The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was a Dutch war detachment formed at the island of Sabang off the north coast of Atjeh in December 1941 — composed of two full infantry companies, heavily reinforced with automatic weapons, drawn from the 2de Garnizoensbataljon and additional Kotaradja troops — that was charged with the defence of the Sabang ocean harbour and airfield against the anticipated Japanese attack. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang is the only Dutch formation of Atjeh to be specifically designated for war service rather than for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, and its successive commanders — Major Palmer van den Broek (December 1941 – mid-February 1942) and Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge (mid-February 1942 – dissolution) — are the only Atjeh officers to have explicitly received orders concerning the demolition of the Sabang oil and aviation-fuel installations.

Formation (December 1941)

On 8 December 8 December 1941, with the outbreak of war with Japan, all Atjeh militia and landstorm conscripts (~140 men) were called up at Kotaradja, with the Sabang contingent (~20 men) called up locally. On 17 December 17 December 1941 the Territoriale Staf was moved from Kotaradja to Kabandjahe, and on the same day, on the orders of the Army Command, one full company of infantry was directed from Kotaradja to Sabang. The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was placed under the command of Major Palmer van den Broek, commander of the Korps Maréchaussee, who had been sent to Sabang for the purpose.

The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was now composed of:

  • 2 full infantry companies, amply provided with automatic weapons (machine-gunners were simultaneously flown in from Java).
  • The 2 brigades of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon already stationed at Sabang for police duties.

In February 1942, with the revision of the operational plan agreed with General Overakker, the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved. Its bulk (two companies) was moved to Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers, with two brigades left behind at Sabang for police duties. The Sabang city guard was disbanded. The two companies at Kotaradja were used to reinforce the 2de Garnizoensbataljon for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Kotaradja area as the F. beweging sabotage wave intensified.

The Sabang demolition prohibition

Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge, who took command of the residual Sabang detachment on the dissolution of the Oorlogsdetachement, received, before his departure from Sabang, the explicit prohibition of the Territoriaal Commandant against demolishing anything at all. The staff history treats this prohibition as a costly strategic error: as a result, large quantities of oil and aviation fuel, together with an undamaged airfield, later fell into enemy hands. The compilers attribute the prohibition to insufficient time for demolition — that is, to the Territoriaal Commandant’s judgement that any demolition attempt would be incomplete and would risk leaving the installations in a worse state than non-demolition.

The failure to demolish the Sabang installations is the staff history’s principal strategic loss of the pre-invasion period, and the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang’s principal legacy in the staff history’s narrative.

Significance

The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the only Dutch formation of Atjeh specifically designated for war service rather than for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, and the only formation whose commanders received explicit demolition orders. The detachment’s dissolution in February 1942 — and the subsequent failure to demolish the Sabang installations — is presented by the staff history as the principal strategic error of the pre-invasion period, and the principal material gain to the Japanese of the early phase of the invasion. The detachment’s two companies, moved to Kotaradja under Bekkers, would form the bulk of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon’s Kotaradja strength at the time of the Japanese landings.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 121–123, 140–141.

The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was a Dutch war detachment formed at the island of Sabang off the north coast of Atjeh in December 1941 — composed of two full infantry companies, heavily reinforced with automatic weapons, drawn from the 2de Garnizoensbataljon and additional Kotaradja troops — that was charged with the defence of the Sabang ocean harbour and airfield against the anticipated Japanese attack. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang is the only Dutch formation of Atjeh to be specifically designated for war service rather than for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, and its successive commanders — Major Palmer van den Broek (December 1941 – mid-February 1942) and Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge (mid-February 1942 – dissolution) — are the only Atjeh officers to have explicitly received orders concerning the demolition of the Sabang oil and aviation-fuel installations.

Formation (December 1941)

On 8 December 8 December 1941, with the outbreak of war with Japan, all Atjeh militia and landstorm conscripts (~140 men) were called up at Kotaradja, with the Sabang contingent (~20 men) called up locally. On 17 December 17 December 1941 the Territoriale Staf was moved from Kotaradja to Kabandjahe, and on the same day, on the orders of the Army Command, one full company of infantry was directed from Kotaradja to Sabang. The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was placed under the command of Major Palmer van den Broek, commander of the Korps Maréchaussee, who had been sent to Sabang for the purpose.

The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was now composed of:

  • 2 full infantry companies, amply provided with automatic weapons (machine-gunners were simultaneously flown in from Java).
  • The 2 brigades of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon already stationed at Sabang for police duties.

In February 1942, with the revision of the operational plan agreed with General Overakker, the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang was dissolved. Its bulk (two companies) was moved to Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers, with two brigades left behind at Sabang for police duties. The Sabang city guard was disbanded. The two companies at Kotaradja were used to reinforce the 2de Garnizoensbataljon for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Kotaradja area as the F. beweging sabotage wave intensified.

The Sabang demolition prohibition

Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge, who took command of the residual Sabang detachment on the dissolution of the Oorlogsdetachement, received, before his departure from Sabang, the explicit prohibition of the Territoriaal Commandant against demolishing anything at all. The staff history treats this prohibition as a costly strategic error: as a result, large quantities of oil and aviation fuel, together with an undamaged airfield, later fell into enemy hands. The compilers attribute the prohibition to insufficient time for demolition — that is, to the Territoriaal Commandant’s judgement that any demolition attempt would be incomplete and would risk leaving the installations in a worse state than non-demolition.

The failure to demolish the Sabang installations is the staff history’s principal strategic loss of the pre-invasion period, and the Oorlogsdetachement Sabang’s principal legacy in the staff history’s narrative.

Significance

The Oorlogsdetachement Sabang is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the only Dutch formation of Atjeh specifically designated for war service rather than for the maintenance of order and tranquillity, and the only formation whose commanders received explicit demolition orders. The detachment’s dissolution in February 1942 — and the subsequent failure to demolish the Sabang installations — is presented by the staff history as the principal strategic error of the pre-invasion period, and the principal material gain to the Japanese of the early phase of the invasion. The detachment’s two companies, moved to Kotaradja under Bekkers, would form the bulk of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon’s Kotaradja strength at the time of the Japanese landings.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 121–123, 140–141.