J. M. Somer was a Dutch captain of infantry (Captain of Infantry) and military historian who authored the 1935 study Het Atjeh-probleem van 1890-1900. De stimulans van Van Heutsz en Snouck Hurgronje, published as an overprint from the Journal / Organ van de Netherlands-Indies Officers Association. His work analysed the shifting military-political systems applied during the Aceh War between 1873 and 1890 and argued that the absence of a consistent strategic line—not military weakness—had caused the prolonged stalemate.
The problem of 1890-1900
Somer’s essay, published in 1935, takes the appointment of Generaal Van Teyn and the subsequent rise of Van Heutsz and Snouck Hurgronje as its central analytical thread. He notes that in the first sixteen years of the Aceh War (from 1873 to 1889), thirteen Ministers of Colonies, five Gouverneurs-Generaal, and nine civil and military governors of Atjeh and its dependencies had raised conflicting opinions on the course to be followed in Atjeh. This rapid turnover of leadership produced what Somer describes as a “stelsel der stelselloosheid”—a system of systemlessness—in which blockades, shipping regulations, the Plan-Pel, reconciliation policies, civil administration, attempts to restore the sultanate, and the Concentrated Line all followed one another without coherent strategic purpose.
The essay argues that the lack of continuity prevented the military from acting with decisive effect. Political interference repeatedly restrained military action: plans to attack Keumala—for instance, by Governor-General Van Lansberge in 1879—were blocked because Generaal Van der Heyden did not consider them necessary. Meanwhile, the Dutch government underestimated the religious-political dimension of Atjehnese resistance, paying excessive honour to the pretender-sultan in Keumala rather than confronting the spiritual leaders who organised the resistance.
The turning point of 1890
Somer identifies the establishment of the Corps Maréchaussée in April 1890 as a symptom of changed insight into the long-criticised problem. From 1890 onward, the appointment of Snouck Hurgronje and later Van Heutsz gradually replaced the old passivity with active aggression. The essay highlights the collaboration between Snouck Hurgronje and Van Heutsz as the decisive factor: their partnership produced the Pidië Expedition (starting 1 June 1898), the capture of Keumala (14 June 1898), and ultimately the pacification of Groot-Atjeh.
Somer emphasises that the two men, despite differing intellectual orientations—Snouck Hurgronje favouring ethnographic and religious understanding, Van Heutsz favouring military pragmatism—formed a harmonious operational team. Their cooperation was formalised through three government decisions in March 1898 (the 5 March, 15 March, and 25 March decrees) that appointed Snouck Hurgronje as adviser for Arabic and indigenous affairs and Van Heutsz as military and civil governor of Atjeh.
Method and sources
Somer’s essay relies on the official Nota’s Politiek Beleid (compiled by “Colijn” in 1907), the work of H. T. Damste (Atjeh-historie, 1916), Hotz’s Beknopt geschiedkundig overzicht van den Atjeh-oorlog, and private information from Prof. Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje. The essay also references Van Heutsz’s 1893 brochure De Onderwerping van Atjeh and Snouck Hurgronje’s 1892 report on the religious-political situation in Atjeh.
Significance
Het Atjeh-probleem van 1890-1900 is a significant primary-source essay that consolidates the strategic debates of the final phase of the Aceh War. It records the transition from the failed alliance-policy under Deykerhoff—which placed excessive trust in T. Oema—to the active subjugation policy executed by Van Heutsz and guided by Snouck Hurgronje. Its value lies in its explicit argument that the war’s prolongation was a political rather than a military failure.
See Also
- Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz
- Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje
- Aceh War
- Keumala
- Pidië Expedition
- Corps Maréchaussée
- Concentrated Line
- T. Oema
- Deykerhoff
- Van Teyn
- Pidië
Source
Somer, Dr. J. M. (Captain of Infantry). Het Atjeh-probleem van 1890-1900. De stimulans van Van Heutsz en Snouck Hurgronje. Overprint uit Journal / Organ van de Netherlands-Indies Officers Association (N.I.O.V.), [1935], pp. 1-11 (pages 4-7 in original pagination). Sources cited by the author include: Nota’s Politiek Beleid (Colijn, 1907); Damste, H. T. “Atjeh-historie,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1916, pp. 318-339, 449-468, 609-620; Hotz, Beknopt geschiedkundig overzicht van den Atjeh-oorlog; private information of Prof. Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje; Van Heutsz, De Onderwerping van Atjeh (1893).