The F-beweging — literally the “F. movement” — was the Atjehnese fifth-column organisation established by the Japanese intelligence officer Fujiwara in Malakka after the fall of Penang of 19 December 19 December 1941, and activated in Atjeh from the night of 19–20 February 20 February 1942 as the principal organised vehicle of the pre-invasion Atjehnese rising against Dutch rule. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the F-beweging is the proximate cause of the Dutch operational disarray of February–March 1942: the body whose sabotage of the Atjehse staatsspoorwegen and the Kotaradja–Medan verbindingsweg drew Dutch troops away from the coast on the eve of the Japanese invasion of 12 March 1942, and whose members, wearing the distinctive witte band met rode letter F, served as guides and auxiliaries to the Japanese landings.
Identification of “F.”
The staff history records that the Dutch command at Kotaradja at first did not understand the significance of the letter F. “Aanvankelijk meende men, dat de afkorting was van Fadjar, dat dageraad betekent.” The correct identification came only after the arrest and interrogation of a Menadonese soldier at Kotaradja — a soldier who “zich meermalen op kleinerende wijze over de Nederlanders uitgelaten en zijn bewondering voor de Japanners niet onder stoelen en banken gestoken.” Under sharp interrogation the soldier confessed “dat hij door een aantal Atjehers te zijn overgehaald toe te treden tot een wijdvertakte z.g. F. beweging.” “Later werd bekend, dat dit een afkorting was van Fujiwara, een Japanner, die in Malakka een georganiseerde colonne had uit aldaar aanwezige Indonesiërs. Reeds na de val van Penang (19 December 1941) maakte Fujiwara met de opbouw van deze organisatie een aanvang.”
The entry thus identifies the Atjeh F-beweging as a branch of the wider Fujiwara-kikan — the Japanese intelligence network that, under Fujiwara and later Masubuchi, would re-emerge in 1945 as the Masubuchi-kikan. The Piekaar account (see F-organisatie) treats the F-beweging as the popular Atjeh face of the same organisation.
The witte band met rode letter F
The membership insignia of the F-beweging is described in detail by the staff history. Members wore “een witte band om de linker bovenarm met daarin de letter F.” The insignia was visible at the murder of Von Sperling on the morning of 24 February 24 February 1942 — most of the 60-strong bende that killed Von Sperling at the sabotaged bridge 25 km south of Kotaradja wore the white band. The band’s purpose, as the Menadonese soldier confessed, was that “alle tot deze beweging toegetredenen zouden door de Japanners als hun vrienden en medewerkers worden beschouwd en het insigne (witte band met rode letter F.) zou bij hun komst op zichtbare wijze worden gedragen.”
The two actie-perioden
The staff history distinguishes two actie-perioden of the F-beweging in Atjeh, with a tijdvak van betrekkelijke rust between them:
- Eerste actie-periode (night of 19–20 February 20 February 1942 to ~24 February 24 February): culminating in the murder of controleur J. C. Tiggelman and the killing of Von Sperling. The sabotage was concentrated in the sagi der XXII moekims around Seulimeum — the district whose sagihoofd was the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem. The period was closed by the dispatch of Palmer van den Broek’s ten-brigade Maréchaussee column from Lawe Sigalagala to Seulimeum and the dag en nacht patrouilling that ensued.
- Tweede sabotage-golf (night of 7–8 March 8 March 1942 to 12 March 12 March 1942): the Lho’Nga school was burned, the Chinese wijkmeester of Seulimeum was murdered, and sabotage along the Kotaradja–Seulimeum road could not be contained “niettegenstaande de aanwezigheid van 4 compagnieën in dit gebied.” The second wave ran directly into the Japanese invasion of 12 March 1942.
Operational effects
The F-beweging’s principal operational effects on the Dutch defence, as enumerated by the staff history, were:
- The draw-down of Dutch troops from the central-Atjeh guerrilla reserve to suppress the Seulimeumse — the operational decision that hollowed out the Palmer van den Broek’s central-Atjeh guerrilla on the eve of the Japanese landings.
- The sabotage of the Atjehse staatsspoorwegen and of the Kotaradja–Medan verbindingsweg, which cut the Dutch telefoon- en telegraafverbindingen at the moment of the Japanese landings.
- The arrest of the eight foremost Atjeh chiefs on 11 March 11 March 1942 — Colonel Gosenson’s impulsieve daad — which the staff history treats as having worsened rather than calmed the rising.
- The direct aid given to the Japanese advance by Atjehnese guides, who led the Japanese along “niet op de kaart staande bevolkingspaden” to outflank Dutch stellingen.
- The systematic verraad of Dutch stellingen and convoys to the Japanese, especially at Lam No, Blang Pidië, and the Bireuën–Takengon road.
Significance
The F-beweging is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the decisive operational factor of the campaign — the body whose pre-invasion rising transformed the Japanese landings of 12 March 12 March from a contested invasion into a near-unopposed occupation. The staff history’s emphasis on the Dutch command’s initial incomprehension of the letter F, on the two-month gap between the fall of Penang and the activation of the Atjeh F-beweging, and on the wijdvertakte character of the movement, frames the F-beweging as a successfully concealed Japanese intelligence operation whose exposure came too late for the Dutch defence to adjust. The movement is the Atjeh face of the wider Fujiwara–Masubuchi organisation that would govern the residency through the Jappentijd.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- F-organisatie
- Masubuchi-kikan
- Fujiwara (Japanese intelligence officer)
- Fall of Penang
- murder of Tiggelman at Seulimeum
- murder of Von Sperling
- arrest of the eight Atjeh chiefs
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- Poesa
- Atjehsche Staatsspoorwegen
- Panglima Polem
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 124–131.