The resistance in Atjeh 1908–1912

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tagsevent, resistance, aceh-war, colonial, dutch, achehnese, pacification, 20th-century
aliasesAtjeh resistance 1908-1912, het verzet 1908-1912, the resistance of 1908-1912, general resistance in Atjeh

30 min read

The resistance in Atjeh of 1908–1912 was the last general armed resistance of the Atjeh-oorlog: it flared up throughout the province, reached its climax in 1908 — the year in which H. N. A. Swart assumed the governorship — and after four years of stubborn struggle ended in 1912 as general resistance. Du Croo devoted a chapter to its course in the six hearths of resistance, warning that the narrative must of necessity be at times monotonous and full of names that say little to the reader, “but which are inseparably bound up with this piece of Atjeh history.”

Causes and the condition of the country

Nowhere had resistance and the accompanying anarchy and insecurity set land and people so far back. The chiefs had lost both their authority over the population and their confidence in the administration; the formerly agricultural and cattle-keeping population had become destitute; the herds proved largely destroyed; and “the system of fines and the unlawful withholding of incomes, and the collection of those fines with a strong arm and with no regard for anything or anyone, had produced nothing but hatred, contempt and resistance.”

The new course brought, in accordance with Swart’s views, immediate redress where possible: the unlawfully withheld incomes were paid out, as were the securities wrongly deposited in the wegenfonds (road fund); the oelèëbalangs were supported and gradually returned to their gampongs; rice and seed-padi were supplied at the administration’s expense, as were advances on a generous scale for the purchase of plough cattle.

The six hearths of resistance

Six districts of Atjeh formed the actual hearths of resistance:

In each of these districts resistance was in fact conducted by its own leaders with their own bands, though mutual contact was maintained, so that bands which found matters too oppressive in one district temporarily sought breathing space with their neighbours.

(a) Keureutòë and Pasè

In this severely afflicted district the foundation for improvement was laid in the last months of 1908; military and civil work complemented each other as far as possible. Where on the one hand hard blows fell and had to fall, on the other the administration sought to work “mitigating, above all just, and… repairing faults.”

One of Swart’s collaborators who administered the district for years described the inheritance: “In Keureutòë, formerly a rich and prosperous land, I found hopeless conditions … For years the chiefs had been cut back in their incomes by withholdings. Spies were not everywhere well directed and supervised, deceived those who sent them out, stirred up trouble among others, harassed the population and, if their demands were not met, had cattle and possessions taken from innocent people. The livestock was thereby practically wiped out. The population no longer cared at all; it grew indifferent and went over to the resistance.”

Swart therefore strove to undo the wrong done, in accordance with his instructions to repay what had been unlawfully withheld. He was sometimes reproached with “scattering money about,” but those who spoke so did not know the conditions. That prompt and never “krenterige” repayment made an excellent impression, as did the advances liberally granted for the purchase of new cattle. The same collaborator declared, on the basis of long administrative experience in the district in 1908 and after, that all advances in his ressort were promptly repaid: attempts at fraud naturally occurred, and it is the administrator’s task to detect them — “if we are not capable of that, we are no good. But it does not argue against the system. That just, conciliatory system had an excellent influence.”

In 1908 the situation already became considerably more favourable. Acts of violence against the population became rare and the population, where sufficiently protected, gave its co-operation. As a result of that co-operation two of Tgk. di Barat’s best commanders fell, while Tgk. di Paja Bakong lost his best pang. Both principal resistance leaders consequently no longer felt safe in Keureutòë and withdrew to the Gajòlanden. The only unsubmitted figure of significance still wandering in the district was T. Radja Sabi, the now twelve-year-old son of the executed T. Tjhi’ Toenòng, with the band of his stepfather Pang Nanggròë.

In 1909 the situation improved throughout the district, but 269 opponents still fell, among them seventeen band-heads or commanders and seven Teungkoes; eleven were taken prisoner, among them the learned and fanatical Tgk. di Reubèë; and seventy-two submitted, mèl sadja.

The year 1910 brought the end for many band-heads. In the first months they, and especially P. Nanggròë, tried to maintain their influence by raiding submitted gampong dwellers, by molestation and threats; but the population felt the strength of the Kompeuni, showed increasing co-operation, and that meant the end for the bands. In February the two principal subordinate commanders of P. Nanggròë submitted and handed in two repeating rifles — repeating rifles had become rare and precious. On 24 September the end came for their leader: sergeant Slooten surprised him in the Paja Tjitjém on 26 September. Then it went faster: Mosselman surprised on 25 October at the kr. Peutòë one of the long-sought Paja Bakong Teungkoes, and that meant the end for Tgk. Sjeh di Paja Bakong, also called Tgk. Seupot Mata, for his son Tgk. Mat Saleh, for five followers, and for Tjoet Meutia, widow of Pang Nanggròë and mother of T. Radja Sabi. Finally Pang Aron, the most active subordinate commander of the great Tgk. di Barat, reported himself with eight followers. In 1910 seventy-one resistance men were killed, fifty-one taken prisoner and eighty reported themselves.

1911 brought the great improvement: “the political situation remained favourable” (“the political situation remained favourable”) became a customary opening of the monthly report. The co-operation of the population with the Kompeuni (“the Company (the Dutch power)”) against the djahats — troublesome to the population too — produced incidents such as that of March: “at the beginning of March the band of Pang Bin Dé of Gloempang Doea carried off two boys by force.” A few nights later the band tried through those two boys to forage in the said gampong but was driven off by the inhabitants, while the boys were freed from its hands.

The work had become “the smaller work (though not for that reason easier), the search for needles in haystacks — but then, as one constabulary commander put it, for “needles that have to eat”.” So in May: “one of the many patrols sent out succeeded in surprising a band of foragers of Tgk. di Mata Ië, in which a woman was accidentally severely wounded; she died the next day through her own wilfulness in wrenching off the bandage.”

Tgk. di Mata Ië’s ladangs were raided, costing him his brother-in-law and best band-head, several other relatives, and all his supplies. In September he again lost a few followers, and the October report recorded the woman with two children found near the raided ladangs, who had wandered a month and a half living on forest fruits without seeing any of her own again, and was sent to Lho’ Seumawè for care.

In June 1911 came news of Tgk. di Barat again, returned from the Gajòland to the upper Keureutòë; his presence at once revealed itself in the defection of the former band-head T. Ali van Pira’, son-in-law of Tgk. di Paja Bakong, with eight followers, all boys of sixteen to eighteen — who stayed away only six nights before reporting themselves again, general opinion saying they had come to the Teungkoe without firearms and been rejected. In December “the situation was favourable”: Behrens and his men were on the Teungkoe’s track.

1911 had been an unlucky year for Tgk. di Barat. In January a great meeting of the resistance party had been held at Seureulo in the Meergebied — now the sub-division Takèngön — where he was in hiding, attended also by Gajò bands; it was discovered or betrayed and dispersed by patrols, his father-in-law being killed. The following month an encounter with the marechaussée went badly, and he left the Meergebied for the plain of Lho’ Soekon and Lho’ Seumawè to reorganise the resistance with Tgk. di Mata Ië. There the marechaussée awaited him; on 22 February 1912 Behrens surprised him with two brigades, “and that was the end for Tgk. di Barat. From that moment the situation in the whole North Coast division became stable and ranged from favourable to very favourable; the suffering there was over.”

(b) Pidië

In this district, “the cradle of the irreconcilable religious leaders, the Tirò Teungkoes,” the oelama party took heavy blows in 1908, after the Tirò band had fled from Geumpang to Pidië at the end of 1907 as a result of the patrol movement of the marechaussée under Schmidt, so that for a considerable time there had been no contact with it.

In Pidië captain G. K. Dijkstra, Swart’s collaborator in Borneo and Celebes, had taken over the administration from major Schröder. But even before Dijkstra’s arrival the Kompeuni struck hard: on 8 February 1908 Schmidt, following found and carefully traced tracks, surprised the band’s hiding-place on the kr. Meu’, where five of the principal Teungkoes fell; on 15 April a lieutenant struck again.

The tide had turned enough that “mèl sadja” (“simply to report and submit”) — simply to report and submit — became the general course, resistance having become too dangerous a business for many. Yet in the night of 8–9 December the resourceful Tgk. Aron carried out with his band “an almost perfect hussar’s trick”: partly dressed as soldiers in captured uniforms and equipment, they passed themselves off at Keudé Garot as a patrol, were admitted by the village watch, captured eight rifles lent to the oelèëbalang, wounded the Imeum of Garot, the head of the watch, and disappeared with their booty — eight rifles being a great deal in those days, though they remained, now that the Kompeuni had become the Kompeuni again, only a “leen.”

The year 1910 brought further general improvement, Boreel at Lam Meulò and Schmidt at Tangsé becoming the pace-setters, Schmidt devoting himself in accordance with his commission exclusively to the destruction of the remaining Tirò Teungkoes. In May came the first blow: Schmidt surprised the hiding-place of the two great Tirò men, Tgk. Tjhi’ Majét and Tgk. di Boekét, who fell with many followers; the headship of the Tirò band passed to the sixteen-year-old Tgk. Ma’at, the last of the line.

In August and September came further hard blows and division arose among the bands: the Pedireezen attached themselves to T. Dagang of Tangsé, the strangers, mainly oelama’s from Groot Atjeh, to Tgk. Ma’at. In August the bivouac commander of Geumpang, onderluitenant Roelofsen, at last laid low the long-sought and notorious resistance leader of that area, Keudjroeën Leupoe, while Boreel settled with Tgk. Aron, though not completely: six followers were disposed of and two of the eight rifles returned to the Kompeuni.

That the population now helped in rendering harmless the terrorising bands, the foragers and the “geld-inners,” had its cause partly in the fact that in that year no fewer than eight gampong people, two of them women, were murdered by the bands’ emissaries. In all, 186 resistance men fell in Pidië in 1910, twenty-eight were taken prisoner and 174 submitted.

1911 brought a steadily more favourable situation, though it began with a reverse: a brigade of infantry sent from its bivouac in gampong Biheuë seven soldiers — half its strength, and squarely against regulations — to nearby Kalé to forage. The unfindable Pang Bintang stood in relation to the keutjhi’ of Kalé, who likewise enjoyed the Kompeuni’s confidence, and who lured four of the seven to a distant part of the gampong. While they were there haggling over rice with the village head’s wife, they were suddenly attacked and wounded by the keutjhi’ and five members of Pang Bintang’s band. But the wounded soldiers struck back hard, killed the keutjhi’ and a band member and drove off the other four; the keutjhi''s revolver even remained in their hands, though a carbine disappeared. A patrol went out at once, recovered the carbine and overtook the four fugitives, all severely wounded. The object had been to obtain firearms: “the bands were becoming alarmingly short of firearms.”

Among those killed in Pidië were the kramat-venerated nestor of the religious resistance leaders, Habib Teupin Wan — so holy that the fingers of anyone who dared point at him would stiffen — three scholars of great name, and two well-known band-heads. Simultaneously a patrol from Meulaboh laid low the resistance head Keutjhi’ Bén in Pameu, while the marechaussée of the 4th Division under captain Van Gheel Gildemeester — Boreel having meanwhile been transferred to the Gajòland — finally rendered harmless the notorious and feared principal band commander in Lam Meulò, Tgk. Moehamat Haroen, with his principal subordinates and six followers.

Swart could report in October 1911: “on 16 October the reporting officer came to the chief place of the sub-division in order, after inspecting the civil establishment, to begin on the 18th a tour through the sub-division. On this tour all the territories were visited, and in the territories all the parishes, in which meetings were held with the village heads and their complaints and requests were heard, investigated and, where possible, satisfied. People from the population, who had come up in great crowds, were also admitted with their requests.”

In July 1911 Swart could report in the monthly report: “towards the end of the month the controleur G. J. van Dongen arrived to take over the administration of the sub-division from the civil authority, the constabulary captain W. A. Herold.” In 1912 the garrison of Pidië could be reduced by two companies.

In December 1911 Schmidt completed his great task: the last survivor of the fanatical house of the Tirò oelama’s, the young Tgk. Tjhi’ Ma’at, who had refused a final proposal of submission because a Tirò Teungkoe preferred sjahid to surrender, fell with his last followers.

(c) Bireuën and Lho’ Seumawè

In Bireuën — comprising Peusangan and Samalanga — situated between Lho’ Seumawè and Pidië and always a turbulent district, the situation improved after the restoration of respect for the Kompeuni, Watrin being the marechaussée commander there. The now protected population began itself to turn against the bands, and that meant on 20 December 1909 the end for Pang Aron and on 24 December for the notorious Tgk. di Atjèh Ma’ Amin, overpowered and delivered up while foraging in gampong Blang.

The year 1910 became the last “verzetsjaar”: bands and above all their commanders were pursued stubbornly and successfully — sixty-two opponents fell that year, thirty-one were taken prisoner and 161 submitted. With that Bireuën was largely cleared, although during the year five gampong dwellers were still murdered and seven wounded by vengeful band members, while attacks on the Gajòweg then under construction occurred repeatedly.

Swart could report at the close of the year: “the general state of security has advanced so far that the valleys of the Beuratjan, the Panté Radja and the Mampréë, deep into the mountain country about three hours’ walk from the inhabited plain, could be occupied. In the new settlements about four hundred registered persons have established themselves with their wives and children; they move about there freely and unarmed and have suffered no molestation.”

In Lho’ Seumawè the situation had remained the most favourable; there too the administration had for a considerable time been in the hands of a controleur, although that division also had its share of the band system: the garrison of the bivouac Boeloh Blang Ara under Schouten repeatedly had its hands full.

(d) The Meergebied and the Dörötstreek

In this little-trodden mountain region — now the sub-division Takèngön — where the bands found good and safe hiding-places everywhere, some successes were obtained in 1908, but little improvement followed even in 1909. Heavy blows fell in the latter year, 132 resistance men being killed, but among this democratically disposed mountain people the chiefs had little authority, and the people supported the ill-disposed, partly from fear of revenge.

Consequently the Dutch troops took blows. On 24 December 1909 a group of infantry returning from Samarkilang was surprised in its marching bivouac at Tjampoeron; the European sergeant and brigade commander, six men and four convicts were killed, while seven fusiliers and four convicts were wounded. Around the captured carbines formed the dangerous Telongbende, which kept the Meergebied in commotion for nearly two years.

In 1910 too the situation remained unfavourable; many uitgewekenen wandered about and resistance was repeatedly offered; eighty-five resistance men lost their lives, ten were taken prisoner and only seventeen reported themselves.

Improvement began only in 1911, under the vigorous marechaussée hand of Hein Meijer. In January the influence of Tgk. di Barat still made itself felt; the bands showed heightened activity, the Telongbende fired on Dutch patrols, and there was another klewang attack at Linggö. But at last the Telongbende received the blow long intended for it: Jenae with a patrol of the 5th Division struck “a blow such as few have been struck” — the entire band of Tgk. Léjman, successor of the well-known Tgk. di Tjòt Tjitjém, was rendered harmless in a surprise attack in which thirty-six men fell and fourteen rifles were taken; the European sergeants Loeff and Roobaart earned the Militaire Willemsorde there.

Moreover in February the hiding-place was surprised of the long-sought panglima of the ex-pretender sultan, Keutjhi’ Saman, who fell with three adherents, while Schmidt found in the Tangsé valley — and, as promised to Swart, within three months — the unfindable Keudjroeën Oebit and struck him from the Register van Bendehoofden.

Sixteen more were killed and a carbine taken in another action, among the dead being recognised a nephew of the Kedjoerön van Boekét. Then some months without much contact; in May a klewang attack on a marching bivouac near Nalon (one killed, three wounded, one carbine); another blow at the Telong band; more reports, more ladangs and hiding-places of Tgk. di Barat cleared up in the Samarkilangsche; and at last in July the news that in most valleys of this mountain country submission was under deliberation — that month costing the resistance nineteen killed, sixty-three reports and three precious surrendered carbines.

In August Swart visited the Meergebied; again some sixty uitgewekenen reported themselves and rifles were handed in, but it lasted until 16 October before the bulk of the Telong band gave up the struggle — twenty men with all their commanders — and submitted, handing in the last three carbines lost in the surprise at Tjampoeron. In November the situation became steadily more favourable. When in 1912 the band in the Dörötstreek also submitted, the condition of the Meergebied and the Dörötstreek could henceforth be judged from favourable to very favourable.

(e) The Westkust

The political situation on the west coast left much to be desired in 1908. In this difficult district with its complicated internal relations and its fanatical and combative population — “Meulaboh is the country par excellence for sabre charges* (“sabre charges”)” — shootings, murderous attacks on well-disposed gampong dwellers, destruction of the telephone line and defections to the resistance party were the order of the day. In addition, nine gezaghebbers had succeeded one another in seven years; in the Wòjla district politics had been “gemodderd,” in the words of an official report; the chiefs “begrudged one another the light in their eyes”; and — worst of all — the available force proved insufficient.

Only when in 1909 the civil authority, the well-known marechaussée captain Geertsema Beckeringh, could dispose of sufficient means of power — a mobile marechaussée column under the well-known captain Darlang temporarily occupying first the mouth of the Wòjla and later Boebon — when Schmidt had cleared up in Teunòm, and when the pacification of the troublesome Boven Wòjla under Scheurleer and from the bivouac Tanòh Mirah had produced the submission of two hundred resistance men (these too being helped with rice and seed-padi), did only the Beneden Wòjla, Boebon and Seunagan remain unquiet in the Meulaboh country.

But — “and that remains the eternal setback” — in January a patrol going up a tributary of the kr. Boebon in prauws under sergeant De Haas fell into an ambush in which the commander and eight men lost their lives and no fewer than eleven carbines disappeared, of which nine were however fished up or handed in.

In Seunagan in March 1909 Waki Him committed another old-fashioned klewang attack which cost eleven wounded, but which brought Waki Him and three of his men their end as sjahid. In April 1909 more than 132 reports came in with two rifles, and after T. Moeda Mat Sa’it fell with his men on the upper Tripa in March, the submission followed in Seunagan, Tadoe and Tripa of all his pangs and band members, plus two rifles.

In the sub-division Tapa’ Toean, where Veltman held the administration and the command, the struggle in 1908 was chiefly against the well-known resistance leader T. Bén Blang Pidië, who kept the whole district in unrest. The action of the marechaussée soon produced the necessary reports: in June T. Bén’s eldest son submitted with a hundred followers and nine rifles; a few weeks later T. Bén himself gave up the resistance with two other sons and 160 men and brought another nine rifles to the “rustkamer der Kompeuni.” In August all the band-heads of Tgk. Pidië came in submission at the bivouac Reusa’ — forty-seven men, fourteen firearms; in September seventy-nine more reports with eight rifles followed, and moreover the important Tgk. Imeum Sradeuë’ fell with four followers. In August the rest also came in submission with eleven more rifles, except Panglima Nja Noer, who chose the end as a witness of the faith and consequently fell in the Gajò Loeös in November. Finally T. Bén brought his two last wandering sons to the administration towards the end of the year, “and Tapa’ Toean became quiet again.” That quiet was maintained in 1909 too, though disturbed now and then by incursions of bands from the neighbouring Gajòland.

In 1910 the favourable signs continued in a general and striking improvement over the whole west coast. In March more than a hundred uitgewekenen reported themselves in the Meulaboh country, among them many adherents of Tgk. Poeti’. April was a fruitful month: in Wòjla the band of the well-known Tgk. Imeum Sradeuë’ was surprised, costing him his son and two rifles, while T. Adam fell on the Beneden Wòjla — another rifle.

But after such success came the inevitable reverse, and the October report recorded: “near Keudé Blang Bajoe (Seunagan) lieutenant S. van Eendenburg left his patrol with one Ambonese constabulary soldier to make a small reconnaissance of the ground, when he suddenly came upon the band-leader Pang Timoe and one follower, with the fatal result that the said officer fell from a sabre stroke, while the constabulary soldier accompanying him was severely wounded; his carbine, however, was not lost.” Yet in that same month a notorious band-head from Tadoe came in submission with sixty-nine men plus six blunderbusses — “they were no longer well supplied with rifles.”

December brought the settlement for October: besides many prominent resistance men reporting themselves, among them two oelama’s notorious for their religious school where resistance against the Kompeuni was preached, sergeant Bossert surprised a ladang in the night of 5–6 November, arresting a band-head with six followers; the same patrol shortly afterwards laid low the band-head who had dealt lieutenant Van Eendenburg the fatal blow in October. On that occasion the well-known Acehnese guide Si Beuram fell on the Dutch side and the patrol commander sergeant Bossert and two men were severely wounded. A patrol under lieutenant Van Arkel surprised an enemy band in Pameu, in which four well-known band-heads fell. And so December became the closing piece: at last Tgk. Poeti’ submitted with all his teungkoes, panglimas and sixty followers.

Thanks to this strong and general improvement, various landschappen could in January 1911 be opened for industrial and agricultural undertakings — “and this is indeed a very great advance on the fanatical West Coast.” Moreover in May, in consequence of the favourable political situation in Wòjla and Boebon, the bivouacs Arongan, Tanòh Mirah and Reusa’ were abolished.

September brought ninety-nine more reports and an unexpected and painful surprise for the great and unfindable Keutjhi’ Bén of Geumpang, for whom Geumpang had become too hot. He had withdrawn to the Boven Moegò district, and there Van Arkel from Tanòh Mirah twice surprised his band, killing his son and five followers and costing the band five rifles, while virtually simultaneously another patrol from Tanòh Mirah under sergeant Gackstätter surprised Keutjhi’ Bén himself in Pameu and laid him low with two of his followers. “And with this the time of “political situation favourable” dawned for Meulaboh as well.”

(f) The Gajòlanden

In the remote and difficult Gajò country, formerly the hiding- and resting-place of the irreconcilables from the coastal region, the situation remained “beslist ongunstig” in 1908 and 1909: the keudeh with pasar shed at the administrative settlement of Blang Kedjerèn was set on fire, well-disposed chiefs were murdered, and there were repeated klewang attacks on brigades supervising road work or “transport liepen.”

The situation was most unfavourable in September. Throughout the sub-division bands of ill-disposed men wandered, terrorising the population and threatening with death everyone on good terms with the administration. In view of this the infantry garrison of Blang Kedjerèn was replaced by marechaussée — the 1st Division under captain Muurling — while a mobile column of three brigades under Kaniess was sent to the western part of the sub-division.

In October the bivouac at Goempang was still burned and a klewang attack was made on the monthly transport to Koeala Simpang at Pénding, in which the Dutch had three wounded while ten of the attackers fell; but through the increased Dutch activity some thirty-eight ill-disposed men were killed in that month, while a number of people submitted of their own accord and in November a number of prominent leaders fell or offered their submission. Thereafter improvement set in: at the end of November Swart visited the district and could already visit gampongs two hours from Blang Kedjerèn without military escort.

The Koloniaal Verslag for 1910 gave a new insight: “more and more it has become apparent that in the Gajò Loeös both the cause and the organisation of the resistance are of a different nature than in the Acehnese territories. Whereas in the latter religious fanaticism plays a part, in the Gajò Loeös the resistance is waged chiefly by an innate love of independence in the Gajò population.”

“The foundation of Gajò society is the tribal bond; mutual deliberation within the blah (clan) is the only source of authority. Those who have gone over to the resistance do not break the bond with the clan; they take part in the common deliberation and are more or less bound by its outcome. Since those in resistance from each clan belong together, there ought to be as many bands as there are clans with men in resistance, which at the beginning of the year was virtually the case. When the bands became too weak to lead an independent existence, those of different clans belonging to the same clan headship joined together. Since the tribal bond is predominant, every clan that counts men in resistance is in its majority hostile to us. Whether the centre of gravity of the clan lies in the village or in the mountains depends on the number and character of the clansmen in resistance, from which it follows that in the Gajò Loeös the first step on the road to pacification must be to bring the centre of gravity of all the clans within reach of the administration, that is, within the villages.” Once that was done, the uitgewekenen could be brought to submission by pressure on the registered — pressure that must first be moral, and if that did not help, by measures of compulsion such as requiring the deposit of a security. “Here, therefore, the resistance must be dealt with in quite a different way than in the rest of Atjeh.”

In 1910 the fighting and patrolling continued. The Kaniess column in the western part brought many from the Padang-vallei to submission, could even spend a temporary “verlof” in its garrison at Koeta Radja, but returned on 25 August and at once laid low by surprise the irreconcilable Imeum van Tjané Toa. Kaniess continued to act with success, so that the situation indeed improved. Since women were repeatedly hit during raids, a hoofdenvergadering in March was charged with letting the wives of the uitgewekenen know that they should not wear men’s clothing and should not run away during a raid.

On 20 September the hiding-place of old Rödjö Pasér with his religious men was raided; among the seven killed were the two principal Teungkoes and two feared commanders of Reröbö; shortly afterwards Tgk. Kalipah, the principal resistance leader of Penosan, was rendered harmless; and in October action was taken especially against the Penosan band, in which the brother of the late Tgk. Kalipah also lost his life. The column Darlang stayed in the Péndéngvallei, so that Lebé Grondong, a notorious resistance leader, moved with his followers to neighbouring sub-divisions. Total losses of the resistance party that year: 141 killed and nine prisoners; 302 had reported themselves; the number of uitgewekenen still stood at 216.

The monthly report for January 1911 partly confirmed the favourable expectations: “after mutual deliberation 22 uitgewekenen from Penosan reported, surrendering their firearms, among them all the panglimas and members of distinguished families. The submission of the Pasér Reröbö party was delayed because a few followers with a rifle had not yet returned from the Lake District; the situation in Péndéng after the death of Tgk. Moedö is not yet clear, since two panglimas went to the Lake District with the carbines and have not yet returned. In the remaining part of Gajò Loeös submission is being deliberated everywhere; the Gajò ödöt (adat), which grants every interested party a voice in any weighty decision, means that mutual deliberation costs much time. The principal religious leader Tgk. Moedö Koetö Serei too is said to be inclined to submit.”

In February the patrols were likewise successful: “to the Kaniess column all the remaining men in resistance from Pasér and Reröbö reported themselves but one, twenty-five in all; a revolver and a model carbine were surrendered, and the three remaining firearms are being fetched.”

March brought the provisional end for Lebé Grondong: “a brigade under Sergeant Wisse surprised on the 16th the hiding place, between Tampor and Lésten, of Lebé Grondong, formerly the right hand and later the successor of Tgk. Moedö Péndéng. Laid low: Lebé Grondong himself, together with his principal panglima and one follower; booty 1 M. 95 rifle, 1 Mauser repeating rifle and a Beaumont and 1 Mauser self-loading pistol.”

March also brought one of those remarkable setbacks, caused by Si Taib, the instigator of the murder of Rödjö Kemala. The monthly report told: “Rödjö Kemala, who was conducting the deliberations on the submission of those of his clan headship who had gone over to the resistance, was murdered on the first of the month under report at the instigation of his kinsman Si Taib, who had himself joined the resistance.” The population brought Taib in custody to the administration, whereupon twenty-four uitgewekenen of the tjèq lineage came in submission, handing in a Beaumont. But Taib escaped from the transport escort at Lésten — “and that will not have been a feast for that transport escort!” — so that the chiefs of Rékét Goïp who had delivered him up feared reprisal. Taib nevertheless fell into Dutch hands, severely wounded and dying of hunger, and died on the twenty-sixth at Lésten.

In April Swart visited the division, inspected various gampongs and held a great meeting with the blah-heads. The Kaniess column returned to its garrison, its task fulfilled; the monthly report closed with “Rödjö Pasér surrendered an M.95 carbine, Reröbö an M.95 carbine and an M.95 rifle, Tgk. Moedö Rema a breech-loader and Konèng a Beaumont” — “without rifles, no bands!”

In May, under Muurling’s leadership, the Kedjoerön Petiambang and fourteen prominent chiefs visited the fair exhibition at Koeta Radja; the administration was temporarily conducted by lieutenant Snell, who while acting brought in eight more uitgewekenen and four muzzle-loaders. During that fair visit Rödjö Tjoet Pasér with his panglimas and the blah-heads of Pasér and Reröbö solemnly asked the Civil and Military Governor for forgiveness.

In June and July a band under Ama-n-Tampog caused fresh trouble and murdered three penghoeloes, and to crown it, news came in September that Lebé Grondong was not killed. It shortly appeared that this dangerous opponent had made a journey through the actual Gajò Loeö during the hari raja feasts, extorting from the population everywhere, and that he had obtained two precious carbines through the death of the once influential resistance head of Badaq. He let no grass grow: in October he murdered Rödjö Akoeb of Penosan in revenge for the latter’s journey to Koetaradja — but he handed in a panglima, a goeroe and a carbine to the Kompeuni. In October Swart made an inspection to Bireuën and Kr. Seumpo, the latter being reached for the first time by motorcar along the Gajòweg.

So 1911 ended, and 1912 was to bring the final settlement with the still-wandering small bands of any significance. That happened promptly: both Lebé Grondong and Tgk. Moedö Koetö Serei came in submission, so that only Pang Manap with eight followers remained — “and that could hardly be called anything,” as sergeant Weers would say.

Casualty figures

Du Croo closed the chapter with two sets of comparative figures. The army lost in 1908: nineteen killed, 290 wounded of whom nine died; in 1912: two killed, thirty-five wounded of whom three died.

The resistance party lost in 1908: 855 dead, twenty-nine wounded, 184 prisoners, 225 firearms; in 1911: 407 dead, twenty-two wounded, 178 firearms; in 1912: 142 dead, thirteen wounded, seventy-eight firearms.

Significance

The four years 1908–1912 ended armed resistance in Atjeh as a general phenomenon. What followed was, in du Croo’s phrase, the search for “needles in the haystack” — the elimination of individual irreconcilables — and the pacifying administrative work that occupied the second half of Swart’s governorship.

See Also

Source

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter XI, pp. 103–115.

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