The Dutch policy of ‘concentration’ (Dutch concentratiepolitiek) was the military and political strategy adopted by the Netherlands-Indian government in the early 1880s in its war against Acheh, by which the Dutch withdrew their forces behind a fortified line — the so-called linie — enclosing Kuta Raja (Banda Acheh) and abandoned active operations in the interior. The policy, described by C. Snouck Hurgronje in The Achehnese, marked a turning-point in the Achehnese War: it was during the period of “concentration” that the Achehnese ulamas rose to prominence as the real leaders of the resistance.
Origin of the Policy
After the failure of the first Dutch campaigns of 1873–74 and the protracted guerrilla warfare that followed, the Dutch government adopted a defensive posture. Troops were concentrated behind the linie, a continuous line of forts round the captured capital. The Achehnese territory beyond the line was left to itself, and the Dutch confined themselves to maintaining a small perimeter of occupied ground. The Dutch settlements within the line were known as the Gompeuni territory; the Achehnese who lived or traded within it were a constant source of contention among the war-leaders.
The Rise of the Ulamas
It was the policy of concentration, Hurgronje argues, that marked the real beginning of the period of the ulamas. Hitherto they had remained somewhat in the background; henceforward they became the real leaders of the war. Each energetic ulama travelled to and fro in the sphere where he possessed or hoped to acquire influence, proclaiming with renewed vehemence the principles of the holy war. The better to prepare for the great work, ruinous mosques were to be repaired, religious worship held in high esteem, and the transgressions of the people checked. The godless pleasures of the Achehnese must come to an end. They did not indeed require military service of every villager, but all had to hold themselves ready to lend assistance in case of need to the bands of volunteers posted in various places, to assist in the construction of the kutas or forts, and to take complaints before the teungku under whose jurisdiction they were.
The argument of the ulamas ran as follows: finally there can be no success where small bodies of troops act without central organization; there must be leaders to supervise the whole and keep a watch over the faith. The Raja of Acheh is almost a negligible factor. The uleebalangs, the true chiefs of the country, indolently shut themselves up each within his own landmarks, and are incapable of united action. The leaders of the bands of volunteers fall short of the conditions which must be fulfilled by commanders in the holy war. Thus, say the ulamas, it is on us that the duty rests of regulating the conduct of the jihad.
Teungku Tiro and the Concentration Period
Teungku Tiro was par excellence a leader from the time of the “concentration” till the day of his death. He knew as well as anyone that money is the life and soul, even of the holy war, and he pushed on with the utmost zeal the collections of the lui sabi (haqq sabil). During the greater portion of the period of his activity, “the Teungku” declared those Achehnese who lived within the linie or traded there to be little better than unbelievers, and did not raise a hand in protest when his troops robbed them of their property or even of their life. It was only when Teuku Uma convinced him that it was in many respects desirable for the chiefs and notables within the linie to keep in touch with the court — so that the court might draw revenues from the other side of the line and make less frequent demand on the ulamas for financial support — that he at length changed his tactics.
Significance
The Dutch policy of concentration thus produced, by a striking irony, the very thing it was meant to avert: instead of pacifying the country, it gave the Achehnese resistance its enduring religious and political leadership. Until the abandonment of the policy and the adoption of Hurgronje’s own advice — to co-operate with compliant uleebalangs and to undermine the prestige of the ulamas — the war continued with no prospect of Dutch victory.
Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)
The Concentration in Atjeh (1884–1898) was the system — introduced by Governor H. Demmeni upon the resumption of unified military and civil authority after the failed civil government — of giving up much of the occupied territory, withdrawing the army within a redrawn line of posts around Koeta Radja, denying itself interference in the interior, and sealing a great part of the Atjehnese coast against the import of weapons, ammunition and provisions. In author Joh. Langhout’s summary it formed, with the shipping regulation, the hinge of the whole governing period 1884–1898 — an “uiterst geringen voortgang” (“utmost meagre progress”) sealed by the Teukoe Oemar crisis of 1896.
The measure
The “concentration” of Dutch power, carried out by Governor Demmeni, aimed in the first place at yielding a part of the occupied territory by altering the existing postenlinie (line of posts); Dutch meddling with interior affairs would be confined as much as possible, while a strict blockade of a great part of the Atjehnese coast would make impossible the import of weapons, ammunition and means of subsistence. Shortly before the measures took effect, the Governor-General issued a proclamation to the rulers of the Coast Landscapes, setting out to them the occasion of the step. A second consequence of the concentration was that the entire fishing was forbidden and only Oelèë Lheue remained open for trade.
Effects
For the army the “gewijzigde postenlinie” had the unpleasant consequence that the troops — some 5,000 in number — had to be heaped up in a relatively small area, which did the already unfavourable state of health of the troops no good. The line itself ran with Koeta Radja as kernel from the post Koeta Pohama over Lambaroe to the blockhouse Sabang (for the defence of this concentrated position a tram-line was laid along the several posts; see Atjeh Tram). Economically, the inhabitants within the line might still occupy themselves with market-gardening, pepper planting and the like, but the population outside the line soon found itself in a state of unrest which brought the rice culture there almost to its downfall. Thus one kept “afwachten” — awaiting the submission of the rest of Atjeh — while the official reports repeatedly noted that “the enemy showed himself more overbold than had been the case for a considerable time”.
From waiting to action
Until 1888 the waiting lasted. Then the system of abstention was replaced by Governor Van Teijn (in office from the end of 1886) with a more forceful action against the resistance, both in Groot-Atjeh and in the Dependencies; the new administrator, instructed to consolidate the concentration with an eye also to the restoration of the Sultanate under Dutch protectorate, came after a year of patience to the conviction that the subjection of the province could only be enforced. The renewed action visibly diminished the enemy’s resistance; damage to telephone lines, railways and bridges occurred almost no more in 1891, and the work of the enemy principally remained the impeding of Dutch troops in clearing the free tract before the line of posts — while in 1889 a part of the steam-tramway between Lambaroe and Lamreng had to be abandoned temporarily because of repeated damage. To hasten subjection the whole North Coast was closed from August 1890 — a measure that embittered the Dutch-minded traders as a “plagerij” and moved the Government to design the shipping regulation (1892–1897), aimed at touching the chiefs of the coast states in their incomes without hampering the country’s economic development. In 1893 the prohibition of exports to outside the line was lifted; the freer trade tempted the “evil elements” to robbery and murder, against which in turn the movement headed by Teukoe Oemar arose in the IV Moekims — the road to his pardon of 30 September 1893.
End of the system
The line survived the crisis of 29 March 1896 by only months: after J. A. Vetter’s commissionership and the chastisement of Teukoe Oemar, effect was given to the insight “waarbij een onafgebroken machtsontwikkeling buiten de geconcentreerde stelling als gebiedenden eisch werd gesteld” (“whereby an unbroken development of power outside the concentrated position was posited as a commanding requirement”); the era of the concentration, which had not brought the pacification nearer, was closed, the concentrated line serving henceforth only as base-point for three mobile columns, with the shipping regulation applied everywhere. Governor-General Van der Wijck paired the new military system with a vigilant care for the economic interests of land and people: registration of the population of the XXV Moekims (1897), support for the founding of pasars (1898), road- and bridge-building in the XXVI Moekims, the native court under the civil magistrate, and coffee-seed for the oelèèbalangs — so that the Colonial Report over 1898 could call the state of the province favourable.
See Also
- Dutch War in Acheh
- Teungku Tiro
- Teuku Uma
- Sabil Contributions
- Habib Samalanga
- Tapa
- Kuta Raja
- H. Demmeni
- Van Teijn
- Scheepvaartregeling in Atjeh
- Betrayal of Teukoe Oemar (1896)
- Atjeh Tram
- Groot-Atjeh
- Establishment of the Dutch ‘linie’ (pale)
Source
The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.
Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 59–76.