The Seulimeum-colonne was a Dutch column formed under Major Palmer van den Broek in late February 1942 — composed of ten brigades of the Korps Maréchaussee drawn from the IVde divisie and the central-Atjeh reserve at Lawe Sigalagala — for the suppression of the F. beweging sabotage wave in the sagi der XXII moekims around Seulimeum. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Seulimeum-colonne is the operational instrument by which Colonel Gosenson sought to suppress the pre-invasion Atjehnese rising — and the operational decision that hollowed out the central-Atjeh guerrilla on the eve of the Japanese landings of 12 March 1942.
Formation (23 February 1942)
On 23 February 23 February 1942 — the day after the Tiggelman murder and the day before the Von Sperling murder — Colonel Gosenson returned from his command post at Takengon to Kotaradja and ordered:
- That several Maréchaussee brigades of the nearest IVde divisie be sent immediately to Seulimeum under an officer.
- That 10 Maréchaussee brigades under Major Palmer van den Broek be directed to the same area as soon as possible.
The latter ten brigades — drawn from the central-Atjeh reserve at Lawe Sigalagala and Kotatjane — formed the Seulimeum-colonne. Palmer van den Broek was given operational orders: to restore order and tranquillity in the XXII moekims and to prevent further sabotage in that area; to track down the chiefs who had fled since the sabotage began (including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem); and to assume the administration of the XXII moekims.
Operations (24 February – 8 March 1942)
By patrolling day and night and laying ambushes, Major Palmer van den Broek succeeded within a few days in bringing about an improvement in the situation and in preventing further sabotage, whereupon the second phase — that is, a period of relative calm — began. The chiefs who had fled — including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem — remained untraceable. The staff history observes drily that the restored calm was merely an apparent success: no resistance cells had been encountered anywhere, and none of the chiefs who had fled had been captured. It had, however, become clear that the F. beweging was planning a second wave of activity. The role of the Poesa remained unclear. The involvement of the local leaders in Seulimeum was certain, as was the involvement of prominent indigenous persons who, like a number of chiefs, had “disappeared.”
The Seulimeum-colonne’s operations closed the first action period of the F-beweging and opened the period of relative calm that would be broken by the second sabotage wave of 7–8 March 8 March 1942. On 8 March 8 March 1942 the colonne reported that the Lho’Nga school had been burned and the Chinese ward master of Seulimeum murdered; in the area between Kotaradja and Seulimeum, which was under strict military control, the sabotage could not be brought under control. The colonne’s operations thus failed to suppress the F-beweging despite the day-and-night patrolling.
Operational consequences
The Seulimeum-colonne’s ten brigades — drawn from the central-Atjeh guerrilla reserve — were not available for the central-Atjeh guerrilla after the Japanese landings of 12 March 12 March. The staff history’s emphasis on the colonne’s failure — no resistance cells had been encountered anywhere — frames the deployment as a strategic error: the Dutch command committed its central-Atjeh reserve to the suppression of a rising it could not suppress, and thereby deprived itself of the reserve it would need for the guerrilla it had planned.
Significance
The Seulimeum-colonne is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the operational instrument of the Dutch response to the F-beweging rising — and the operational decision that hollowed out the central-Atjeh guerrilla. The staff history’s emphasis on the colonne’s apparent success — outward calm without the actual suppression of the resistance cells — frames the deployment as the structural cause of the Dutch inability to mount a sustained central-Atjeh guerrilla after the Japanese landings. The colonne is also the staff history’s principal instance of the operational paradox of the pre-invasion period: the more troops the Dutch committed to the suppression of the F-beweging, the fewer troops they had available for the guerrilla they had planned.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- IVde Divisie Marechaussee
- F-beweging
- murder of Tiggelman at Seulimeum
- murder of Von Sperling
- Panglima Polem
- Poesa
- Seulimeum
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 122–128.
The Seulimeum-colonne was a Dutch column formed under Major Palmer van den Broek in late February 1942 — composed of ten brigades of the Korps Maréchaussee drawn from the IVde divisie and the central-Atjeh reserve at Lawe Sigalagala — for the suppression of the F. beweging sabotage wave in the sagi der XXII moekims around Seulimeum. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Seulimeum-colonne is the operational instrument by which Colonel Gosenson sought to suppress the pre-invasion Atjehnese rising — and the operational decision that hollowed out the central-Atjeh guerrilla on the eve of the Japanese landings of 12 March 1942.
Formation (23 February 1942)
On 23 February 23 February 1942 — the day after the Tiggelman murder and the day before the Von Sperling murder — Colonel Gosenson returned from his command post at Takengon to Kotaradja and ordered:
- That several Maréchaussee brigades of the nearest IVde divisie be sent immediately to Seulimeum under an officer.
- That 10 Maréchaussee brigades under Major Palmer van den Broek be directed to the same area as soon as possible.
The latter ten brigades — drawn from the central-Atjeh reserve at Lawe Sigalagala and Kotatjane — formed the Seulimeum-colonne. Palmer van den Broek was given operational orders: to restore order and tranquillity in the XXII moekims and to prevent further sabotage in that area; to track down the chiefs who had fled since the sabotage began (including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem); and to assume the administration of the XXII moekims.
Operations (24 February – 8 March 1942)
By patrolling day and night and laying ambushes, Major Palmer van den Broek succeeded within a few days in bringing about an improvement in the situation and in preventing further sabotage, whereupon the second phase — that is, a period of relative calm — began. The chiefs who had fled — including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem — remained untraceable. The staff history observes drily that the restored calm was merely an apparent success: no resistance cells had been encountered anywhere, and none of the chiefs who had fled had been captured. It had, however, become clear that the F. beweging was planning a second wave of activity. The role of the Poesa remained unclear. The involvement of the local leaders in Seulimeum was certain, as was the involvement of prominent indigenous persons who, like a number of chiefs, had “disappeared.”
The Seulimeum-colonne’s operations closed the first action period of the F-beweging and opened the period of relative calm that would be broken by the second sabotage wave of 7–8 March 8 March 1942. On 8 March 8 March 1942 the colonne reported that the Lho’Nga school had been burned and the Chinese ward master of Seulimeum murdered; in the area between Kotaradja and Seulimeum, which was under strict military control, the sabotage could not be brought under control. The colonne’s operations thus failed to suppress the F-beweging despite the day-and-night patrolling.
Operational consequences
The Seulimeum-colonne’s ten brigades — drawn from the central-Atjeh guerrilla reserve — were not available for the central-Atjeh guerrilla after the Japanese landings of 12 March 12 March. The staff history’s emphasis on the colonne’s failure — no resistance cells had been encountered anywhere — frames the deployment as a strategic error: the Dutch command committed its central-Atjeh reserve to the suppression of a rising it could not suppress, and thereby deprived itself of the reserve it would need for the guerrilla it had planned.
Significance
The Seulimeum-colonne is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the operational instrument of the Dutch response to the F-beweging rising — and the operational decision that hollowed out the central-Atjeh guerrilla. The staff history’s emphasis on the colonne’s apparent success — outward calm without the actual suppression of the resistance cells — frames the deployment as the structural cause of the Dutch inability to mount a sustained central-Atjeh guerrilla after the Japanese landings. The colonne is also the staff history’s principal instance of the operational paradox of the pre-invasion period: the more troops the Dutch committed to the suppression of the F-beweging, the fewer troops they had available for the guerrilla they had planned.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- IVde Divisie Marechaussee
- F-beweging
- murder of Tiggelman at Seulimeum
- murder of Von Sperling
- Panglima Polem
- Poesa
- Seulimeum
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 122–128.