The Batoe Iliq Expedition of 15 July 1880 – 5 August 1880 was the Dutch military expedition against the kampong Batoe Iliq in Samalanga on the north coast of Atjeh, led by the governor Major-general K. van der Heyden, undertaken in punishment for the attack of 30 June 1880 by the male population of Batoe Iliq and the surrounding kampongs on part of the garrison of Samalanga that had extended its military walk beyond the missigit Raja. The three successive stormings of 15 July 15 July, 22 July 22 July and 1 August 1 August all failed against the impregnable bamboe-doern palisades and the hail of stones hurled from the parapet; only on 2 August 2 August did the artillery, by 76 rounds of breech-loading guns, open the north face of Batoe Iliq. As the chiefs now tendered their complete submission, Van der Heyden considered the matter closed and returned to Atjeh on 5 August 5 August.
Background
On 30 June 30 June 1880 part of the garrison of Samalanga, having extended its military walk further than usual — beyond the missigit Raja — was attacked by a great number of Atjehers and forced, not without loss, to retreat hastily. According to information obtained by the acting assistant-resident, the attack had been opened by some persons from the kampong Batoe Iliq, where there was a principal priest-school, but the male population of the surrounding kampongs had immediately joined them. The hatred against the unbelievers was too great to admit that they should move on terrain hitherto not trodden; perhaps too it was hoped by the attack to force the radja to leave the Dutch side.
The First Storming, 15 July 1880
At the insistence of the assistant-resident it was decided to equip an expedition to punish the kampongs whose inhabitants had taken part in the attack, in order to prevent the well-disposed population from making common cause with the enemy. Batoe Iliq was the principal object. On 15 July [1880] the troops marched and soon reached the very strongly placed enemy bentings, among which that of Batoe Iliq was the strongest. By a column of omtrekking some hill-bentings were taken. The artillery opened its fire. Soon the storming began. This failed, however often repeated. “One stumbled against the impenetrable bamboe-doern beplanting and suffered great losses from the enemy’s powerful fire.” On the north-west and north sides the attack seemed for a moment to have a chance of success. “The benting could be approached without danger, because the dead angle, owing to the strongly sloping terrain and the height of the parapet, was very great; and when the Atjehers climbed their parapet to drive off our men, they were soon forced by our fire to withdraw. But now the enemy used another means: over the parapet he threw a great number of stones, and thereby made most soldiers retreat; only the two section-commanders with a sub-officer and 4 Ambonese soldiers held their ground. Lieutenant Von Ernst, struck on the back of the head by a stone, lost consciousness for some moments, but was soon on his feet again, and with Jobse reconnoitred the terrain. Nowhere was an opening in the more than two-metres-high parapet to be seen, and it was clear that one would first, before proceeding to storming, have to remove the bamboe-doern obstruction.” The end was that the retreat had to be decided upon.
The Second Storming, 22 July 1880
Van der Heyden sent reinforcements and ordered that the conquest of Batoe Iliq should again be attempted. On 22 July [1880] the attack was renewed, but again repulsed. “All attempts to remove the bamboe-doern or to break through it failed, by the murderous fire from the benting and by the masses of stones thrown from it upon the troops… Even an attempt was made to sprinkle the bamboe-doern under the enemy’s fire with petroleum and to set it alight, but in vain. Hand-grenades were thrown into the benting and sprang there mostly all, but the enemy did not slacken in his defence and even threw one of the hand-grenades back to our troops in good time; this sprang, however, without doing damage.” True, by an omtrekkende column a benting was taken that commanded the others, but it did not succeed in getting into connection with the others. Again the retreat had to be decided upon, after first setting fire to the kampong Batoe Iliq.
The Third Storming and Artillery, 1-2 August 1880
Now Van der Heyden himself came to take over the command, and on 1 August [1880] the third attack took place. “On the signal ‘stormen’ the hill-slopes were climbed and the storm column advanced to the bamboe-doern. The enemy received it with a heavy fire and a hail of stones, so that our men suffered considerable losses; however, three officers with some 16 rank-and-file succeeded in working their way through the bamboe-doern and reaching the immediate vicinity of the parapet; but now they perceived that the breach was not climbable; only the top of the parapet had been shot away. They held their ground here for some time, but when the two foremost officers and the greater part of the men were put out of action, the retreat was unavoidable.” After the losses suffered that day the general thought he might not undertake a new storming. Only the artillery would the next day try to destroy the enemy’s positions as much as possible.
“At 7 h. 40 m. the fire was opened. As one could now turn the experience of the previous day to account, it had an excellent effect. In all, with a rest of three hours, which was necessary to await the supply of new ammunition, 76 rounds were fired from the breech-loading guns, while the half mountain-battery supported that fire by its shots, both on the benting and on the hill-positions. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the fire was stopped; the northern face of Batoe Iliq lay wholly open, the other faces were heavily damaged. One saw no enemy here any more, and in all probability he had abandoned his fortification and withdrawn to the heights behind.” As the various chiefs now came to tender their complete submission, Van der Heyden thought he could leave the matter at that and returned to Atjeh on 5 August [1880].
Significance
The Batoe Iliq expedition was a costly failure. It demonstrated the limits of Dutch storming tactics against a fortified mosque in a strong position defended by a determined population. The episode foreshadowed the long years of guerrilla warfare that were to continue despite the formal conquest of Great Acheh in 1879.
See Also
Source
De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, pp. 109-113.