W. F. Palmer van den Broek was a major of the Netherlands Indies Army who commanded the Korps Maréchaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen in Atjeh from July 1941 and, in that capacity, became the senior Dutch field commander of the central-Atjeh guerrilla during the Japanese invasion of March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account of the Atjeh campaign (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Palmer van den Broek is the most-cited Dutch field commander: the officer to whom Colonel Gosenson successively entrusted the suppression of the Seulimeumse sabotage, the command of the oorlogsdetachement Sabang, and the leadership of the central-Atjeh guerrilla in the Tangse–Geumpang–Takengon–Blangkedjeren theatre.
Command of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon and transfer to the Maréchaussee
Before his appointment to the Maréchaussee, Palmer van den Broek had commanded the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Kotaradja. In July 1941 he was appointed commander of the Korps Maréchaussee, succeeding in that post the officer under whom the Korps had been reorganised through the 1940–1941 reductions. He handed the 2de Garnizoensbataljon to Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers, “die tevoren nimmer eerder in Atjeh gediend” — a transfer the staff history implicitly faults for the loss of Atjeh-experience at the top of the Kotaradja garrison.
Command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang (December 1941 – February 1942)
On 17 December 1941, with the outbreak of war with Japan, Palmer van den Broek was sent to Sabang to take command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang, formed by combining the two Sabang brigades already there with a full infantry company sent from Kotaradja and a second company, all “ruime mate voorzien van automatische vuurwapens.” He remained in command at Sabang through the heaviest Japanese air raids of January–February 1942.
In mid-February 1942 the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved under the revised operational plan agreed with General Overakker, and Palmer van den Broek was summoned to the Territoriaal Commandant’s post at Takengon for consultations. The new plan placed him in command of the central-Atjeh guerrilla: with about twenty reorganised Maréchaussee brigades at Lawe Sigalagala, Kotatjane and Blangkedjeren, he was to attack the Japanese in the flank and rear once they had penetrated the Brastagi–Kabandjahe highlands. On 23 February 1942 this plan was modified in favour of immediate dispatch to Kotaradja to suppress the Seulimeumse rising.
Suppression of the Seulimeumse (February 1942)
On arrival at Kotaradja, Palmer van den Broek was ordered by Gosenson “orde en rust in de XXII moekims te herstellen en in dit gebied het verrichten van sabotagedaden tegen te gaan, de sedert het plegen van de sabotagedaden gevluchte hoofden op te sporen (o.a. de oudste zoon van de overleden Panglima Polem), het bestuur van de XXII moekims op zich te nemen.” The staff history credits him with restoring an outward calm within days: “door dag en nacht te patrouilleren en hinderlagen te leggen slaagde majoor Palmer van den Broek er binnen enkele dagen in, verbetering in de toestand te brengen.” The gevluchte hoofden — including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem — remained untraceable. The staff history observes drily that the restored calm “was slechts een schijnsucces”: “bepaalde verzetskernen waren nergens ontmoet en geen der gevluchte hoofden had men in handen kunnen krijgen.”
The March 1942 central-Atjeh guerrilla and capitulation at Takengon
After the 12 March 1942 Japanese landings at Kotaradja, Sabang, Ujong Batëë, Kuala Bughah and Tandjong Tiram, Palmer van den Broek commanded the 3de hoofdgroep in the Bireuën–Koeala Simpang–Blangkedjeren–Takengon theatre. His instructions were to fight a delaying action along the Bireuën–Takengon road through three successive stellingen, manned by brigades of the IIIde and Vde divisie Maréchaussee: the first under Lt van Pesch about 10 km south of Bireuën, the second under Captain Wetzels, the third under Captain Boucherie.
On 19 March 1942, with the Japanese within 30 km of Takengon, Palmer van den Broek judged further resistance useless and “besloot te capituleren, na alle transportmiddelen te hebben vernield.” He issued written orders — in both Dutch and Malay — that all Dutch and indigenous soldiers still at large must surrender; any soldier arrested in uniform carrying arms would be treated as a franc-tireur and shot without trial. The order was distributed from the internee camp at Takengon. With this capitulation, the central-Atjeh theatre was effectively closed. The staff history’s Nabeschouwing singles out Palmer van den Broek for having “de troep weten te inspireren” and for having “getrouwen om zich heen verzameld” to continue the hopeless struggle — a rare note of praise.
Significance
Palmer van den Broek is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the figure who carries the operational weight of the Dutch defence. He is the officer dispatched successively to Sabang, to Seulimeum and to central Atjeh, and at each post he is presented as competent and energetic; the failure of his guerrilla is attributed not to his command but to the demoralisation of the indigenous soldaten, the desertion of the inheemse militairen, and the hostility of the Atjehnese population. His 19 March 1942 capitulation order at Takengon is the formal Dutch act that closed the central-Atjeh campaign.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Lt W. van Pesch
- Captain F. Wetzels
- Captain L. A. Boucherie
- Lt J. F. Westerweel
- Captain F. J. van Nues
- Lt A. van der Waag
- Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
- Seulimeum-colonne
- F-beweging
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.
W. F. Palmer van den Broek was a major of the Netherlands Indies Army who commanded the Korps Maréchaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen in Atjeh from July 1941 and, in that capacity, became the senior Dutch field commander of the central-Atjeh guerrilla during the Japanese invasion of March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account of the Atjeh campaign (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Palmer van den Broek is the most-cited Dutch field commander: the officer to whom Colonel Gosenson successively entrusted the suppression of the Seulimeumse sabotage, the command of the oorlogsdetachement Sabang, and the leadership of the central-Atjeh guerrilla in the Tangse–Geumpang–Takengon–Blangkedjeren theatre.
Command of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon and transfer to the Maréchaussee
Before his appointment to the Maréchaussee, Palmer van den Broek had commanded the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Kotaradja. In July 1941 he was appointed commander of the Korps Maréchaussee, succeeding in that post the officer under whom the Korps had been reorganised through the 1940–1941 reductions. He handed the 2de Garnizoensbataljon to Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers, “die tevoren nimmer eerder in Atjeh gediend” — a transfer the staff history implicitly faults for the loss of Atjeh-experience at the top of the Kotaradja garrison.
Command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang (December 1941 – February 1942)
On 17 December 1941, with the outbreak of war with Japan, Palmer van den Broek was sent to Sabang to take command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang, formed by combining the two Sabang brigades already there with a full infantry company sent from Kotaradja and a second company, all “ruime mate voorzien van automatische vuurwapens.” He remained in command at Sabang through the heaviest Japanese air raids of January–February 1942.
In mid-February 1942 the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved under the revised operational plan agreed with General Overakker, and Palmer van den Broek was summoned to the Territoriaal Commandant’s post at Takengon for consultations. The new plan placed him in command of the central-Atjeh guerrilla: with about twenty reorganised Maréchaussee brigades at Lawe Sigalagala, Kotatjane and Blangkedjeren, he was to attack the Japanese in the flank and rear once they had penetrated the Brastagi–Kabandjahe highlands. On 23 February 1942 this plan was modified in favour of immediate dispatch to Kotaradja to suppress the Seulimeumse rising.
Suppression of the Seulimeumse (February 1942)
On arrival at Kotaradja, Palmer van den Broek was ordered by Gosenson “orde en rust in de XXII moekims te herstellen en in dit gebied het verrichten van sabotagedaden tegen te gaan, de sedert het plegen van de sabotagedaden gevluchte hoofden op te sporen (o.a. de oudste zoon van de overleden Panglima Polem), het bestuur van de XXII moekims op zich te nemen.” The staff history credits him with restoring an outward calm within days: “door dag en nacht te patrouilleren en hinderlagen te leggen slaagde majoor Palmer van den Broek er binnen enkele dagen in, verbetering in de toestand te brengen.” The gevluchte hoofden — including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem — remained untraceable. The staff history observes drily that the restored calm “was slechts een schijnsucces”: “bepaalde verzetskernen waren nergens ontmoet en geen der gevluchte hoofden had men in handen kunnen krijgen.”
The March 1942 central-Atjeh guerrilla and capitulation at Takengon
After the 12 March 1942 Japanese landings at Kotaradja, Sabang, Ujong Batëë, Kuala Bughah and Tandjong Tiram, Palmer van den Broek commanded the 3de hoofdgroep in the Bireuën–Koeala Simpang–Blangkedjeren–Takengon theatre. His instructions were to fight a delaying action along the Bireuën–Takengon road through three successive stellingen, manned by brigades of the IIIde and Vde divisie Maréchaussee: the first under Lt van Pesch about 10 km south of Bireuën, the second under Captain Wetzels, the third under Captain Boucherie.
On 19 March 1942, with the Japanese within 30 km of Takengon, Palmer van den Broek judged further resistance useless and “besloot te capituleren, na alle transportmiddelen te hebben vernield.” He issued written orders — in both Dutch and Malay — that all Dutch and indigenous soldiers still at large must surrender; any soldier arrested in uniform carrying arms would be treated as a franc-tireur and shot without trial. The order was distributed from the internee camp at Takengon. With this capitulation, the central-Atjeh theatre was effectively closed. The staff history’s Nabeschouwing singles out Palmer van den Broek for having “de troep weten te inspireren” and for having “getrouwen om zich heen verzameld” to continue the hopeless struggle — a rare note of praise.
Significance
Palmer van den Broek is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the figure who carries the operational weight of the Dutch defence. He is the officer dispatched successively to Sabang, to Seulimeum and to central Atjeh, and at each post he is presented as competent and energetic; the failure of his guerrilla is attributed not to his command but to the demoralisation of the indigenous soldaten, the desertion of the inheemse militairen, and the hostility of the Atjehnese population. His 19 March 1942 capitulation order at Takengon is the formal Dutch act that closed the central-Atjeh campaign.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Lt W. van Pesch
- Captain F. Wetzels
- Captain L. A. Boucherie
- Lt J. F. Westerweel
- Captain F. J. van Nues
- Lt A. van der Waag
- Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
- Seulimeum-colonne
- F-beweging
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.