L. P. E. Kloprogge was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army — and a younger brother of Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge of the Westkust Maréchaussee — who commanded the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang in mid-February 1942 after the detachment’s first commander, Major Palmer van den Broek, was recalled to Kotaradja, and who subsequently conducted the Dutch rearguard retreat from Kotaradja through Seulimeum to Tangse in the 2de hoofdgroep of the northern Atjeh campaign. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the younger Kloprogge is the principal eyewitness of the failure to demolish the Sabang oil and aviation-fuel stocks — a failure the staff history treats as a major strategic loss to the Japanese.
Command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
When, in mid-February 1942, the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved as a separate formation and its bulk was moved to Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers (with two brigades left behind at Sabang for police duties), the younger Kloprogge — a brother of the previously mentioned Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge — was appointed to command the Sabang detachment. He had been severely weakened by malaria and was hospitalised at Kotaradja when the order to dissolve the Sabang formation arrived; he returned to Sabang only just in time to take command.
The staff history singles out for criticism the explicit prohibition of the Territoriaal Commandant, given to Kloprogge before his departure from Sabang, against any demolition of the Sabang oil, gasoline and airfield installations. The compilers observe that, owing to insufficient time for demolition, large quantities of oil and aviation fuel, together with an undamaged airfield, later fell into enemy hands — a strategic loss for which the prohibition was responsible.
The 12 March 1942 retreat and the Seulimeum trains
By the early morning of 12 March 12 March 1942 — by which time he was virtually recovered — Kloprogge learned at Kotaradja of the Japanese landings to the east. He was the last senior officer to leave Kotaradja: he learned that at 07.00 the last troops left the city in the direction of Seulimeum, and that the train carrying the last women and children to Medan was scheduled to depart at 06.30. He decided to ride that train himself to Seulimeum. As the senior officer aboard, he took charge of the transport regulation; the train was delayed by the great influx of refugees, by the need to shunt wagons, and by the absence of trained railway personnel — a city watchman, a former engine driver, was finally induced to drive the train. The train was fired on en route by armed Atjehnese, and a steam roller had to be cleared from the tracks.
At Seulimeum, reached around noon, Kloprogge found only the battalion adjutant — the rest of the staff had already moved on to Sigli and Tangse. On the battalion adjutant’s request, he took command of the four brigades left behind at Seulimeum, with the task of sealing the Kotaradja–Seulimeum road until an extra locomotive from Sigli could arrive, and of marching from there to a provisions depot about 16 km south of Seulimeum — supplies intended for future guerrilla actions.
The march to Tangse and the capitulation
Between 13 and 18 March 18 March the younger Kloprogge moved the provisions forward to the appointed place. On 19 March 19 March he marched with the remainder toward Tangse, where he met three Atjehnese — among them a trusted agent of the head of Tangse — who reported that Tangse and Geumpang were already in Japanese hands and that all Dutch troops there had surrendered. He then resolved to lead his volunteers (about 30 men, the original strength having been about 70) along an elephant track around Geumpang toward Takengon to join Colonel Gosenson. The march was estimated at eight days.
In the evening of the same day, more Atjehnese arrived — including another trusted agent of the head of Tangse — who urged him to give up. The head of Tangse sent a written confirmation that Tangse and Geumpang were in Japanese hands. With the completely hostile disposition of the greater part of the population weighing on him, Kloprogge decided to surrender his reduced force. The staff history notes that he was one of the last Dutch field officers in the noordkust theatre to capitulate, the surrender of his brother on the Westkust coming ten days later at Lae Boetar.
Significance
The younger Kloprogge is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal witness to two costly Dutch errors of the campaign: the Territoriaal Commandant’s prohibition on the demolition of the Sabang oil and airfield installations, and the breakdown of the railway evacuation from Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March. His independent decision to surrender his Geumpang-area detachment — taken on the written authority of the head of Tangse — closes the noordkust theatre’s western flank.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Atjehsche Staatsspoorwegen
- Seulimeum-colonne
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.
L. P. E. Kloprogge was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army — and a younger brother of Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge of the Westkust Maréchaussee — who commanded the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang in mid-February 1942 after the detachment’s first commander, Major Palmer van den Broek, was recalled to Kotaradja, and who subsequently conducted the Dutch rearguard retreat from Kotaradja through Seulimeum to Tangse in the 2de hoofdgroep of the northern Atjeh campaign. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the younger Kloprogge is the principal eyewitness of the failure to demolish the Sabang oil and aviation-fuel stocks — a failure the staff history treats as a major strategic loss to the Japanese.
Command of the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
When, in mid-February 1942, the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved as a separate formation and its bulk was moved to Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers (with two brigades left behind at Sabang for police duties), the younger Kloprogge — a brother of the previously mentioned Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge — was appointed to command the Sabang detachment. He had been severely weakened by malaria and was hospitalised at Kotaradja when the order to dissolve the Sabang formation arrived; he returned to Sabang only just in time to take command.
The staff history singles out for criticism the explicit prohibition of the Territoriaal Commandant, given to Kloprogge before his departure from Sabang, against any demolition of the Sabang oil, gasoline and airfield installations. The compilers observe that, owing to insufficient time for demolition, large quantities of oil and aviation fuel, together with an undamaged airfield, later fell into enemy hands — a strategic loss for which the prohibition was responsible.
The 12 March 1942 retreat and the Seulimeum trains
By the early morning of 12 March 12 March 1942 — by which time he was virtually recovered — Kloprogge learned at Kotaradja of the Japanese landings to the east. He was the last senior officer to leave Kotaradja: he learned that at 07.00 the last troops left the city in the direction of Seulimeum, and that the train carrying the last women and children to Medan was scheduled to depart at 06.30. He decided to ride that train himself to Seulimeum. As the senior officer aboard, he took charge of the transport regulation; the train was delayed by the great influx of refugees, by the need to shunt wagons, and by the absence of trained railway personnel — a city watchman, a former engine driver, was finally induced to drive the train. The train was fired on en route by armed Atjehnese, and a steam roller had to be cleared from the tracks.
At Seulimeum, reached around noon, Kloprogge found only the battalion adjutant — the rest of the staff had already moved on to Sigli and Tangse. On the battalion adjutant’s request, he took command of the four brigades left behind at Seulimeum, with the task of sealing the Kotaradja–Seulimeum road until an extra locomotive from Sigli could arrive, and of marching from there to a provisions depot about 16 km south of Seulimeum — supplies intended for future guerrilla actions.
The march to Tangse and the capitulation
Between 13 and 18 March 18 March the younger Kloprogge moved the provisions forward to the appointed place. On 19 March 19 March he marched with the remainder toward Tangse, where he met three Atjehnese — among them a trusted agent of the head of Tangse — who reported that Tangse and Geumpang were already in Japanese hands and that all Dutch troops there had surrendered. He then resolved to lead his volunteers (about 30 men, the original strength having been about 70) along an elephant track around Geumpang toward Takengon to join Colonel Gosenson. The march was estimated at eight days.
In the evening of the same day, more Atjehnese arrived — including another trusted agent of the head of Tangse — who urged him to give up. The head of Tangse sent a written confirmation that Tangse and Geumpang were in Japanese hands. With the completely hostile disposition of the greater part of the population weighing on him, Kloprogge decided to surrender his reduced force. The staff history notes that he was one of the last Dutch field officers in the noordkust theatre to capitulate, the surrender of his brother on the Westkust coming ten days later at Lae Boetar.
Significance
The younger Kloprogge is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal witness to two costly Dutch errors of the campaign: the Territoriaal Commandant’s prohibition on the demolition of the Sabang oil and airfield installations, and the breakdown of the railway evacuation from Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March. His independent decision to surrender his Geumpang-area detachment — taken on the written authority of the head of Tangse — closes the noordkust theatre’s western flank.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Oorlogsdetachement Sabang
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Atjehsche Staatsspoorwegen
- Seulimeum-colonne
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.