The Occupation of Kroeng-Raba (Lok-Nga) on 15 July 1896bezetting van Kroeng-Raba (Lok Nga) op 15 Juli — was the permanent Dutch occupation of the IV Moekims (Kroeng-Raba) region, undertaken eight days after the death of Generaal-Majoor J. J. K. de Moulin during his fatal excursie (reconnaissance (excursie)) to the same region on 7 July 1896. The occupation — known to the Dutch as Lok-Nga, the modern Lho-Nga (Lhoknga) — was authorised by the telegram of Governor-General Van der Wijck of 18 July 1896 (although the occupation itself predated the formal authorisation by three days), and represented the first permanent Dutch occupation of a point beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) in the second semester of 1896. The occupation was a significant departure from the geen postenstelsel policy laid down in the conference of 18 June 1896 between Van der Wijck and the late De Moulin, which had specified that tot een postenstelsel, behalve dat van onze geconcentreerde stelling, niet mag worden overgegaan.

The Policy of 18 June 1896 and its Modification

The conference of 18 June 1896 between Governor-General Van der Wijck and Generaal-Majoor De Moulin had laid down that the geconcentreerde linie — the cordon of bentengs around the Dutch-held Koeta-Radja area — was to remain the kern (core) of the Dutch occupation of Groot-Atjeh, and that tot een postenstelsel, behalve dat van onze geconcentreerde stelling, niet mag worden overgegaan — no system of posts, other than that of the concentrated line, was to be undertaken. The holding of any individual point beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) could only be van voorloopigen aard (provisional), and any permanent occupation would require the decision of the Opperbestuur (Supreme Government). The death of De Moulin on 7 July 1896 — during an excursie (reconnaissance (excursie)) to the very region which the Dutch now proposed to occupy — placed this policy under immediate strain. The Governor-General’s telegram of 18 July 1896eene nadere uiteenzetting zijner bedoelingen omtrent de verdere actie — modified the policy by authorising the bezetting dezer moekims (occupation of these mukims) on condition that voortdurende aanvulling van troepen en dwangarbeiders steeds mogelijk zullen zijn (continuous replenishment of troops and forced labourers would always be possible).

The Occupation of 15 July 1896

The occupation of Kroeng-Raba (Lok-Nga) was undertaken on 15 July 1896 — three days before the formal authorisation of 18 July 1896, indicating that Stemfoort had already received telegraphic approval to proceed. The occupation involved the establishment of a permanent Dutch kampement (camp) at Kroeng-Raba / Lok-Nga, with a garrison drawn from the available bataljons of the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line). The choice of Kroeng-Raba as the site of the first permanent Dutch forward position beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) was determined by three factors: first, the region had been the objective of De Moulin’s fatal excursie, and its occupation was both a military necessity and a symbolic gesture; second, Kroeng-Raba commanded the principal route from Koeta-Radja to the XXVI Moekims and the XXII Moekims, and its occupation gave the Dutch a strategic foothold in the IV Moekims; third, the modern Lho-Nga (Lhoknga) — the Lok-Nga of the Dutch — was the principal port of the western coast of Groot-Atjeh north of Koeta-Radja, and its occupation gave the Dutch control of a possible supply route by sea.

The Authorisation of 18 July 1896

The telegram of 18 July 1896 — which formalised the authorisation of the occupation — laid down the beheersching (domination) programme which would govern Dutch operations for the next four months: de XXV Moekims moeten in haar geheel door ons beheerscht worden, wij moeten de woelgeesten en de hen volgende benden onschadelijk maken, minstens verdrijven, vervolgens moet er naar gestreefd worden, de medegesleepte kampongbevolking en hare traditioneele hoofden te doen terugkeeren; aan die hoofden mogen geen wapens worden verstrekt, en vuurwapens zelfs slechts tot zeer gering aantal in hun bezit gelaten worden, maar hun worde dan ook alleen de eisch gesteld om tegen dieven en roovers enz. op te treden, terwijl wij de woelgeesten en benden á faire moeten nemen en langzamerhand van hoofden en bevolking gedaan moeten krijgen, daarin geholpen te worden, door geheime inlichtingen en aanwijzingen hunnerzijds. The telegram further specified that the occupation of the XXVI Moekims could not be decided until door leger-bestuur mij verzekerd is, dat voortdurende aanvulling van troepen en dwangarbeiders steeds mogelijk zullen zijn — the army administration had assured him that continuous replenishment of troops and forced labourers would always be possible.

The Significance of the Occupation

The occupation of Kroeng-Raba (Lok-Nga) on 15 July 1896 is significant in the documentary record of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel as the first permanent Dutch occupation of a point beyond the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) in the second semester of 1896. The occupation — undertaken eight days after the death of De Moulin in the same region — was both a military necessity and a symbolic gesture, and its authorisation by the telegram of 18 July 1896 marked the formal modification of the geen postenstelsel policy of the 18 June conference. The occupation of Kroeng-Raba (Lok-Nga) would be followed, in the next four months, by the construction of the Blang Bintang camp on 7 September 1896, the temporary occupation of Indrapoeri on 28 October 1896, and the occupation of Samahani in late August 1896 — a slow, methodical extension of Dutch forward positions which characterised the pacificatie (pacification) of the second semester of 1896 under Stemfoort’s second tenure.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt., pp. 7, 25, 29.