C. H. Bogaert — a Dutch naval officer, zeeofficier — served as stationscommandant voor de Oostkust (station commander for the East Coast) of Atjeh from June 1873 onwards, and again as commander of the blockade of Atjeh of 18841885. His administration of the East Coast from his ship, from June 1873 until the transfer of civil administration in June 1875, was the model of effective Dutch coastal control in Atjeh, and his name, Kruijt records, “leeft nog onder de Atjehers voort” (still lives on among the Atjehers).

The East Coast Station (June 1873 – June 1875)

On 7 May 1873 — only days after the Dutch flag had disappeared from the coast of Groot-Atjeh following the failure of the Eerste Atjeh-expeditie — the Dutch flag was raised on the East Coast in the little state of Edi. The radja of Edi had before the war requested to be placed under Dutch sovereignty; repeating his request, he was now permitted to do so. This was the beginning of the Dutch establishment on the East Coast.

Under the able and tireless leadership of Bogaert, who appeared in June 1873 as stationscommandant for the East Coast, Dutch influence rapidly extended over the whole East Coast and a part of the North Coast, from Tamiang to Telok Semawé. Mostly operating peacefully, only rarely having recourse to force — “maar dan kort en goed” (but then briefly and effectively) — the Dutch soon had complete control of the trade. Edi alone, under Dutch supervision, was permitted to import and export; it thereby greatly increased in prosperity and wealth, became the commercial centre of the whole East Coast, and later the seat of the administration, which it remains to this day.

To certain statelets that had given proofs of good disposition, permits were issued for restricted import and export, under Dutch supervision, to and from Edi; but all others had their ports or rivers effectively closed. Many vessels with rich cargoes were taken at the coast or in the rivers and declared prize. “Bogaert was op zijn schip meester van de kust” (Bogaert was master of the coast from his ship), Kruijt writes; “he had aan wal en aan boord voortdurend aanrakingen met de hoofden” (he had continuous contacts with the chiefs both ashore and aboard); “hij blokkeerde niet alleen, hij regelde en bestuurde uit eigen initiatief” (he did not merely blockade, he regulated and governed on his own initiative); “hij werd overal geëerd en gevreesd en nog leeft zijn naam onder de Atjehers voort” (he was everywhere honoured and feared, and his name still lives on among the Atjehers).

Contrast with the Other Stations

On the other stations — the North and West Coasts — blockade was indeed carried on, vessels were stopped, searched, and occasionally confiscated, and reprisals were taken for acts of hostility; but no contacts with chiefs and population took place, no knowledge of land and people was acquired, and facilities were granted without proper supervision. “De groote toewijding van Bogaert werd er gemist” (Bogaert’s great dedication was missed there), Kruijt writes, and the comparison would be drawn throughout the war between the well-administered East Coast and the neglected North and West Coasts.

When, towards November 1873, almost all the warships departed for Groot-Atjeh to await the arrival of the second expedition under General van Swieten, Bogaert alone remained with his squadron on the East Coast. The blockade was raised for the whole East Coast as far as Telok Semawé and for the West Coast from Troemon to Rigas. Only the hostile Simpang Olim on the East Coast remained blockaded.

The Blockade of 1884–1885

Bogaert returned to Atjeh a decade later to take command of the blockade of 18841885 decreed by the concentration system of 1884. “Met zijn oude energie” (with his old energy), Kruijt records, Bogaert came out from the Netherlands, “bezield met den vasten wil de blokkade aan haar doel te doen beantwoorden” (animated by the firm will to make the blockade answer its purpose). How bitterly he was disappointed. Already before he had taken command, he heard at Batavia that its early abolition had been decided. “Tal van uitzonderingen voortspruitende uit politieke en andere consideratiën” (numerous exceptions arising from political and other considerations), Kruijt writes, “belemmerden hare geheele uitvoering en vernietigden dus ook hare uitwerking” (obstructed its whole execution and therefore destroyed its effect). Bogaert did what he could under the circumstances, but always regretted that he had been used for what Kruijt calls, with bitter wordplay, a “politioneele (polichinelle) blokkade” — a Punchinello blockade, a farce.

Significance

Bogaert’s administration of the East Coast from June 1873 to June 1875 was the model of the scheepvaartregeling avant la lettre — the maritime trade regulation that would only be officially instituted in 1883 and applied throughout Atjeh in 18931894. His combination of military blockade, political contact with the chiefs, commercial regulation, and administrative initiative from on board his ship, demonstrated what could be achieved on the coasts with adequate dedication; and the contrast with the North and West Coasts, where no such dedication was shown, demonstrated what was lost by its absence. His later disappointment with the blockade of 18841885 is one of the recurrent instances in Kruijt’s brochure of Dutch policy undermined by exceptions and inconsistencies.

Sources

De geschiedenis van Nederland in onzen tijd, by J. A. de Bruyne, Directeur der Hoogere Burgerschool te Zierikzee. Deel IV. 1872-1883. Nieuwe uitgave. Schiedam: J. F. Dupont, 1912, Hoofdstuk I, p. 29.

C. H. Bogaert was a lieutenant-at-sea 1st class of the Dutch navy, commandant of the ship Timor, who was the principal agent in the submission of the east coast of Atjeh to Dutch authority in 1873-1875. “Bogaert was on his ship master of the coast, he had on shore and aboard continual contact with the chiefs, he did not only blockade, he regulated and governed on his own initiative; he was everywhere honoured and feared, and his name still lives on among the Atjehers.”

Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)

Verstege, reporting the general judgment that the blockade of the Atjeh coast of 1884-1885 had had little or no result, gives the widely held explanation current at the time, “van meer dan eene zijde” (“from more than one side”) assured: that the commander of the blockade flotilla, kapitein ter zee Bogaert, had his hands so tied from the beginning that “alle kans op succes daar voor reeds dadelijk werd uitgesloten” (“all chance of success was from the very outset excluded”) — one of the circumstances which Verstege adds to the picture of the whole operation’s futility (see Blokkade).

See Also

Source

De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter II (Bogaert’s East Coast administration), Chapter IX (Bogaert’s 1884–85 blockade command). OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 11–12, 47.

Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), p. 86 note. OCR: DLP-158.