Toekoe Oemar’s defection (1896) was the act by which the Atjehnese war-leader Toekoe Oemar (Teuku Umar) — formerly the principal Atjehnese ally of the Dutch in Groot-Atjeh — turned against his former patrons, unhinged the Concentratie-stelsel ([[1884-1896)|concentratie-stelsel]] of 1884-1896 and ushered in the final, decisive phase of the Atjeh-oorlog ([[1873-1904)|Atjeh-oorlog]]. The defection is the immediate trigger of the Van Heutsz-Van Daalen conquest of Atjeh.
The pre-1896 alliance
Before 1896 Toekoe Oemar was the principal Atjehnese ally of the Dutch in Groot-Atjeh. The concentratie-stelling around Koeta Radja — the “Noordoostpolder”-sized perimeter held since 1884 — was sustained in part by alliances of this kind; the Dutch forces, confined to the perimeter, depended on indigenous auxiliaries to extend their effective reach. The earlier period of co-operation is reflected in the 1893 Submission of Teuku Uma to the Dutch Government and the so-called Uma period of Dutch-Atjehnese relations.
The defection
In 1896 Toekoe Oemar defected, turning his weapons and his influence against his former patrons. The concentratie-stelling around Koeta Radja was thereby unhinged; even the small “Noordoostpolder”-sized area the Dutch had held since 1884 was “niet meer geheel zeker” — no longer wholly secure.
The 1896 parliamentary debate
The crisis of 1896 brought the long-simmering criticism of Atjeh policy to a head in the Tweede Kamer. Fransen van de Putte (u.l.) declared that “naar mijn oordeel zijn wij er niet op aangekleed zulk een land te veroveren” — in my judgement we are not equipped to conquer such a land — and recalled that the Netherlands had sat in Makassar for 150 years without being able to move beyond the city limits. He compared the Atjeh war unfavourably with the government’s patient toleration of de facto self-rule on Celebes.
Van Kol (s.d.) “stelde voor, dat Nederland zich geheel uit Atjeh zou terugtrekken” — proposed that the Netherlands withdraw entirely from Atjeh. With the Sumatra-tractaat ([[1871)|Sumatra-tractaat]] in hand the Netherlands had nothing to fear from England; other powers would readily recognise Dutch claims on Atjeh. The only danger was that, by continuing “onze wrede wijze van oorlogvoeren” — our cruel way of waging war — the Netherlands would give a great power a pretext for intervention.
Kuyper (a.r.) acknowledged that the Netherlands bore guilt for unleashing the war in 1873 but held that this injustice had now prescribed. He summed up the Atjeh policy as a “volledige staalkaart van alle denkbare methoden om Atjeh te bestrijden” — a complete sample-card of every conceivable method of combating Atjeh — and observed sardonically that, by 1896, the government had returned to “het reeds eenmaal beproefde stelsel van Van der Heyden” and that “een negende nieuw stelsel heeft men blijkbaar niet kunnen vinden”.
Cremer (lib.) and Rutgers van Rozenburg (lib.) called for “een drastisch optreden in Atjeh om, ‘deze kanker’ te verwijderen, ook in het belang van onze financiën” — drastic action in Atjeh to remove “this cancer”, also in the interest of our finances.
The post-1896 recovery
The post-1896 campaigns of Van Heutsz — the Van der Heyden-Van Heutsz system of pursuit into the remotest hiding-places — restored Groot-Atjeh outside the perimeter. The resistance chiefs withdrew, first to Pedir, and were pursued: first to Pedir, then to the coasts, and finally — in 1904 — to the Gajoe- and Alaslanden. The Cremer footnote in Vermeulen observes that what complicated the recovery was the fear of the population that the Dutch troops would again withdraw, and that it would then be at the mercy of a figure like Toekoe Oemar. Once the population was given confidence that the Dutch would not leave again, “hadden wij het spel half gewonnen”.
Significance
Toekoe Oemar’s defection ([[1896)|The 1896 defection]] is the political-military hinge of the Atjehnese war. The post-1896 policy of Van Heutsz — the recovery of Groot-Atjeh, the pursuit of the resistance chiefs to Pedir and thence to the Gajoe- and Alaslanden — is the direct consequence of the collapse of the pre-1896 alliance system that Oemar’s defection revealed.
See Also
- Toekoe Oemar
- Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904)
- Concentratie-stelsel (1884-1896)
- J. B. van Heutsz
- Van der Heyden
- G. C. E. van Daalen
- I. D. Fransen van de Putte
- H. B. van Kol
- Abraham Kuyper
- J. T. Cremer
- Rutgers van Rozenburg
- Groot-Atjeh
- Koeta Radja
- Pedirse
- Gajoland
- Alasland
- 1896
- 1904
Source
Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901, by Mr W. J. van Welderen baron Rengers, 4th rev. ed., Vol. IV: Oost-Indië 1891-1918 by Dr W. H. Vermeulen (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 269-270.