Van Daalen’s Gajo-Alas-Batak expedition (1904) was the military campaign led by lieutenant-colonel Van Daalen — later governor and military commander of Atjeh — through the Gajoe-, Alas- and Bataklanden of interior Atjeh in 1904, in the course of which, according to the official figures, 2,922 inlanders — among them 1,149 women and children — were killed “in weinige dagen” — in a few days. The expedition is the bloodiest single episode of the post-Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|Oemar]] phase of the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]] and the political-military climax of the war’s concluding phase.

Origins

After the recovery of Groot-Atjeh following Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|the defection of Toekoe Oemar]] in 1896, the principal resistance leaders did not submit but withdrew to Pedir. They were pursued — first to Pedir, then to the coasts — and finally, in 1904, to the Gajoe- and Alaslanden. The expedition of Van Daalen to the Gajoe-, Alas- and Bataklanden was, formally, intended to begin “bespreking van wederzijdse belangen” — discussion of mutual interests.

The expedition

In practice the expedition became a campaign of annihilation. According to the official figures cited by Vermeulen, 2,922 inlanders — among them 1,149 women and children — were killed “in weinige dagen” — in a few days. The expedition “verstoorde echter reeds zeer spoedig de illusie van de naderende vrede” — shattered very soon the illusion of approaching peace — that Van Kol’s 1902 traverse of Atjeh had encouraged.

Parliamentary reactions

Van Kol (s.d.) declared the expedition “erger dan de dagen van Alva’s schrikbewind” — worse than the days of Alva’s reign of terror. The Catholic De Stuers went further back into history and compared the expedition to the campaigns of Timoer Lenk and Djengis Khan: “Het is of men op de inlanders een bende bloedhonden heeft losgelaten, het is beulenwerk” — it is as if a pack of bloodhounds had been set loose on the natives, it is the work of executioners. De Stuers’ conclusion echoed that of Fransen van de Putte: “Laten wij beschaving brengen, maar niet door middel van bloedbaden! Wat is daarvoor dan nodig? Eén ding. Geduld. Dat nu ontbreekt”.

The Lohman-Rutgers defence

Lohman (c.h.) framed the question as one between “een voortdurende toestand van anarchie” — a perpetual state of anarchy — and “één bloedige oorlog, die ten slotte leidt tot orde, rust en recht” — one bloody war that finally leads to order, rest and right. His verdict: “Wanneer wij door middel van geweld de mensen willen onderwerpen, niet aan onze heerschappij, maar aan het gezag van recht en vrede, dan is dat een geoorloofd doel en dan meen ik, dat dit doel alle middelen heiligt” — when we wish, by means of violence, to subject men, not to our rule, but to the authority of right and peace, then that is a permissible end and then, I hold, this end sanctifies the means.

Rutgers van Rozenburg (lib.) went further, justifying even the cutting-in-two of slain Atjehnese as a means to disarm the prang sabil preaching of the Atjehnese priests. There were, Vermeulen drily notes, “weinig kamerleden die Rutgers van Rozenburg of Lohman in dergelijke theorieën wilden volgen, hoezeer zij ook het betrekkelijke gelijk aan hun zijde hadden” — few chambermembers who wished to follow them in such theories, however much they might have a relative right on their side.

The ministerial defence

Idenburg (a.r.) defended the expedition in the Tweede Kamer. Patience had been tried in Atjeh during the Concentratie-stelsel ([[1884-1896)|concentratie]] period with the result that the resistance had only grown stronger; patience had been tried in Djambi until “absolute anarchie” had set in; patience had been tried for years on Lombok, and the Netherlands had had to pay for it with hundreds of lives. Following the argument of Snouck Hurgronje, Idenburg maintained that Islam forbade the faithful to submit to any authority that had not proven its unshakeable superiority. The women and children who sacrificed themselves had done so under the influence of religious fanaticism: Van Daalen, it was argued, had made the futility of the struggle clear in advance.

The De Stuers-Kolkman incident

De Stuers’ comparison of Van Daalen to Timoer Lenk was so far beyond the bounds of criticism customary for a member of a governing party that he was openly and solemnly gedesavoueerd — disavowed — by his fractieleider Kolkman. At the next begrotingsdebat — after the elections — De Stuers called Kolkman’s statement “het product ener electorale nachtmerrie” — the product of an electoral nightmare. The members of the expedition had, meanwhile, received 148 decorations — including 44 military Willemsorden — for “180 bajonetten” (it was actually about 230), a generosity that De Stuers found “wat overdadig”.

Significance

The 1904 expedition is the military and political hinge of the Atjehnese war. It broke the back of organised Atjehnese resistance; the colonial authority could thereafter begin, in earnest, the pacificatie that would extend over the next four years and culminate in the Van Heutsz report of June 1908. The parliamentary debate it provoked is the moral climax of the Atjehnese-war record.

Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)

Van Daalen’s expedition through the Gajo, Alas and Batak lands — the march for which Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. E. van Daalen, then commanding in the Dependencies of Atjeh, was charged in February 1904 by Governor Johannes van Heutsz — was named by author Joh. Langhout “one of the principal military operations” (“een der voornaamste krijgstochten”) of the Van Heutsz period, and prepared the definitive creation of the department of Gajo- en Alaslanden in 1908.

The commission

“The expedition to the Gajo- and Alas-lands, wherewith Colonel Van Daalen in February 1904 was charged” — thus Langhout announces it, one of the foremost military expeditions that took place under Van Heutsz’s administration. For the military particulars of that march he refers to the book of J. C. J. Kempees: “De tocht van Overste Van Daalen door de Gajo-, Alas- en Bataklanden” (“The march of Colonel Van Daalen through the Gajo-, Alas- and Batak lands”), since his own theme permits only the economic reading of the period (and since the march together with the Pidië expedition framed Van Heutsz’s war-years from 1898 onward).

Consequences for the highlands

The expedition opened the central highlands to Dutch authority: the Gajo and Alas lands, already sketched into the first general map of Atjeh (1901) from data collected by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, received their administration from Van Daalen himself until, in May 1904 — one of Van Heutsz’s last pacification measures — the department of the Dependencies of Atjeh passed from military hands to a civilian assistant-resident. When in 1908 the last piece of the province, the department of the Gajo- and Alaslanden, was definitively created, it was Governor Van Daalen who tried to realize the political unity of the whole province also in the economic sense: the Gajo road from Bireuen to the Laoet Tawar, with the iron bridge at Teupen Blang Manè (1906), the introduction of the potato in the Gajo lands, and the traffic and credit measures of his administration (see G. C. E. van Daalen).

Account from the Maréchaussée Jubileum-nummer (1930)

the 1930 jubilee number of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië calls the expedition “den roemruchtigen tocht naar de Gajoe-Loeös onder bevel van luitenant-kolonel G. C. E. van Daalen” — the far-famed march to the Gajo-Loeös — and counts it among “de schitterendste wapenfeiten” of the Korps Maréchaussée.

Duration and composition

The expedition lasted from February to July 1904. It “bestond aanvankelijk uit 10 brigades Maréchaussées, om allengs te worden uitgebreid tot 14 brigades” — consisted initially of ten brigades of Maréchaussée, to be gradually enlarged to fourteen brigades.

Civil authority in the hands of the division commanders

“Aan de divisiecommandanten werd tevens het civiel bestuur opgedragen” — to the division commanders the civil administration was at the same time entrusted. This applied the general rule laid down when the corps was enlarged in 1899, that commanders of divisions and afdeelingen were, where circumstances required, charged with the administration as civiel-gezaghebber.

Awards and aftermath

The register of honours in the same issue lists a separate group of awards under the heading Gajo- en Alaslanden: the Militaire Willems-Orde 3rd class to Kapt. Mar. W. B. J. A. Scheepens and the 4th class to 1ste Luit. Mar. P. A. H. Holten.

The expedition was followed by a rising, quelled in 1905 by the young officer W. V. Rhemrev, who was mortally dangerously wounded in the action and declared unfit for active service, but continued to serve at the request of Governor-General Van Heutsz and of Colijn.

The jubilee number treated the whole period 18981906 as marked by “bijzonder-opvallende krijgsdaden,” reflected in the royal distinctions conferred during those years.

See Also

Source

Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 271-272.

Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 80–81, 86, 88–90, footnote p. 81.

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930 (“The Corps of Maréchaussée in Atjeh: The Atjehnese Guard”), Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.