allowed himself to be called to the second-highest office.

Swart got on well with the Governor-General: “When the Governor-General went on a journey … he always said: I am glad again that during my absence General Swart is at Batavia.” He postponed his own departure once more so that it should not coincide with the change of Governors-General. On 4 January 1922, forty-two years after entering service, he was honourably discharged at his own request from the service of the State.

Retirement and the memory of Bapa Swart

As a private citizen Swart returned to the Netherlands, settling at Den Haag, but Atjeh retained his warm and continuous interest. When resistance broke out again on the west coast of Atjeh in 1925, his opinion was sought in Holland and reported by the journalist J. Schaap, formerly editor-in-chief of the Java-Bode, in The Weekly of an Amsterdammer of 14 and 21 September 1927 — a statement du Croo called “Swart’s Atjehsch testament”.

He revisited the Indies in 1927/1928, travelling in Celebes and visiting the landschapshoofd of Peusangan; he spoke again with T. Tjhi’ Peusangan. On his seventieth birthday, 12 October 1933, he received the letter of the Acehnese chiefs, drawn up by T. Maharadja Mangkoeboemi, zelfbestuurder of Lho’ Seumawè, and T. Tjhi’ Moehammad Djohan Alamsjah, zelfbestuurder of Peusangan, and signed by thirty-two chiefs of the north coast — the very region where resistance had raged most fiercely.

He kept up his correspondence with the humblest of his old subordinates. A letter of 19 February 1937 to the Ambonese old soldier Jacob Lawalata, celebrating on 26 February 1937 his thirty-fifth year as a Knight of the Militaire Willemsorde (“Military William Order”) at Jogjakarta, is reproduced in facsimile in the biography; a letter to Swart from his old brigade commander W. J. Mosselman, written from De Hoenderhof at Tandjoengsari near Bandoeng on 12 September 1936, is printed beside it.

Swart himself kept no letters and no notes: “Swart kept no letters and no notes; he possesses no archive and no diaries,” du Croo recorded, which made the reconstruction of the correspondence difficult.

Significance (du Croo, 1943)

Du Croo summarised Swart’s achievement in ten propositions. The great blessing of his ten-year governorship was that the government remained and could remain for ten consecutive years in the hands of a Governor with such outstanding administrative talents. In the long series of years from 1873 to 1898 the Acehnese had gained no better experience of Dutch administration than a clear absence of line and direction, both military and civil; only the period of Van der Heijden formed a favourable exception, and it was too short to leave a lasting result. Swart, by balanced and calm government alongside vigorous action, brought the Acehnese to the conviction that Dutch authority was and remained overwhelming, while at the same time winning the confidence of chiefs and population, so that he was “beside being feared, also respected and beloved.”

Because he could so completely win the confidence of the adat chiefs and of the simple gampong man, the Acehnese attached himself personally to Swart — a typically Acehnese trait being attachment to, and service of, a person. Through that he was able to bring both chiefs and population to trust the administration, so that the well-known phrase in the Memorie van Overgave of his first civil successor — “everything in Atjeh that walks about on two legs hates the European” — was in its generality a gross exaggeration and untrue: everything depended on the person.

His long administration formed an excellent school of government for his officers and administrative officials, provided they served under him long enough; Governor Van Aken was du Croo’s best example of a successor formed in it. He made Atjeh ripe for civil government in its full extent, provided the successor continued along his lines and had the tact to leave the military element a generous place for the time being. The qualities the Acehnese valued in him above all were his honesty and his justice, which he also required of his subordinates.

The simple title Bapa — father — became, in du Croo’s judgement, the highest distinction Swart ever won among all his high and very high decorations: “Bapa Swart was one of those very few.” The biography closes by comparing the Acehnese memory of him with the royal salute Bayete! which the Matabele brought unbidden to Cecil Rhodes in the Matoppo Hills.

Sources

Drie Atjeh-mannen: Snouck Hurgronje — Van Heutsz — Van Daalen, door H. T. Damsté (September 1936). OCR-filename: 20260718_105749_DLP-111-Drie_Atjeh_mannen_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, p. 2.

Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu, by J. Jongejans, Oud-Resident van het Gewest Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, with a foreword by Dr. H. Colijn (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 42.

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

H. N. A. Swart was a Dutch officer and administrator who as Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh and Onderhoorigheden (1908–1918) completed the pacification of the country, and who later, as old Vice-President of the Council of the Indies, furnished the foreword to Joh. Langhout’s Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923). Under his administration, in the phrase of the writer J. Kreemer, “the swords were forged into ploughshares”: the last organized resistance of the Acheh War was extinguished by 1913, and a vast programme of schools, credit institutions, waterworks and roads followed.

Appointment and early measures

By Government resolution of 4 May 1908 Major-General G. C. E. van Daalen was, at his own request, honourably discharged as Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. N. A. Swart, then Civil and Military Governor of Celebes and Dependencies, was appointed in his place. Swart accepted the administration on 10 June 1908; it would last unbroken for ten years. Because of the circumstances of the change of government, F. A. Liefrinck, Member of the Council of the Indies, twice visited Atjeh as Government Commissioner in the first years of Swart’s governorship to guarantee that the government of the province continued to answer to the principles fixed by the Government. Swart none the less followed a different administrative line from his predecessor, while continuing Van Daalen’s policy of restlessly pursuing and rendering harmless the religious resistance-leaders and band-chiefs.

Among his first measures was a proposal — accepted — to repay the landscape chiefs the share of import and export duties and excises which had been withheld from them “allegedly for their punishment”, and to refund their imposed surety sums; Swart everywhere handed these back personally to prove, as he said, that the Government “knew how to practise clemency and to redress wrong”. As the political state improved he saw no objection to furnishing several landscape chiefs with rifles and charging them with the maintenance of peace and order in their territories, holding that “by giving trust, trust is won”. He likewise sought to win the confidence of the common man by providing quick and cheap justice, through an administrative organisation dividing the province into five departments under assistant-residents, split into many sub-departments, whereby the supervision of native jurisdiction became steadily more accurate.

End of the war

With the death or submission of the principal religious and secular resistance-leaders and many thousands of their followers in the years 1908–1913, all effective opposition ended by the latter year; a few dozen evildoers holding out in the most inaccessible mountain tracts had no significance. Governor Swart had the exiles whose residence in the province had been forbidden under article 47 R.R. allowed to return, with the exception of the ex-pretender-sultan Toeankoe Moehamad Dawot and his son Toeankoe Ibrahim. From 1909 silver and gold stars for loyalty and merit were conferred on higher and lower chiefs for their good cooperation. Submitted resistance-fighters and chiefs whose dwellings or koeta’s (fortified places) had been destroyed were set on their feet with interest-free advances from funds obtained from the Government.

Welfare, education and health policy

Convinced that the European government no longer had to act merely punitively, Swart powerfully furthered everything serving the people’s welfare. Popular education was his first care, aimed at the practice of life: agriculture teaching for boys, hand- and household-work for girls. The five village-schools with some 300 pupils at his accession grew to 125 schools with 6,000 pupils by 1911, and to 242 schools with nearly 13,000 pupils by 1918; a first girls’ school opened at Oelèë Lheue in 1910, and by 1918 there were fifteen girls’ schools with more than 1,000 pupils, through which the government hoped to combat the evil of child-marriage (kinderhuwelijken). A Hollandsch-Indlandsche school opened at Koeta Radja in 1915, followed by Lho Seumawè and Langsar (1916), and a Hollandsch-Chineesche school at Koeta Radja in 1918; an Ambonese school for children of Ambonese soldiers, opened in 1911, counted nearly 400 pupils in 1918; an ambachtschool (native trade school) for carpenters was opened at Koeta Radja in 1916. Agricultural schools at Beureunoen and Oeléë Karang kept farming as the first means of existence; chiefs’ sons were educated at Fort de Kock, Bandoeng (later Serang), the Asahan school, the Cultuurschool at Soekaboemi, the agricultural school at Buitenzorg and the native law school at Batavia. Unattended lepers were gathered in colonies, that of Groot-Atjeh being an agricultural colony on the islet Pò-Amat (1911), and on the island Roebia in Sabang bay a quarantine station for returning pilgrims was set up in 1912. When smallpox epidemics broke out in 1915 and 1916, vaccination was vigorously enforced. Taxes averaged only one guilder per head and compulsory labour two days per month, with redemption of heerendiensten (statute labour) permitted by way of trial; the sub-department and landscape treasuries spent the proceeds on works of public utility.

Economic measures

Agriculture was stimulated through the agricultural adviser posted in the province since 1908, new irrigation works, the diking of the lower courses of the Peusangan and Djambo Ajé rivers, cattle-selection under the government veterinary surgeon (from 1911), weekly cattle markets, and interest-free advances (including buffalo-advances for plough cattle on the North Coast). The Atjeh Tram was carried on to Koeala Simpang (1912) and Besitang (1916) and transferred to the State Railways on 1 January 1916; the People’s credit institutions, including the Afdeelingsbank (September 1908), kampong banks, and credit banks at Lho Seumawè (1913) and Langsar, combated usury. The annual fair exhibition at Koeta Radja was repeated in 1911, and after the Semarang colonial exhibition of 1914 the Atjeh pavilion was re-erected at Koeta Radja as the Atjeh Museum, opened in the second half of 1915. The agency of the Javasche Bank at Koeta Radja owed its first stone to the Governor. From 1911 Swart worked at the gradual separation of civil and military authority.

Character

Nineteen years Swart had lived and worked among the Atjehnese; ten years in succession he governed land and people. Receiving author Langhout as old Vice-President of the Council of the Indies, he rejected press talk of an ineradicable hereditary hatred of the Dutch among the kampong women — “Wie dat zegt, kent het volk niet!” (“Whoever says that, does not know the people!”) — and told of Teukoe Tjhi Peusangan, of Panglima Polem and his sister, of Polem’s brother-in-law Toeankoe Radja Keumala, of Pòtjoet Meurah and her husband Toeankoe Machmoed, and of so many other descendants of sultans and Atjehnese chiefs who entrusted to the kaphé (infidel) their “dearest and most secret thoughts”. In his foreword of 31 March 1923 at The Hague, signed “H. N. A. Swart, Oud Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden”, he held that after the long and tenacious struggle a state of rest and order had prevailed for about ten years, which only needed time fully to consolidate. Stepping ashore at Sabang again at the end of January 1922 on his way to Europe, he was told by the Atjehnese chiefs who came to compliment him that the economic development of Atjeh was still progressing.

In the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)

The 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië carried a photograph captioned “Voor Zijne Excellentie H. N. A. Swart, gewezen Gouverneur van Atjeh en Vice-President van den Raad van Indië” — for His Excellency H. N. A. Swart, former Governor of Atjeh and Vice-President of the Council of the Indies.

Colonel L. A. Snell, interviewed in the same issue, named Swart among “de groote pioniers, die van het Korps gemaakt hebben wat het geworden is” — the great pioneers who made of the Korps Maréchaussée what it became — with Graafland, Van Daalen, Colijn, Van der Maaten and, above all, Van Heutsz.

Account from Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf (1925)

H. N. A. Swart was Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden from 1908 to 1918, whose administration was the central focus of J. Langhout’s jubilee book Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923).

Administration as described by Broersma

Dr. R. Broersma characterized Swart’s period as a period of appearance and self-advertisement, elevated in the tasteless advertising of 1923 to a vessel full of “blessings of peace”. According to Broersma, Swart was indicated as the person truly responsible for the content of Langhout’s book, although Langhout was listed as author. Len Langhout had never seen land and people when he compiled overview from data presented to him.

Broersma considered the departmental support of the Department of Colonies for this advertising as unworthy of the Dutch state, particularly as an English edition was also provided.

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Governor 1908-1918 under whose long administration the transition from repressive (repressief) military action to preventive (preventief) military action took place, alongside the pacification work initiated by Van Daalen. Under him: administration regulated, judiciary organized, public education introduced, support given to repair war damages, regional chiefs (landshoofden) restored to old position.

Source: J. Jongejans, Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij N.V., c. 1938), pp. 42.

Source

De Buitenbezittingen, Deel II, Aflevering 2: Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, bewerkt door het Encyclopaedisch Bureau, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der Buitenbezittingen (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1917), Bijlage I and pp. 33–36, 205. J. B. van Heutsz als Gouverneur Generaal 1904-1909, by J. C. Lamster (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen & Zoon N.V., 1938), pp. 52, 92, 96, 161, 199, 271. Rijksarchief, Den Haag. Oom Ambon van het K.N.I.L., by G. W. T. Dames, Maj. Inf. K.N.I.L. b.d. (‘s-Gravenhage: Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 1954), chapters on the colonne Schmidt and on Dominee Thenu. Oost-Indisch Journael: Palaver om de tafel met het gat, by Merac, Toekan-Serie no. 2, ed. G. L. Tichelman (Haarlem: De Gulden Pers, 1947), the chapter on overplaatsingswee, the chapter on den zieleherder, and the chapter Jagerslatijn. Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen ter bespreking van de verdere voorbereiding eener hervorming van het bestuurswezen in Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1914), pp. 118–130. Atjèh. Algemeen samenvattend overzicht van land en volk van Atjèh en onderhoorigheden, door J. Kreemer, Archivaris van het Atjèh Instituut. Tweede Deel. Leiden: N.V. Boekhandel en Drukkerij voorheen E.J. Brill, 1923. Identifier: Delpher MMKB02B:000001798; PPN 395084288. Koninklijke Bibliotheek. Melati en rotan: Gedichten van F. Kunst, pentekeningen van Johanna Roberti (Bandoeng: Vacuüm-Handel Maatschappij Vortex en Uitgeverij en Boekhandel W. Mellink, 1947), p. 41 (“Bij den dood van Generaal Swart, den pacificator van Atjeh”). Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 273. Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Foreword; Chapters I–IV, VIII–XVII; Appendixn: Letter of the Acehnese chiefs, Extract from the service record of H. N. A. Swart, pp. 1–177. Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), Voorwoord, pp. 94–113, 121–122.

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794. Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf, by Dr. R. Broersma, Gebrs. Cohen, Utrecht, 1925, pp. 5-6, 121-131.

description	Dutch lieutenant-general of infantry (active 1890s–1918) who, as Civil and Military Governor of Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden from 1908 to 1918, restored conciliatory governance after the Van Daalen years, presided over the 1913–1914 Sumatra administrative reform, and finally handed a peaceful Aceh over to a civilian governor in 1918 — closing the forty-five-year Aceh War.
tags	person, general, dutch, colonial, military, governor, aceh, aceh-war, knil, bestuursreorganisatie, 20th-century, achehnese, 19th-century, pacification, marechaussee, officer, period-van-heutsz, pacificator, atjeh, 1908-1918
aliases	H. N. N. A. Swart, Hendrik Nikolaas Albert Swart, Swart, Mr. Swart, Major Swart, Kolonel Swart, Generaal Swart, General Swart, Governor Swart, Gouverneur Swart, Lieutenant-General Swart, Toean Gouverneur Swart, Aceh-connoisseur Swart, successor of Van Daalen, Swart the Pacificator, Pacificator of Atjeh, Pacificator van Atjeh, Henri Nicolaas Alfred Swart, Toean Besar Swart, Bapa Swart, de Bult, Swart (Atjeh officer), Pacificator van Atjeh Swart, N. A. Swart, Henri Swart, H. N. A. Swart oud-gouverneur van Atjeh

Explorer

H. N. A. Swart

Early Career and the Case Against Van Daalen

Service in Borneo and Celebes

Succession to the Aceh Governorship, 1908

The Letter from the Three Hoofden (1910–1911)

The Bestuursreorganisatie Sumatra (1913–1914)

Views on Atjeh’s Governance

The Sagi System Explanation

Cultural Initiatives

Kreemer’s account: the administrative reforms

Restoration of the Hasil-reglement (1908)

Reform of wasé oelèëbalang (1910, 1915)

Opposition to voorschotten (1908)

Wegenfonds and boetenfonds

Expansion of volksonderwijs

The Ten-Year Administration and the Handover of 1918

Datoek’s Sobat Kras

Swart and Dominee Thenu

Later Career and Consolidation

Significance

Account from Atjèh by J. Kreemer (Deel II)

Account from Melati en rotan (1947) — the Pacificator van Atjeh elegy

Account from Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis (1955)

The 1905 nomination

The 1908 aftermath

Significance

Account from Atjeh by H.C. Zentgraff (1938)

The Meurandeh Paja massacre, 26 January 1905

Authorisation of Schmidt’s Tiro pursuit, 1908

The false T. Radja Sabi, December 1913

Origins, childhood and schooling

From volunteer soldier to officer

First Atjeh service and the Militaire Willemsorde, 1890

The Korps Pupillen at Gombong, 1891–1894

Staff and adjutant years, 1894–1898

Captain in Atjeh, 1898–1900: “Swart and his Jans”

Leave, marriage and return, 1900–1901

Marechaussee and civil authority: Poelò Raja and Lho’ Seumawè, 1902–1905

Swart’s administrative principles

The first clash with Van Daalen

Borneo and Celebes, 1905–1908

Appointment to Atjeh, 1908

Taking over the government, 1908

The Liefrinck inspections

Promotions during the governorship

Method: men, orders and correspondence

Character, manner and anecdote

Farewell and departure, 1918

Vice-President of the Raad van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1918–1922

Retirement and the memory of Bapa Swart

Significance (du Croo, 1943)

Sources

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

Appointment and early measures

End of the war

Welfare, education and health policy

Economic measures

Character

In the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)

Account from Atjeh als land voor handel en bedrijf (1925)

Administration as described by Broersma

See Also

Account from Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu

Source

Graph View

Table of Contents