The Vlaghijscherij — flag-raising — was the Dutch policy, pursued from January 1874 onwards, of obtaining the formal submission of the coastal statelets of Atjeh by having their radjas (chiefs) raise the Dutch flag, sign an onderwerpingsacte (act of submission) acknowledging Dutch supremacy, and undertake to enter into no political relations with other powers. The policy, pursued principally by Van Swieten’s proclamation of January 1874 and by his successors, was, in Kruijt’s judgement, “een wassen neus” (a wax nose — a fake) — a paper submission that, on the North and West Coasts in particular, was obtained without supervision, without control, and often in concert with the enemy, and that furnished the coastal statelets with the means to import and export freely and so to supply the very resistance the Dutch sought to suppress.
The Proclamation of January 1874
The Vlaghijscherij was instituted by Van Swieten’s proclamation to the chiefs of January 1874, in the aftermath of the fall of the kraton. The chiefs were required to sign an onderwerpingsacte in which they acknowledged Dutch supremacy, undertook to fly the Dutch flag, and promised to enter into no political relations with other powers. To those who submitted, self-government was left; they were permitted to import and export under pass; some commercial facilities were granted to those who would have submitted but for special reasons dared not yet openly declare themselves; the statelets whose chiefs refused to submit would be blockaded.
The East Coast Success
The Vlaghijscherij was a success on the East Coast, where the trade control already in force under Bogaert had established an effective Dutch presence. Over the whole East Coast the flag was hoisted in the presence of the stationscommandant, and the continuous contacts with chiefs and population both ashore and aboard gave a certain guarantee for the future. There the situation was controlled by the Dutch; there the Dutch governed. The submission of Edi of 7 May 7 May 1873 was the model of the East Coast Vlaghijscherij.
The North and West Coast Failure
On the North and West Coasts the Vlaghijscherij was, Kruijt writes, “een groote fout” (a great mistake). The flag and the act of recognition were usually simply sent ashore by a messenger, and nothing more, and trade was opened without supervision, “zoodat de deuren er wijd werden opengezet om den vijand van alles te voorzien en het verzet te stijven” (so that the doors were thrown wide open to supply the enemy with everything and to stiffen the resistance). Moreover, the radja of Giegieng received for this a douceurtje of ƒ25,000. The good results obtained on the East Coast should have been a finger-withe pointing the way to act.
In short, Kruijt writes, the manner in which on the North and West Coasts the Dutch flag was granted and the harbours were opened was a great mistake. The whole submission was a wax nose — a means to import and export freely — and had in all probability taken place in concert with the enemy. From the Atjehers this was very well seen; from the Dutch, less so.
The Later History
The Vlaghijscherij was repeatedly renewed throughout the war, as additional statelets submitted or re-submitted. In February 1876 the Dutch flag was raised at Pedir; in July 1874 at Telok Semawé (with a cash gift); and so on. The later submissions were increasingly conditioned on personal contact with the chief and on his being sworn in; but by then it was too late. The pattern of paper submission without supervision had been established, and the coastal statelets continued to supply the resistance throughout the war.
The Contrast with Scheepvaartregeling
The Vlaghijscherij was, in Kruijt’s analysis, the antithesis of the scheepvaartregeling. The Vlaghijscherij obtained formal submission without effective control; the scheepvaartregeling obtained effective control without formal submission. The Vlaghijscherij was the instrument of the early Dutch coastal policy, before the Dutch had recognised the true centre of gravity of the war; the scheepvaartregeling was the instrument of the later Dutch coastal policy, after Scherer had diagnosed the true situation. The Dutch’s persistence in the Vlaghijscherij long after its failure had been demonstrated — and the Dutch government’s repeated refusal or half-hearted application of the scheepvaartregeling that should have replaced it — was, in Kruijt’s judgement, one of the principal causes of the protraction of the war.
Significance
The Vlaghijscherij is, in Kruijt’s analysis, one of the principal Dutch strategic errors of the Atjeh-oorlog. The policy of obtaining formal submission without effective control — pursued principally on the North and West Coasts, in contrast to the effective administration of the East Coast under Bogaert — furnished the coastal statelets with the means to supply the very resistance the Dutch sought to suppress, and so contributed directly to the protraction of the war. The contrast between the Vlaghijscherij and the scheepvaartregeling is one of the recurrent themes of Kruijt’s brochure.
See Also
- Onderwerpingsacte
- Jan van Swieten
- C. H. Bogaert
- Edi
- Telok Semawé
- Pedir
- Giegieng
- Scheepvaartregeling
- Scherer
- Oostkust
- Noordkust
- Westkust
- Onderhoorigheden
- Sultan of Aceh
- Aceh War
- Atjeh-oorlog
- January 1874
- 7 May
- July 1874
- February 1876
- 1873
- 1874
- 1876
Source
De Atjeh-Oorlog: Kort Overzicht van Oorsprong, Verloop en Gevolg, door J. A. Kruijt. ‘s-Gravenhage: Loman & Funke, 1896. Chapter III (the proclamation and the East Coast success), Chapter IV (the North and West Coast failure), Chapter VII (the contrast with scheepvaartregeling). OCR-filename: 20260716_140310_DLP-101-De_Atjeh_oorlog_Nemotron-OCR-v2_OCR.txt, pp. 15–16, 20–21, 34–39.