Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (April 1896)

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tagsevent, battle, aceh-war, 1896, aceh, biloel, lamkoenjit, xxv-moekims, groot-atjeh, dutch-victory, geluk, stemfoort, buitenlinie
aliasesthe relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, the April 1896 relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, the relief of 9 April 1896, Ontzet van Biloel en Lamkoenjit, Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (8 April 1896), 8 April 1896 relief operation, Ontzettingscolonne Stemfoort

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The Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (April 1896) — the Ontzet van Biloel en Lamkoenjit — was the Dutch military operation of 9 April 1896 (per the Atjeh-Album of 1896) or 8 April 1896 (per Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96) by which a column of two battalions under Kolonel Stemfoort relieved the besieged Dutch temporary posts at Biloel and Lamkoenjit in the XXV Moekims of Groot-Atjeh, six weeks after the posts had been besieged by the forces of Toekoe Oemar following his defection from the Dutch alliance. The relief was the first of the three relief operations of April 1896 — followed by the battle of Tjot Rang on 14 April 14 April 1896 and the relief of Anagaloeng on 18 April 18 April 1896 — and it cost the life of Captain Geluk and seven subordinates, with Lieutenants ten Seldam and Hockstein and 23 subordinates wounded (per the Atjeh-Album). Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 records the casualties of the 8 April 1896 operation as one officer, three European and four native soldiers killed, and two officers, thirteen European, one African, two Ambonese, and seven native soldiers wounded, with an ammunition expenditure of 22 grenades, 73 shrapnel shells, 37,960 Beaumont cartridges, and 7,000 repeater cartridges.

The reinforcement

The Atjeh-Album of 1896 records that, in response to Toekoe Oemar’s defection in March 1896, the Dutch government dispatched reinforcements to Atjeh under the command of Kolonel Stemfoort: suppletie-troepen van Padang en twee Bataljons van Batavia, ieder ongeveer 20 officieren en 500 man sterk — reinforcement troops from Padang and two battalions from Batavia, each approximately 20 officers and 500 men strong — which stapten te Oleh-leh aan wal — stepped ashore at Oleh-leh. The reinforcement was the immediate Dutch military response to the defection, and the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit was its first operational employment.

The siege

The Atjeh-Album records that the temporary posts at Biloel and Lamkoenjit — together with the posts at Anagaloeng and Senelop — had been besieged by the forces of Toekoe Oemar since his defection in March 1896. The album’s narrative of the siege places the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit within the larger context of the four sieges of the spring 1896 crisis, and it identifies the relief of 9 April 9 April 1896 as the first of the three April relief operations.

Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 adds that within hours of Teuku Umar’s defection on approximately 26 March–29 March 1896, the posts of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on the western buitenlinie had been invested by superior Achehnese forces armed, in significant part, with the Dutch-supplied Beaumont and repeater rifles that Umar had been lent the previous autumn. Kapt. van der Wedden had taken command of Biloel on 17 March 1896, and the garrison of Lamkoenjit had been reinforced as the storm gathered. By 29 March 1896 both posts were cut off from Koeta Radja; the Insluiting van den tijdelijken post Lamkoenjit — the investment of the temporary post of Lamkoenjit — lasted, in Kruisheer’s accounting, from 29 March to 8 April 1896.

The engagement of 9 April 1896 (Atjeh-Album account)

The Atjeh-Album records that the column of two battalions under Kolonel Stemfoort engaged the besieging forces of Toekoe Oemar at Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 9 April 1896. The engagement was fierce — de strijd hevig was, dien Kolonel Stemfoort aanvoerde — the battle was fierce that Colonel Stemfoort commanded — but the Dutch victory was complete: de overwinning was aan ons — the victory was ours. The album’s narrative of the engagement records that the two posts were relieved ten koste van Kapitein Geluk en zeven minderen, die sneuvelden, en van de Luitenants ten Seldam en Hockstein, die met 23 minderen werden gewond — at the cost of Captain Geluk and seven subordinates who fell, and of the Lieutenants ten Seldam and Hockstein who, with 23 subordinates, were wounded.

The engagement of 8 April 1896 (ATJEH ‘96 account)

Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 — which dates the relief to 8 April 1896 — records that Lt.-Gen. Vetter had arrived as Regeeringscommissaris on 7 April 1896 and immediately issued secret operational instructions for the relief. The relief column was assembled at Tjot Goeë and was commanded by Kol. Stemfoort with Lt.-Col. van Vliet as Chef van den Staf. Its order of battle comprised the 6e Bataljon under Lt.-Col. Bendien (10 officers, 170 European and 135 native ranks), three companies of the 3e Bataljon, one company of the 14e Bataljon under Kapt. Bruynis, two sections of the 1e Bergbatterij under Kapt. Bangert, the 4e Bergbatterij, one cavalry platoon under 1e Luit. van Haaff (1 officer, 29 men), a detachment of engineers under 1e Luit. Ruzette, and two ambulances.

The column advanced on the morning of 8 April 1896 in march order, the 6e Bataljon forming the spearhead under Lt.-Col. Bendien, with the cavalry platoon of 1e Luit. van Haaff reconnoitring ahead. The terrain was the usual Achehnese mixture of rice-fields, kampong (village) edges, and small heights — the tjots — from which a stubborn defence could be conducted. The Achehnese had had ten days to prepare their positions, and the column was contested at every step. The artillery of the 1e Bergbatterij under Kapt. Bangert was brought into action repeatedly to clear the kampong edges, and the infantry advanced by rushes across the open ground.

Casualties mounted steadily. By the end of the day the relief column had lost one officer, three European and four native soldiers killed; and two officers, thirteen European, one African, two Ambonese, and seven native soldiers wounded. The ammunition expenditure — 37,960 Beaumont cartridges and 7,000 repeater cartridges, in addition to 22 grenades and 73 shrapnel shells — testifies to the intensity of the firefight. A cavalry patrol sent at 10:30 a.m. by the Chef van den Staf reported that the 14e Bataljon had already reached Lamkoenjit, where the garrison had been holding out under continuous investment since 29 March 1896. The Biloel garrison was similarly relieved in the course of the afternoon.

The morning after and the withdrawal

Kruisheer records that the morning after the main relief — 8 April 1896 — the 3e compagnie of the relief column came under fire from the west while marching on the main road near Tjot Tjigari and was forced to take up positions in the south edge. At 12:10 p.m. the column commander ordered: “Lamboekoeng bezet houden tot dekking flank hoofdcolonne bij terugkeer” — Lamboekoeng to be held to cover the flank of the main column on its return. At 1 p.m. the order came to return by the shortest route to Tjot Goeë; the withdrawal was carried out sprongsgewijs (by bounds). By 2:30 p.m. the column was back at Tjot Goeë. Simultaneously, other columns operated: the 2e colonne had reached Nesoch; artillery fire from Blang Kirai was redirected to Ateuh; and the algemeene reserve (general reserve) at Lampeneroet was ordered to send forward transports for Biloel and Lamkoenjit.

The dismantling of the posts

The Atjeh-Album records that, after the relief, the posts at Biloel and Lamkoenjit were geslecht (dismantled) — Eerst moesten Biloel en Lamkoenjit geslecht worden, alweder ten koste van een mindere, vóór Generaal Vetter zijn troepen kon wenden naar het Oosten — First Biloel and Lamkoenjit had to be dismantled, again at the cost of a subordinate, before General Vetter could turn his troops to the East. The dismantling of the posts was, in the album’s narrative, the operational prerequisite for the continuation of the relief operations to the east — towards Anagaloeng and Senelop.

Kruisheer confirms that the relief was followed, on 12 April 1896, by the formal evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit: within four days both posts would be abandoned, burned, and written off. The relief operation had also demonstrated the cost of fighting a unified Achehnese enemy on its own ground: 37,960 Beaumont cartridges and 7,000 repeater cartridges in a single day, for the relief of two posts that would be evacuated within the week.

The aftermath

The Atjeh-Album records that, after the relief and dismantling of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, the column wenden naar het Oosten — turned to the East — to relieve the besieged posts at Anagaloeng and Senelop. The relief of Anagaloeng was accomplished on 18 April 18 April 1896, and the battle of Tjot Rang — the second of the April relief operations — was fought on 14 April 14 April 1896 in the course of the eastward movement.

Significance

The Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit is significant in the documentary record of the Atjeh-oorlog as the first of the three relief operations of April 1896 — the moment at which the Dutch, having been reinforced in response to Toekoe Oemar’s defection, began to recover the initiative from Toekoe Oemar’s defected forces. The engagement cost the life of Captain Geluk — the third officer fatality of the spring 1896 crisis — and it was, in the album’s narrative, the operational prerequisite for the continuation of the relief operations to the east. The relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit was followed, in the next ten days, by the battle of Tjot Rang and the relief of Anagaloeng, which together completed the recovery of the Dutch outer perimeter.

In Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 framing, the relief of 8 April 1896 was the first major operation of the Vetter interregnum and the prototype of the relief-and-evacuation operations that would follow over the next two weeks. It established the pattern — heavy column, massive ammunition expenditure, tactical success, strategic withdrawal — that would characterise the Dutch operations of April 1896 until the recovery of initiative in the three-day offensive of 23–25 May. The relief also vindicated, in a sense, the decision to send Vetter: where Deykerhoff had hesitated and refused to believe the worst of Teuku Umar, Vetter had acted within hours of his arrival. The cost of the operation, however, was a sober foretaste of the price that the Dutch would pay, in cartridges and casualties, for the policy of native alliance that had collapsed on 29 March 1896.

See Also

Source

Atjeh-Album van Eigen Haard, uitgave van de N.V. Het Tijdschrift “Eigen Haard”, Amsterdam, 1896, pp. 10–11 (Een Terugblik — Wat Reeds Verkregen Werd).

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 60–61, 1235.

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