Van der Maaten — K. van der Maaten — was a Marechaussee commander in Aceh who served under J. B. van Heutsz during the Aceh War and, almost two decades later, became one of the most outspoken critics of his former chief’s post-governorship campaign to remake the defence of Netherlands Indies, publishing in 1917 the pamphlet Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië. As a young officer he was one of the famed patrol commanders whose names, in the memory of Oost-Indisch Journael by Merac (1947), “rang through the Indies like carillon music”; as a retired veteran he was the man who broke publicly with Van Heutsz to expose what he regarded as the political and personal manoeuvring behind the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden defence programme.
Marechaussee commander in Aceh
Van der Maaten served in the Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen during the offensive phase of the Aceh War that followed the defection of Teukoe Oemar on 29 March 1896. He was one of the great patrol commanders of the war — the colonne-leaders who carried the small-war method of the Marechaussee into the interior of Aceh in the years of Van Heutsz’s governorship (1898–1904) and beyond. In Oost-Indisch Journael by Merac (1947), Van der Maaten is the fifth-named in Musket’s list of the Marechaussee commanders:
“Gilles Graafland, Van Daalen, Campioni, Christoffel, Van der Maaten, Scheepens, Watrin, Webb, Colijn, Geertsema Beckering, Darlang and the sergeants Nussy, Salowono, Pongoh … a colourful array.”
The names of these famous fighters and Marechaussee commanders, the book recalls, “rang through the Indies like carillon music,” and their stories of brave deeds, adventures, and peculiarities “went the rounds as if they were legends.” Van der Maaten thus figures in the book as one of the fellows of the old time — the cohort of Aceh officers whose reputation long outlived the war itself.
Subordinate of Van Heutsz in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden
Van der Maaten served in various functions in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden under Van Heutsz when the latter was Civil and Military Governor of the territory. The relationship between the two men during this period was that of chief and subordinate; Van der Maaten later recalled having contemplated writing his “Atjeh-mémoires” — a personal account of his service under Van Heutsz — and the very existence of that plan suggests that he regarded himself as a credible witness to the conduct of the Atjeh-politiek inspired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, whom Van der Maaten would later call the “geestelijken vader” of the policy followed since 1896.
The break with Van Heutsz: the Atjeh-enquête of 1908
The special relationship between Van der Maaten and his former chief did not survive the publication of the Rapport over de Atjeh-enquête in 1908. The enquête, which followed the abusive administration of Van Daalen as Civil and Military Governor of Aceh, exposed arbitrary punishments, dismissals of uleebalang, and illegal fines in Pidië and elsewhere; it forced Van Daalen’s departure and discredited the rougher style of Aceh command. Van der Maaten sided with the critics of the post-Van Heutsz regime, and the consequent forced departure of Van Daalen as Civil and Military Governor of Aceh “prevented any further special relationship with his former chief.” The break was complete; the planned Atjeh-mémoires were set aside, and Van der Maaten’s passage into retirement became, in effect, a passage into opposition.
The 1917 pamphlet against Van Heutsz’s defence campaign
Almost a decade after the enquête, Van der Maaten re-entered public life with a published attack on his former chief. The immediate occasion was Van Heutsz’s speech at the Bond van Vrije Liberalen in Amsterdam on 13 January 1917, at which Van Heutsz had endorsed the defence proposals of his son-in-law, J. Van der Weyden, and implicitly invited his own appointment as buitengewoon Regeerings-Commissaris with unlimited powers to reform the colonial defence system. Van der Maaten responded with the pamphlet Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië, written in Montreux and dated 25 February 1917, published at ‘s-Gravenhage by Martinus Nijhoff. After reading the Handelsblad report of Van Heutsz’s second major address — the Industriebond speech of 17 February 1917 — Van der Maaten added a Naschrift (Postscript) before publication, making the Industriebond meeting a direct trigger for one of the pamphlet’s most consequential sections.
Argument of the pamphlet
The pamphlet’s central argument was that Van Heutsz had done virtually nothing for the defence of Netherlands Indies during his term as Governor-General (1904–1909). The only defence proposal Van Heutsz had made as Governor-General was the Soemedang-stelling in October 1908, which was based on Army Command proposals and actually perpetuated the discredited old defence system. Van der Maaten argued that Van Heutsz lacked defence expertise because he had devoted his career almost exclusively to the Atjeh question and shared the common view that defending Netherlands Indies was an impossible task for a small country like the Netherlands.
Van der Maaten further argued that Van Heutsz had no right to issue the devastating private judgment on the Staatscommissie voor de Verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indië report that he had authorised Van der Weyden to quote at the Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap on 9 January 1914 — that the proposed fleet “niet vechten zal” (will not fight) and the proposed army “niet vechten kan” (cannot fight). Van Heutsz had declined to sit on the Staatscommissie voor de Verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indië in 1912, dismissing its work as “monnikenwerk”; Van der Maaten observed that the Commission included no kwajongens (troublemakers) and that Van Heutsz, in his capacity as Adjutant-Generaal of the Queen and Groot-Officier of the Kroon, owed a duty of loyalty.
Revelation of the “brochure Van Heutsz-Van der Weijden”
The pamphlet’s most consequential revelation was that the brochure by J. Van der Weyden, Weerplicht voor Inlanders en samenstelling van de weermacht in Nederlandsch-Indië — ostensibly the independent work of a General Staff officer — was in fact co-authored by Van Heutsz himself. Pages 389–395 of the brochure, Van der Maaten disclosed, were entirely in Van Heutsz’s own hand; the work should therefore properly be called the “brochure Van Heutsz-Van der Weijden.” Van der Maaten had originally planned to write a separate brochure critiquing the actual defence proposals of the Van der Weyden brochure, but the campaign to appoint Van Heutsz as buitengewoon Regeerings-Commissaris compelled him to address the broader question of Van Heutsz’s fitness for the role.
Defence views: submarines over battleships, India not to pay alone
On the substance of colonial defence, Van der Maaten advanced a distinctive alternative to both the government’s plan and the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden programme. He argued that as long as funds were insufficient for a fleet capable of gaining naval supremacy, all money for the naval force should go to submarines of great power and range rather than to battleships — which, he predicted, would be destroyed within weeks in the event of war, forcing the land army into the exclusive defence of Java. He rejected the brochure’s proposal that India (the contemporary Dutch term for Netherlands Indies) should bear all costs of defence, including both fleet and army, calling it “immorality”; the Netherlands and India, he insisted, should share defence costs in a fair proportion. He identified the “Hollandsche Koopmansgeest” (Dutch merchant spirit) — the habitual Dutch tendency to settle defence matters “op een koopje” (on the cheap) — as a root cause of both the cadre shortage and broader patterns of defence neglect.
On native militia service and the Kader-quaestie
Van der Maaten was equally sceptical of the proposal for native compulsory military service that lay at the heart of the Van der Weyden programme. He noted Van Heutsz’s hypocrisy on the issue: as Governor-General, Van Heutsz had strongly advised against introducing militia service (militieplicht) for natives, but in 1917 he advocated for it in order to support his son-in-law’s defence proposals — an about-face that Van der Maaten attributed not to conviction but to the desire to promote the Van der Weyden plan. Van der Maaten also drew an explicit comparison between the Kader-quaestie — the problem of finding sufficient European officer and non-commissioned officer cadres to lead an expanded native army — and the Atjeh-vraagstuk (the Aceh Question), arguing that just as the Aceh War had been prolonged by indecision and excessive consultation, so too would the cadre question prove tractable once entrusted to “a practically experienced man with clear judgment and knowledge of Indian affairs.” The comparison implicitly endorsed the decisive methods that had ultimately brought the Aceh war to a conclusion.
Acknowledgement of Van Heutsz’s merits
Van der Maaten was careful to acknowledge Van Heutsz’s great merits in other domains. As Civil and Military Governor of Aceh, Van Heutsz had carried out the political programme inspired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, whom Van der Maaten called the “geestelijken vader” of the Atjeh-politiek followed since 1896. As Governor-General, Van Heutsz had applied the same policy on a larger scale across the Buitenbezittingen. However, Van der Maaten insisted that these achievements in colonial administration did not qualify Van Heutsz as an expert on the defence of Netherlands Indies. The pamphlet included six appendices (Bijlagen) containing full meeting reports and speeches, providing the documentary basis for Van der Maaten’s arguments.
Significance
Van der Maaten is significant in Oost-Indisch Journael as one of the Marechaussee commanders whose “name rang through the Indies like carillon music” — one of the book’s fellows of the old time. He is significant in the 1917 defence debate as the most authoritative internal critic of the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden programme, whose personal rupture with his former chief gave his pamphlet a documentary force that pure strategic argument could not have matched. The combination of these two roles — the patrol commander of the Aceh War and the pamphleteer of 1917 — makes Van der Maaten one of the most revealing figures of the long afterlife of the Aceh campaign, in which the methods and reputations forged in the colonial small-war theatre were redeployed in the metropolitan debate over the survival of the empire they had helped to build.
In the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)
The Overzicht van Onderscheidingen printed in the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië records two awards to Van der Maaten:
- 1902 — the Militaire Willems-Orde 3rd class, as Kapt. Mar., jointly with his brigade commander Eur. Sergt. Mar. J. C. Heijnen, Alg. Stb. No. 31519
- 1905 — the Militaire Willems-Orde 4th class, as Kapt. Mar., together with M. W. E. van Bloemen Waanders and 1ste Luit. Mar. J. C. Lamster
The issue reproduced a photograph of Van der Maaten with the caption recording that it “werd door zijn oud-divisiecommandant aan sergeant Heijnen opgedragen” — was dedicated by his former division commander to Sergeant Heijnen, who had been promoted to the 3rd class at the same time as he.
Colonel L. A. Snell named Van der Maaten among “de groote pioniers, die van het Korps gemaakt hebben wat het geworden is,” with Graafland, Van Daalen, Colijn, Swart and, above all, Van Heutsz.
See Also
- Oost-Indisch Journael
- Musket
- Gilles Graafland
- Van Daalen
- Campioni
- Christoffel
- Scheepens
- Watrin
- Webb
- Colijn
- Geertsema Beckering
- Darlang
- Nussy
- Salowono
- Pongoh
- Atjeh-oorlog
- Governor Van Heutsz
- J. Van der Weyden
- Van der Weyden’s defense brochure
- Van der Maaten’s pamphlet on Van Heutsz and the Defense of Netherlands Indies
- Van Heutsz’s Bond van Vrije Liberalen defense speech (13 January 1917)
- Industriebond defense meeting (17 February 1917)
- Defense of Netherlands Indies debate (1917)
- Inlandsche Militieplicht
- Kader-quaestie
- G. C. E. van Daalen
- C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Rapport over de Atjeh-enquête
- Atjeh-enquête
- Overzicht van Onderscheidingen toegekend aan het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (1890-1930)
- Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh (Jubileum-nummer 1930)
- C. A. Snell
- Heynen
- Militaire Willemsorde
Source
Oost-Indisch Journael: Palaver om de tafel met het gat, by Merac, Toekan-Serie no. 2, ed. G. L. Tichelman (Haarlem: De Gulden Pers, 1947), the chapter on den zieleherder.
K. van der Maaten, Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917).
Van der Maaten — K. van der Maaten — was a Marechaussee commander in Aceh who served under J. B. van Heutsz during the Aceh War and, almost two decades later, became one of the most outspoken critics of his former chief’s post-governorship campaign to remake the defence of Netherlands Indies, publishing in 1917 the pamphlet Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië. As a young officer he was one of the famed patrol commanders whose names, in the memory of Oost-Indisch Journael by Merac (1947), “rang through the Indies like carillon music”; as a retired veteran he was the man who broke publicly with Van Heutsz to expose what he regarded as the political and personal manoeuvring behind the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden defence programme.
Marechaussee commander in Aceh
Van der Maaten served in the Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen during the offensive phase of the Aceh War that followed the defection of Teukoe Oemar on 29 March 1896. He was one of the great patrol commanders of the war — the colonne-leaders who carried the small-war method of the Marechaussee into the interior of Aceh in the years of Van Heutsz’s governorship (1898–1904) and beyond. In Oost-Indisch Journael by Merac (1947), Van der Maaten is the fifth-named in Musket’s list of the Marechaussee commanders:
“Gilles Graafland, Van Daalen, Campioni, Christoffel, Van der Maaten, Scheepens, Watrin, Webb, Colijn, Geertsema Beckering, Darlang and the sergeants Nussy, Salowono, Pongoh … a colourful array.”
The names of these famous fighters and Marechaussee commanders, the book recalls, “rang through the Indies like carillon music,” and their stories of brave deeds, adventures, and peculiarities “went the rounds as if they were legends.” Van der Maaten thus figures in the book as one of the fellows of the old time — the cohort of Aceh officers whose reputation long outlived the war itself.
Subordinate of Van Heutsz in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden
Van der Maaten served in various functions in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden under Van Heutsz when the latter was Civil and Military Governor of the territory. The relationship between the two men during this period was that of chief and subordinate; Van der Maaten later recalled having contemplated writing his “Atjeh-mémoires” — a personal account of his service under Van Heutsz — and the very existence of that plan suggests that he regarded himself as a credible witness to the conduct of the Atjeh-politiek inspired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, whom Van der Maaten would later call the “geestelijken vader” of the policy followed since 1896.
The break with Van Heutsz: the Atjeh-enquête of 1908
The special relationship between Van der Maaten and his former chief did not survive the publication of the Rapport over de Atjeh-enquête in 1908. The enquête, which followed the abusive administration of Van Daalen as Civil and Military Governor of Aceh, exposed arbitrary punishments, dismissals of uleebalang, and illegal fines in Pidië and elsewhere; it forced Van Daalen’s departure and discredited the rougher style of Aceh command. Van der Maaten sided with the critics of the post-Van Heutsz regime, and the consequent forced departure of Van Daalen as Civil and Military Governor of Aceh “prevented any further special relationship with his former chief.” The break was complete; the planned Atjeh-mémoires were set aside, and Van der Maaten’s passage into retirement became, in effect, a passage into opposition.
The 1917 pamphlet against Van Heutsz’s defence campaign
Almost a decade after the enquête, Van der Maaten re-entered public life with a published attack on his former chief. The immediate occasion was Van Heutsz’s speech at the Bond van Vrije Liberalen in Amsterdam on 13 January 1917, at which Van Heutsz had endorsed the defence proposals of his son-in-law, J. Van der Weyden, and implicitly invited his own appointment as buitengewoon Regeerings-Commissaris with unlimited powers to reform the colonial defence system. Van der Maaten responded with the pamphlet Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië, written in Montreux and dated 25 February 1917, published at ‘s-Gravenhage by Martinus Nijhoff. After reading the Handelsblad report of Van Heutsz’s second major address — the Industriebond speech of 17 February 1917 — Van der Maaten added a Naschrift (Postscript) before publication, making the Industriebond meeting a direct trigger for one of the pamphlet’s most consequential sections.
Argument of the pamphlet
The pamphlet’s central argument was that Van Heutsz had done virtually nothing for the defence of Netherlands Indies during his term as Governor-General (1904–1909). The only defence proposal Van Heutsz had made as Governor-General was the Soemedang-stelling in October 1908, which was based on Army Command proposals and actually perpetuated the discredited old defence system. Van der Maaten argued that Van Heutsz lacked defence expertise because he had devoted his career almost exclusively to the Atjeh question and shared the common view that defending Netherlands Indies was an impossible task for a small country like the Netherlands.
Van der Maaten further argued that Van Heutsz had no right to issue the devastating private judgment on the Staatscommissie voor de Verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indië report that he had authorised Van der Weyden to quote at the Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap on 9 January 1914 — that the proposed fleet “niet vechten zal” (will not fight) and the proposed army “niet vechten kan” (cannot fight). Van Heutsz had declined to sit on the Staatscommissie voor de Verdediging van Nederlandsch-Indië in 1912, dismissing its work as “monnikenwerk”; Van der Maaten observed that the Commission included no kwajongens (troublemakers) and that Van Heutsz, in his capacity as Adjutant-Generaal of the Queen and Groot-Officier of the Kroon, owed a duty of loyalty.
Revelation of the “brochure Van Heutsz-Van der Weijden”
The pamphlet’s most consequential revelation was that the brochure by J. Van der Weyden, Weerplicht voor Inlanders en samenstelling van de weermacht in Nederlandsch-Indië — ostensibly the independent work of a General Staff officer — was in fact co-authored by Van Heutsz himself. Pages 389–395 of the brochure, Van der Maaten disclosed, were entirely in Van Heutsz’s own hand; the work should therefore properly be called the “brochure Van Heutsz-Van der Weijden.” Van der Maaten had originally planned to write a separate brochure critiquing the actual defence proposals of the Van der Weyden brochure, but the campaign to appoint Van Heutsz as buitengewoon Regeerings-Commissaris compelled him to address the broader question of Van Heutsz’s fitness for the role.
Defence views: submarines over battleships, India not to pay alone
On the substance of colonial defence, Van der Maaten advanced a distinctive alternative to both the government’s plan and the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden programme. He argued that as long as funds were insufficient for a fleet capable of gaining naval supremacy, all money for the naval force should go to submarines of great power and range rather than to battleships — which, he predicted, would be destroyed within weeks in the event of war, forcing the land army into the exclusive defence of Java. He rejected the brochure’s proposal that India (the contemporary Dutch term for Netherlands Indies) should bear all costs of defence, including both fleet and army, calling it “immorality”; the Netherlands and India, he insisted, should share defence costs in a fair proportion. He identified the “Hollandsche Koopmansgeest” (Dutch merchant spirit) — the habitual Dutch tendency to settle defence matters “op een koopje” (on the cheap) — as a root cause of both the cadre shortage and broader patterns of defence neglect.
On native militia service and the Kader-quaestie
Van der Maaten was equally sceptical of the proposal for native compulsory military service that lay at the heart of the Van der Weyden programme. He noted Van Heutsz’s hypocrisy on the issue: as Governor-General, Van Heutsz had strongly advised against introducing militia service (militieplicht) for natives, but in 1917 he advocated for it in order to support his son-in-law’s defence proposals — an about-face that Van der Maaten attributed not to conviction but to the desire to promote the Van der Weyden plan. Van der Maaten also drew an explicit comparison between the Kader-quaestie — the problem of finding sufficient European officer and non-commissioned officer cadres to lead an expanded native army — and the Atjeh-vraagstuk (the Aceh Question), arguing that just as the Aceh War had been prolonged by indecision and excessive consultation, so too would the cadre question prove tractable once entrusted to “a practically experienced man with clear judgment and knowledge of Indian affairs.” The comparison implicitly endorsed the decisive methods that had ultimately brought the Aceh war to a conclusion.
Acknowledgement of Van Heutsz’s merits
Van der Maaten was careful to acknowledge Van Heutsz’s great merits in other domains. As Civil and Military Governor of Aceh, Van Heutsz had carried out the political programme inspired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, whom Van der Maaten called the “geestelijken vader” of the Atjeh-politiek followed since 1896. As Governor-General, Van Heutsz had applied the same policy on a larger scale across the Buitenbezittingen. However, Van der Maaten insisted that these achievements in colonial administration did not qualify Van Heutsz as an expert on the defence of Netherlands Indies. The pamphlet included six appendices (Bijlagen) containing full meeting reports and speeches, providing the documentary basis for Van der Maaten’s arguments.
Significance
Van der Maaten is significant in Oost-Indisch Journael as one of the Marechaussee commanders whose “name rang through the Indies like carillon music” — one of the book’s fellows of the old time. He is significant in the 1917 defence debate as the most authoritative internal critic of the Van Heutsz–Van der Weyden programme, whose personal rupture with his former chief gave his pamphlet a documentary force that pure strategic argument could not have matched. The combination of these two roles — the patrol commander of the Aceh War and the pamphleteer of 1917 — makes Van der Maaten one of the most revealing figures of the long afterlife of the Aceh campaign, in which the methods and reputations forged in the colonial small-war theatre were redeployed in the metropolitan debate over the survival of the empire they had helped to build.
See Also
- Oost-Indisch Journael
- Musket
- Gilles Graafland
- Van Daalen
- Campioni
- Christoffel
- Scheepens
- Watrin
- Webb
- Colijn
- Geertsema Beckering
- Darlang
- Nussy
- Salowono
- Pongoh
- Atjeh-oorlog
- Governor Van Heutsz
- J. Van der Weyden
- Van der Weyden’s defense brochure
- Van der Maaten’s pamphlet on Van Heutsz and the Defense of Netherlands Indies
- Van Heutsz’s Bond van Vrije Liberalen defense speech (13 January 1917)
- Industriebond defense meeting (17 February 1917)
- Defense of Netherlands Indies debate (1917)
- Inlandsche Militieplicht
- Kader-quaestie
- G. C. E. van Daalen
- C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Rapport over de Atjeh-enquête
- Atjeh-enquête
Source
Oost-Indisch Journael: Palaver om de tafel met het gat, by Merac, Toekan-Serie no. 2, ed. G. L. Tichelman (Haarlem: De Gulden Pers, 1947), the chapter on den zieleherder.
K. van der Maaten, Z. E. De Oud Gouverneur-Generaal J. B. van Heutsz en de Defensie van Nederlandsch-Indië (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917).
Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.