C. J. Bekkers was a lieutenant-colonel of the Netherlands Indies Army who, in July 1941, succeeded Major Palmer van den Broek as commander of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Kotaradja — a post he held through the Japanese invasion of March 1942 — and who, in that capacity, commanded the 2de hoofdgroep of the Dutch northern-Atjeh guerrilla during the retreat from Kotaradja via Seulimeum and Lam Meulo to Tangse and Geumpang. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Bekkers is the central command figure of the noordkust theatre.
Appointment to the 2de Garnizoensbataljon
Bekkers took command of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon in July 1941, when Palmer van den Broek was promoted to command the Korps Maréchaussee. The staff history notes pointedly that Bekkers had not previously served in Atjeh — an absence of Atjeh experience that the compilers implicitly register as a liability. The 2de Garnizoensbataljon at that moment comprised the Kotaradja staff, three companies (with 23 brigades), and the detachments at Lho’Nga (3 brigades) and Seulimeum (4 brigades).
In February 1942 the battalion was reinforced at Kotaradja with the bulk of the dissolved Oorlogsdetachement Sabang (2 companies, with light machine guns), and was charged with the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Kotaradja area as the F. beweging sabotage wave intensified.
The 12 March 1942 retreat from Kotaradja
On the night of 11–12 March 1942, at approximately 01.00, Bekkers received the telephonic report that Japanese landing operations were under way east of Kotaradja. He immediately summoned the company commanders and ordered them to march as soon as possible along the road Kotaradja–Seulimeum–Sigli–Lam Meulo–Tangse. The telephonic connection to the Lho’Nga airfield garrison was broken within five minutes of the landing report. The last Dutch troops left Kotaradja at approximately 07.00 on 12 March 1942.
By the time Bekkers reached Sigli he took command of the Sigli garrison and instructed its commander to remain at Sigli as long as possible and to cover the movement of the main body. He then continued to Tangse and Geumpang, where the IVde divisie Maréchaussee brigades from Lam Meulo and Sigli had been ordered to concentrate.
The “Poort” stelling and the capitulation at Tangse (18 March 1942)
Bekkers’s operational plan placed his troops at the so-called “Poort” — an excavation through a range of hills through which the main road ran, giving access to the Tangse plateau — about halfway between Lam Meulo and Tangse. On 13 March 1942 he rode forward to Lam Meulo to assess the position; he found the garrison already withdrawn without enemy contact, and ordered the Poort to be held.
The troops at the Poort broke on 13 March 13 March at approximately 14.30, when fireworks set off by malicious persons in the vicinity triggered a panic; the troops fled, abandoning their equipment. Bekkers reorganised the troops and appointed a new commander, but morale among these and the other troops had deteriorated sharply, and desertions and the failure to carry out orders occurred repeatedly. On 17 March 17 March the Poort stelling was again abandoned after the Japanese appeared in the rear and flank — guided, the staff history notes, by Atjehnese along unmapped local paths. Captain Deutekom reported from Tangse that the troops there refused to fight unless the corps commander himself was present in the forward line.
On 18 March 18 March Bekkers, citing the very poor morale, a complete lack of fighting spirit, and the betrayal by the Atjehnese, decided to capitulate. The staff history treats the capitulation as forced by the collapse of troop morale rather than by enemy pressure: the Japanese had not yet attacked the Tangse stelling in strength when the surrender was ordered.
Significance
Bekkers’s command is the staff history’s principal case study of the demoralisation that overtook the Dutch garrison troops in the noordkust theatre. The compilers emphasise that he was a new arrival to Atjeh — who had not previously served there — and that his troops, stripped of experienced officers and indigenous reinforcements through 1940–1941, were already inclined to panic before the Japanese appeared. The capitulation at Tangse on 18 March 18 March closed the noordkust theatre ten days before the general capitulation at Blangkedjeren.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- 2de Garnizoensbataljon
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge
- Captain C. A. Deutekom
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- Seulimeum-colonne
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.
C. J. Bekkers was a lieutenant-colonel of the Netherlands Indies Army who, in July 1941, succeeded Major Palmer van den Broek as commander of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Kotaradja — a post he held through the Japanese invasion of March 1942 — and who, in that capacity, commanded the 2de hoofdgroep of the Dutch northern-Atjeh guerrilla during the retreat from Kotaradja via Seulimeum and Lam Meulo to Tangse and Geumpang. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Bekkers is the central command figure of the noordkust theatre.
Appointment to the 2de Garnizoensbataljon
Bekkers took command of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon in July 1941, when Palmer van den Broek was promoted to command the Korps Maréchaussee. The staff history notes pointedly that Bekkers had not previously served in Atjeh — an absence of Atjeh experience that the compilers implicitly register as a liability. The 2de Garnizoensbataljon at that moment comprised the Kotaradja staff, three companies (with 23 brigades), and the detachments at Lho’Nga (3 brigades) and Seulimeum (4 brigades).
In February 1942 the battalion was reinforced at Kotaradja with the bulk of the dissolved Oorlogsdetachement Sabang (2 companies, with light machine guns), and was charged with the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Kotaradja area as the F. beweging sabotage wave intensified.
The 12 March 1942 retreat from Kotaradja
On the night of 11–12 March 1942, at approximately 01.00, Bekkers received the telephonic report that Japanese landing operations were under way east of Kotaradja. He immediately summoned the company commanders and ordered them to march as soon as possible along the road Kotaradja–Seulimeum–Sigli–Lam Meulo–Tangse. The telephonic connection to the Lho’Nga airfield garrison was broken within five minutes of the landing report. The last Dutch troops left Kotaradja at approximately 07.00 on 12 March 1942.
By the time Bekkers reached Sigli he took command of the Sigli garrison and instructed its commander to remain at Sigli as long as possible and to cover the movement of the main body. He then continued to Tangse and Geumpang, where the IVde divisie Maréchaussee brigades from Lam Meulo and Sigli had been ordered to concentrate.
The “Poort” stelling and the capitulation at Tangse (18 March 1942)
Bekkers’s operational plan placed his troops at the so-called “Poort” — an excavation through a range of hills through which the main road ran, giving access to the Tangse plateau — about halfway between Lam Meulo and Tangse. On 13 March 1942 he rode forward to Lam Meulo to assess the position; he found the garrison already withdrawn without enemy contact, and ordered the Poort to be held.
The troops at the Poort broke on 13 March 13 March at approximately 14.30, when fireworks set off by malicious persons in the vicinity triggered a panic; the troops fled, abandoning their equipment. Bekkers reorganised the troops and appointed a new commander, but morale among these and the other troops had deteriorated sharply, and desertions and the failure to carry out orders occurred repeatedly. On 17 March 17 March the Poort stelling was again abandoned after the Japanese appeared in the rear and flank — guided, the staff history notes, by Atjehnese along unmapped local paths. Captain Deutekom reported from Tangse that the troops there refused to fight unless the corps commander himself was present in the forward line.
On 18 March 18 March Bekkers, citing the very poor morale, a complete lack of fighting spirit, and the betrayal by the Atjehnese, decided to capitulate. The staff history treats the capitulation as forced by the collapse of troop morale rather than by enemy pressure: the Japanese had not yet attacked the Tangse stelling in strength when the surrender was ordered.
Significance
Bekkers’s command is the staff history’s principal case study of the demoralisation that overtook the Dutch garrison troops in the noordkust theatre. The compilers emphasise that he was a new arrival to Atjeh — who had not previously served there — and that his troops, stripped of experienced officers and indigenous reinforcements through 1940–1941, were already inclined to panic before the Japanese appeared. The capitulation at Tangse on 18 March 18 March closed the noordkust theatre ten days before the general capitulation at Blangkedjeren.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- 2de Garnizoensbataljon
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- Captain L. P. E. Kloprogge
- Captain C. A. Deutekom
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- Seulimeum-colonne
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.